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1. The War on Terror Continues

Author:
Jytte Klausen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Do jihadist terror organizations still represent a serious threat? If so, do they pose a serious threat to the West? The United States and Europe suffered few attacks during the past decade, and yet more jihadist groups are launching more attacks over a larger portion of the world than ever before. They all trace their origins and allegiances to al-Qaeda and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)...
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Islamic State, War on Terror, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

2. Re-embracing the Wartime Detention Mission

Author:
Ryan J. Vogel
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has made clear his intent to utilize wartime detention in the fight against al-Qaeda and ISIS. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rule of Law and Detainee Policy, William Lietzau, and I have argued elsewhere, this could be a positive development in the United States’ evolving approach to the war against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their associates, so long as it is coupled with a commitment to continuing key detention policies and humane treatment standards developed over the past fifteen years. In recent years, the United States has largely avoided adding to the detainee population at Guantanamo (GTMO) – mainly in reaction to some of the more infamous excesses from the first couple of years after the attacks on September 11, 2001. But failing to capture new enemy fighters has come with an operational and humanitarian cost. The United States should take the opportunity that comes with political transition to re-embrace the wartime detention mission.
Topic:
Government, Human Rights, Law, Prisons/Penal Systems, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Middle East, Global Focus, United States of America, and Guantanamo

3. Pulling Apart at the Seams: How the Smuggling and Narcotics Trade Are Helping to Reshape Governance in the Sahel

Author:
Andrew Lebovich
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The jihadist takeover of northern Mali in mid-2012 caught many regional observers by surprise. For years, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and later the AQIM splinter group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO in French), were seen largely as smugglers, criminals, and “narco-traffickers.” This perception led to a curious process by which some analysts dismissed the risk posed by these groups, while others (chiefly, Western governments) developed a near obsession with the prospect that money from smuggling operations, particularly drugs, would finance jihadist activity in the Sahara and Sahel.[1] While regional experts have since aggressively critiqued the notion of extensive ties between Sahelian militant groups and smuggling, particularly in the narcotics trade,[2] it is nonetheless important to assess the extent of these connections and how they fit into a larger regional context. ​ The purported link between cocaine trade and militant groups gained traction among outside observers due to the appearance of both in northern Mali at approximately the same time. Cocaine first began circulating through and in northern Mali in the early 2000s, while the group that would become AQIM, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), achieved notorious renown in 2003 with the kidnapping of 32 Europeans in southern Algeria. [3] Analysts also focused extensively on cocaine, despite the large circulation through and within the region of cannabis products, amphetamines, and other drugs.[4] However, the rise of smuggling networks and economies in the region long preceded the arrival of jihadist militancy. As anthropologist Judith Scheele and others have noted, smuggling in northern Mali began in the 1960s and 1970s with the trade in foodstuffs, especially powdered milk and pasta produced in Algeria, which was then re-sold in Mali and northern Niger.[5] In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, illicit or semi-licit (grey market) trades emerged, including the smuggling of subsidized petrol from Libya and Algeria into the Sahara, as well as the two-way movement of weapons, counterfeit or contraband cigarettes, and people.[6] This smuggling was itself part of an older process in a region that has always depended on the circulation of people and goods for survival...
Topic:
Crime, Al Qaeda, Borders, Drugs, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Sahara

4. Purveyors of Terror: Counterterrorism in Africa's Failing States

Author:
Thomas Dempsey
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Weak and failing states in Africa continue to offer challenging environments for counterterrorism campaigns in both a military and a civil law enforcement context. Weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in these states offer venues that violent extremist groups continue to exploit as platforms for terrorism. These groups – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are simply two of the more prominent examples – use these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces to recruit new followers, build capability and capacity, and launch new terrorist attacks while avoiding the scrutiny and attention of African security sectors and their international partners. A defining feature of these weakly governed and ungoverned spaces in Africa is the predominance of non-state security actors, including local militias, neighborhood watch organizations, traditional hunting societies, and traditional, customary, or religious justice processes that operate outside of the formal court system. Some of these non-state actors themselves represent violent extremist groups involved in acts of terror. Others play central roles in the mediation of disputes (administration of justice), delivery of police services, or as military surrogates in providing for local defense. I argued in Counterterrorism in African Failed States that collaboration between U.S. military forces and law enforcement agencies is essential to effective counterterrorism interventions in African failed states.[i] Subsequent counterterrorism operations in the region have confirmed that argument, and African senior police and militaryleaders increasingly emphasize the importance of collaboration between military and police forces.[ii] In addition to military forces and law enforcement services, counterterrorism in Africa must effectively address the need for effective partners in the justice sector – prosecutors (and defense counsels), courts, prisons and corrections – in implementing counterterrorism strategies. All three components of counterterrorism strategies must confront the reality that weakly governed and ungoverned spaces are ground zero for counterterrorism on the continent, and that non-state security actors are a defining feature of those spaces. To address the purveyors of terror – in most cases, non-state security actors like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or AQIM in the Sahel – counterterrorism strategies in ungoverned and weakly governed spaces in Africa must address all of the non-state security actors that proliferate in those areas.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:
Africa