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1. The Future of European Digital Competitiveness

Author:
Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi’s recent report on Europe’s competitiveness lays bare the negative effects of overregulation in the EU economy and the underperformance of its digital sector. However, Draghi failed to draw connections between these two phenomena. The future of Europe’s competitiveness is inextricably linked to the future of its digital economy. Unfortunately, the economic contribution of Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector remains significantly smaller than that of the US ICT sector to the US economy. There are well-known reasons behind this divergence. Chief among them is the lack of sufficient investment in Europe’s intangible and tangible assets. Regulation, particularly those regulations governing the digital economy, has emerged as a key factor that restricts Europe’s usage of digital technologies and hinders subsequent productivity growth. The EU now has nearly 100 tech-focused laws, comprising thousands of pages, provisions, and restrictions. This must change. The EU should develop a joint plan for digitalisation and competitiveness. This plan should build upon Europe’s comparative advantages: openness, strong institutions, the rule of law, robust intellectual property protections, and high levels of human capital. Above all, the EU must recognise that, while protecting consumer rights, EU policies and regulations must also prioritise the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT sector and promote the widespread adoption of digital technologies across the entire EU economy.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Quantum Technology: A Policy Primer for EU Policymakers

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Oscar du Roy, and Andrea Dugo
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Quantum technology is rapidly emerging as a transformative force with the potential to reshape industries ranging from finance and pharmaceuticals to automotive and aerospace. In 2024 alone, investments in quantum technology reached over USD 56 billion. Its development, however, presents unique geopolitical challenges, stemming from its applications in defence and encryption, as well as its power to unsettle established comparative advantages and market specialisations across countries. Against this backdrop, an open and collaborative approach to quantum innovation is critical for maximising the benefits of this technology. Countries perform more effectively in quantum technology when they support cross-border collaborations and market specialisation. Firms producing quantum hardware or software solutions can sell to a range of industrial users who, in turn, integrate these cutting-edge systems into goods and services. Such synergy reduces the overall risks and costs of R&D, as different partners share both the financial burden and any uncertainties related to the commercial viability of quantum applications. Moreover, collaboration fosters a wider diffusion of quantum technologies. As firms specialising in quantum computing, communication, or sensing deepen their expertise, their insights permeate adjacent sectors through the shared knowledge enabled by joint collaborations. Conversely, restrictive policies that limit interaction between domestic and foreign firms risk stifling innovation. Self-reliance strategies reduce opportunities for knowledge-sharing, limit the pool of potential partners, and ultimately slow the pace of quantum breakthroughs. This operating framework supports the current EU approach to quantum technology, which emphasises openness and encourages a higher number of collaborations between EU and non-EU companies. This approach is grounded in economic realities: the EU ranks second only to the US in terms of the number of companies and collaborations between firms and it thrives on partnering with non-EU countries as the number of collaborations with companies outside the EU far exceeds the number of collaborations within the EU.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Digital Policy, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in Europe

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, Elena Sisto, Oscar du Roy, Renata Zilli, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to better understand the growth of mass litigation in the European Union (EU) and its economic consequences. European authorities have long encouraged consumers to seek redress through private litigation in European competition law and, more recently, they have shifted their focus towards collective actions in a broad range of areas, including data privacy and product liability. Facilitating access to justice through collective actions is not a cost-free option. Unfortunately, there is a lack of economic analysis on the consequences of an increase in collective action cases in the EU. It is crucial to understand the economic consequences of a “mixed regime” – that is, a regime based on both ex-ante public enforcement through regulation and ex-post enforcement through private litigation. The combination of these two enforcement models raises questions about how the system is intended to work together and what the consequences might be for the economy. This study examines the economic implications of these developments in the EU.
Topic:
Law, European Union, Regulation, Regional Economy, and Litigation
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Models of Industrial Policy: Driving Innovation and Economic Growth

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s approach to industrial policy has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years, with state aid reaching 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2022, levels unseen since the early 1990s. While advocates of substantial state aid argue that this intervention is necessary to maintain competitiveness in a world where the US and China are implementing large-scale industrial strategies, the effectiveness of this approach remains contested. This paper critically examines the evolution of EU industrial policy, contrasting it with alternative models adopted globally and within Europe itself. While EU economic strategies since the 1980s had focused mainly on horizontal policies such as market liberalisation, competition enforcement and support to Research and Development (R&D), recent developments have shifted towards a more interventionist stance. This shift has largely been driven by crises – the financial crisis of 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, and the energy transition – which have prompted calls for greater state involvement in shaping industrial outcomes. However, this paper shows that, while industrial policy can support good economic development, it is not a determinant of economic success. All successful economies have pursued industrial policy, but so have all unsuccessful ones. This suggests that industrial policy, in and of itself, is not a determinant of economic growth and competitiveness. The effectiveness of industrial policy depends on its design, its ability to avoid market distortions, and its capacity to stimulate genuine private-sector investment rather than crowding it out. The revival of industrial policy in the EU – best exemplified by a series of high-level reports, including the Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi Reports of 2024 – signals a shift towards an industrial strategy that embraces state aid as a central tool for economic restructuring. Unlike earlier EU economic strategies that prioritised the deepening of the Single Market as the best form of industrial policy, recent proposals advocate for a relaxation of state aid rules to enable greater public subsidies for European industries. The rationale is that the EU must respond to global competitors who are no longer playing by the rules of free trade. As documented in this study, across a diverse range of EU countries, sectors, and policy targets, the prevailing industrial policy model in Europe consistently prioritises a selection of incumbent firms over the private sector as a whole, direct grants over other policy instruments, middle-technology sectors over high-tech ones. This paper argues that such an approach will not generate the desired outcome and assesses its shortcomings to encourage careful review by policymakers before Europe embarks on more of the same. In search of other policy solutions, this paper contrasts the broad European model of industrial policy with other approaches, particularly those of the US, South Korea, Switzerland, and Ireland, which offer, in different fields, alternative frameworks for fostering industrial competitiveness. These models are attractive because they respond to specific and growing problems in the EU economy that public policy can help to alleviate: low levels of investment, declining inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), lagging R&D-based innovation, and problems supplying industry with adequate human capital.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Collective Action in the Netherlands: Why It Matters for the Transposition of the Product Liability Directive

