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21. Should the EU Pursue a Strategic Ginseng Policy? Trade Dependency in the Brave New World of Geopolitics

Author:
Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Political leaders all over the world are calling for strategic autonomy. The removal of critical trade dependencies has become a guiding principle in most policy proposals, including the EU’s new industrial strategy. In making these decisions, it is important for policymakers to understand the reasons behind why shortages of critical goods and technologies have emerged in the first place. The instruments that new policies cerate should respond to real problems, not invented ones. For instance, if shortages are due to temporary mismatches of supply and demand, most of them will be fixed without the need of any policy intervention. On the other hand, shortages can also be engineered by countries using their dominance in the production of certain goods to coerce other countries. As the EU experienced first-hand after the Russian war on Ukraine in 2022, the concentration of market power in the production of any product carries geopolitical risks. For that purpose, it is crucial to understand the nature of trade dependencies. This policy brief presents indicators and a conceptual framework to measure trade dependency. The framework consists of two indicators: the first measures the share of EU imports from outside the EU over EU production proxied as the sum of imports and exports, while the second indicator considers the market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). It then applies this framework to EU trade with the rest of the world in 2020 and elaborates on the product categories and partner countries behind these dependencies. From a total of more than 9,000 product categories, there were only 233 products that could be classified as dependent within our framework. In terms of values, they represented 1.5% of EU total imports or €50 billion. The major suppliers of these products to the EU were China, United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Imports of hydrocarbons from Russia are part of this list of trade dependencies, but so are many other goods which are not of strategic importance. A policy intervention should be tailored to the specific product and the specific export country. Given the small size of the EU imports in which the EU can be considered dependent, it is not advisable to base Europe’s new industrial policy on a general fear of dependency and apply new policies in many sectors. Many of these products are easy to substitute and the economy can function without them. For the select few products where dependency is an economic concern, our paper explores different measures that the EU can put in place to lower trade dependency and how this dependency can be reduced through international trade.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, and Imports
Political Geography:
Europe

22. After the DMA, the DSA and the New AI regulation: Mapping the Economic Consequences of and Responses to New Digital Regulations in Europe

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Erik van der Marel, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has pursued an ambitious agenda for regulating the digital economy, and it is now planning to establish a new package of regulations, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and a new regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These regulations build on an already established structure of digital and business regulations in Europe that is comparatively restrictive but that varies substantially between EU member states. In this study, we take stock of the new incoming regulations and review their effect on EU member states’ economies. More precisely, the paper considers how different countries in Europe will be affected by the regulations and how they should balance these effects with policies that help the economy to prosper. The European Commission’s economic analyses and impact assessments of the new regulations are thin. In fact, they are grossly inadequate for the purpose at hand: to better understand how the economy will change because of these regulations. The Commission identifies some benefits – for instance, positive competition outcomes from reduced network effects and more trust in AI-based goods and services. There are good reasons to think that these benefits are real. However, these regulations will also lead to new costs and have broader consequences for firms and resource allocation in the economy. Remarkably, the only costs identified in the impact assessments are direct compliance and administrative costs. Obviously, for far-reaching regulations such as the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, the main costs will not be the direct compliance burden, but the dynamic and downstream economic effects spurred by their implementation. This is because these regulations will prompt firms and markets to change their current and future behaviour: these changes are likely to define the most important costs. Furthermore, it is important to get a better idea of the distribution of these costs. It is highly unlikely that all sectors and countries will be affected equally. Some sectors will be more affected than others just as some countries will experience economic consequences that are bigger than in other countries. The question is: what factors will lead to the expected variation in the costs and consequences of the three new regulations? In this paper, we argue that two factors are important for grasping the distributive patterns of costs from digital regulations. First, the industry structure of a country is key. In the economy, countries have different endowment structures, and the modern European economy is defined by factor endowments such as data and digital competences. These factor endowments are exploited in the economy by firms and organisations that use them to create different comparative advantages. In turn, these advantages influence how a firm and a country market, sell and trade. Second, the existing structure of a country’s business and digital regulations will influence how an economy will respond to new and additional digital regulations. In fact, the restrictiveness of regulations that we know to impact on the digital economy vary substantially in the European Union – both between countries and between sectors. This variation will have consequences for the distribution of the costs of the three new regulations that are going to be implemented. This paper maps countries and country groups in the digital economy: their endowments, advantages, and flows. Especially, it evaluates the digital performance of countries in a number of key indicators and data points, and anchors the analysis in the academic literature. The paper points to some specific consequences of the DMA, the DSA and the AI regulation, and how different regulations will affect endowments structures and advantages. One key finding is that the distributive effects of the regulations will depend on size advantages and disadvantages. In short, small economies and small firms will likely carry a disproportionate part of the cost of new digital regulations. Furthermore, countries that have used their endowments to specialise in the digital economy will be more affected than others. On this score, there is a vast difference between EU countries. For instance, countries in Europe’s North – generally small, competitive, and open economies – will be most affected by these new regulatory burdens. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe will also be negatively affected, especially through risks of market exclusion effects for small firms. It is important for European policymakers to now consider how they can avoid that these new digital regulations continuously reinforce size advantages for big economies and big firms. There are some policy strategies that should be considered. First, regulations can be changed to better fit the overwhelming evidence that young, dynamic, and innovative firms drive a substantial part of productivity growth in the economy. Second, EU and national policymakers can pursue policies that make the transition into a more size-balanced economy easier, for instance by taxing and regulating small firms differently. Smaller economies can also be helped by having corporate taxes that are lower than in big economies. Third, EU and national policymakers can reform other digital and business regulations and make them less burdensome. Fourth, the EU can help to support the build-up of digital advantages in smaller economies.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

23. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

24. A Compass to Guide EU Policy in Support of Business Competitiveness

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU agenda for improving competitiveness is missing in action. Economic competitiveness has been a central plank in the development of the European Union – a relentless quest for policies that lead to more prosperity and that make European companies in world markets more successful. However, since the end of the Lisbon Agenda in 2010, economic competitiveness seems to have fallen off the EU map. This Agenda had its flaws, but it rightly sought to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-economy in the world”. The impression now is that Europe is on the retreat and the current European Commission is the first without a strategy to strengthen competitiveness at the EU level since the early 1990s. Hopefully, a course correction may now be on its way. Ursula von der Leyen has promised a “competitiveness check” on new EU policy. With the strong economic headwinds facing Europe and the world, the EU needs to pursue structural economic reforms that raise productivity and growth.
Topic:
European Union, Business, Regional Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

25. China’s Public Procurement Protectionism and Europe’s Response: The Case of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Anna Guildea, Oscar Guinea, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper concerns China’s market for medical technologies and how the Chinese state is assisting its own companies to gain greater sales at the expense of producers from Europe and other advanced manufacturing economies. The medical technology sector captures a variety of products, services and solutions which are essential to the provision of healthcare to citizens. Examples range from fairly simple technologies such as sticking platers, to complex ones, such as coronary stents, orthopaedics and pacemakers. In the last decades, Europe’s exports of medical devices to China have grown robustly. On the back of vibrant innovation, firms from Europe and elsewhere have not just followed the growth of Chinese demand for medical devices – they have also increased their share of Chinese imports. Now, however, this market is at risk of being gradually closed off for European firms as China doubles down on various policies that advantage local firms, while ultimately harming innovation and Chinese patients. China has recently introduced a new element in its industrial policy for its medical technology sector – a policy that builds on its long-term ‘made-in-China’ ambition to have local firms taking up the lion’s share of the market for medical devices by 2030. Beijing and provincial governments are using many different policies to provide support to the domestic industry and are in effect pursuing a policy for import substitution. Accessing the Chinese market for medical devices has never been easy but it has become increasingly challenging in recent years. Direct financial support, tax benefits, R&D support, local content requirements, opaque approval systems and other forms of advantages to domestic MedTech producers are now becoming major sources for the behaviour and development of the Chinese medical device market. China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and the country’s new economic model of ‘dual circulation’ reinforces this trend. The Chinese market is becoming less open. Added to that is centralised state procurement – a new public procurement policy in China that was launched in 2019 for medical devices which has led to a grossly distorted procurement market. While this policy has reduced the price of medical devices in a drastic way, it has also paved the way for Chinese firms to take up a larger market share. This procurement policy is gradually squeezing European firms out of the Chinese market. Competition in China is becoming less fair. These policies follow a pattern. In several sectors, Chinese firms have grown their domestic market share through industrial subsidies and policies that restrict market access for foreign firms – or make it more difficult for foreign firms to compete in China. From their domestic market, these firms have then expanded abroad and taken a more prominent role outside of China. Backed by the Chinese state, these firms can squeeze market opportunities even more for otherwise-competitive European producers. Now this development is happening in the MedTech sector. It is urgent for Europe to respond to China’s procurement protectionism. MedTech manufacturers in Europe are often small and medium-sized enterprises, and they already struggle with getting into the Chinese market. China’s new procurement policy has also had a significant impact on Chinese imports of medical devices: a 1.3 billion euro trade deficit for China in medical technology products in 2019 turned into a 5.2 billion euro surplus in 2020. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, competitive European manufacturers are now confronted with competition from Chinese MedTech companies that have the backing of the Chinese state. The competitive distortions in the Chinese market now spill over to the global market – making European MedTech manufacturers even more disadvantaged. Europe should consider a case at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against China’s policies which reduce European market presence for medical devices. Once agreed, a new International Procurement Initiative might be a useful instrument to wield pressure against the Chinese government to agree to free and fair competition. Europe can also negotiate with China – for instance in the framework of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) or through the new initiative on trade and health that Europe proposed to the Ottawa Group in 2020. These responses should focus both on remedying China’s current policy for growing its domestic medical technology industry by distorting its market and setting out the core policies and rules that should guide the future market for medical technologies. Fredrik Erixon and Anna Guildea are Director and Research Associate, respectively, at ECIPE. Oscar Guinea and Philipp Lamprecht are Senior Economists at ECIPE. The authors are grateful to a number of experts in the private sector and from the European Commission, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology that have taken their time to share their knowledge with us.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, European Union, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

26. EU and Mercosur in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Stock of the Economic and Cultural Ties

Author:
Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the latest developments in the EU-Mercosur economic relationship and outlines the existing non-economic relationship in order to contextualise the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement and its potential for strengthening common bonds between both regions. Trade between the EU and Mercosur is significant, with both regions holding an important place as large markets for each other’s exports. Currently, trade between the two is dominated by trade in machinery, agriculture, and chemicals. As relevant as these traditional sectors are, their trade is also increasingly supported by trade in services, which unlike trade in traditional agricultural products such as soya, beef and sugar that are either stable or declining, is rapidly increasing. In addition to trade, EU and Mercosur economic bonds are also supported by investments. EU member states hold a large stock of investment in the Mercosur countries while investment flows from Mercosur into the EU are also increasing. This increase has been particularly marked in high-tech sectors like R&D and computer software, emphasising again the changing economic relationship between the EU and Mercosur from traditional to advanced sectors. These trade and investment dynamics are complemented by changes in the EU-Mercosur supply chains. Over the past ten years, the effects one region has on the competitiveness of the other have increased and will continue to do so into the future. The EU is the largest contributor to Mercosur exports, meanwhile Mercosur countries provide the biggest value-added to EU agricultural products. A primary underlying trend found across all dimensions of the EU-Mercosur economic relationship has been the rise of China. In trade, it takes two to tango, and since 2015, it has been China, rather than the EU, that has risen to become Mercosur’s main trading partner. Over the past nine years, the amount of Chinese value-added embedded in Mercosur exports has more than tripled. Moreover, China has ramped up its investment into Mercosur countries, while also receiving increased investments from Mercosur. So, although the EU-Mercosur relationship is changing and bonds have deepened, the EU faces constant competition from China in its relationship with Mercosur. Despite these changes, the EU and Mercosur share a long history of close non-economic relationships. Both have been at the receiving end of large migration flows from each other. This has led to the development of kindred cultures, shared languages, and strong non-economic ties. These similarities have long supported the establishment of deep economic bonds through meaningful collaborations in science and technology, ease of doing business, and provisions for working professionals through various cooperation agreements. However, with the rapidly changing nature of their commercial relationship, these cultural links might not be enough to sustain the economic relationship between the two. These ties need to be complemented by the ratification of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement to nurture their changing relationship.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Trade, South American Union (UNASUR), and Mercosur
Political Geography:
Europe and South America