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief explores the implications of the Netherlands’ transposition of the new EU Product Liability Directive (PLD), focusing on its interaction with the Dutch collective action system. As one of the first EU countries to implement PLD and a key hub for mass litigation, the Netherlands offers a compelling case study. Features such as low claim thresholds, opt-out mechanisms, flexible settlements, limited cost-shifting, and the ease of creating litigation-backed entities make the Netherlands particularly attractive for mass claims, reinforcing its reputation as a “litigation magnet.” The new PLD simplifies liability claims, broadens the definition of “product” to include software, digital files, and related services, lowers evidentiary thresholds, extends liability to third-party actions such as cyberattacks, and includes post-market defects. These provisions, combined with the Netherlands’ collective redress regime, are expected to drive a rise in mass litigation. This rise poses particular economic risks for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s most digitised economies. Ranked sixth in digital adoption by Eurostat’s Digital Intensity Index, Dutch firms – especially in finance, insurance, ICT, and manufacturing – may also face growing exposure to collective actions under the PLD, which extends liability across the entire value chain. These sectors account for 27 percent of the value added in the Dutch market economy and are widely recognised as key drivers of economic growth. Increased legal uncertainty may also reduce the Netherlands’ attractiveness to multinational corporations, threatening levels of foreign direct investment and employment, both essential pillars of the Dutch economy. Growing mass litigation may also hinder innovation by redirecting R&D resources toward legal risk management. This is particularly concerning for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s top R&D investors. Drawing on US evidence, large-scale litigation can significantly erode market capitalisation, and based on our estimates, the cumulative loss in value for 31 Dutch companies featured in the EU R&D Scoreboard could reach €5.5 billion under the high-growth scenario. Such declines could impact household wealth, as Dutch households save approximately 14.6 percent of their gross disposable income, of which 20 percent is invested in equity. Pension funds, which also play a central role in Dutch long-term savings, can also hold significant stakes in publicly traded Dutch companies. As a result, the effects of collective actions on the market value of Dutch companies extend beyond corporate balance sheets, posing potential negative consequences for Dutch savers, as well as current and future pensioners. This report was commissioned by the European Justice Forum, a coalition of businesses, individuals and organisations that are working to build fair, balanced, transparent and efficient civil justice laws and systems for both consumers and businesses in Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Litigation, and Liability
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands

6. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Finance, and Litigation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

7. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Regulating the Working Conditions of Platform Work: What Can We Learn from EU Member States?

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Elena Sisto, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Policymakers in Estonia, France, Greece, and Spain share the common objective of enhancing the working conditions of platform workers. However, variations in their labour markets, legal frameworks, and political landscapes have led to four distinct approaches in achieving this goal. Predominantly, the Spanish regulation has been geared towards attempting to reclassify platform workers from self-employed to employees. In contrast, the regulatory strategies in France and Greece have focused on retaining the sector within the realm of independent work, while simultaneously improving the working conditions of platform workers. Estonia adopted a broader perspective, emphasising the enhancement of working conditions for all freelancers, not exclusively those categorised as platform workers. This Policy Brief offers a comprehensive evaluation and comparison of the regulatory frameworks governing platform work in four European countries. The comparative analysis draws upon research conducted by the OECD and the World Economic Forum (WEF) on the principles of good regulation. Adapting this research to the context of digital platforms, three key principles for assessing the regulation of working conditions on these platforms were identified: (i) the consistency with the policy objective of improving the working conditions of platform workers; (ii) the feasibility of implementing the regulatory requirements; (iii) the presence of regulatory dialogue and appeal mechanisms. The evaluation of the four countries’ regulations against the three outlined principles offers valuable insights into the regulation of platform work. In Spain, the primary aim of the regulation regarding platform workers was not solely the improvement of working conditions but predominantly the reclassification of platform workers from self-employed to employees. This distinction is crucial, as platform workers highly value the benefits of self-employment, such as access to work, income opportunities, flexibility, and autonomy. Evidence presented in this study suggests that a majority of Spanish delivery workers preferred to maintain their self-employed status, while only about one-third expressed a desire to be classified as employees. Moreover, the Spanish regulation is characterised by a broad formulation of the conditions defining employment for digital delivery workers. This lack of specificity has led to an uncertain application of the regulation, with digital platforms adopting diverse strategies to achieve compliance. Ultimately, the Spanish regulatory framework has been marred by a profound disregard for the interests of, and a notable lack of communication with, those directly impacted by the regulation: the digital platforms and the platform workers. Greece has demonstrated that it is possible to enhance working conditions for platform workers while preserving the advantages of self-employment. The Greek regulation mandates that digital platforms adhere to the same welfare, health, and safety obligations for platform workers as they would for employees. Additionally, Greece has established clear criteria to define the presumption of self-employment for platform workers. This clarity offers legal certainty and enabled platform workers to accurately assess their employment status. Consequently, there has been a notable reduction in court cases regarding the classification of platform workers. France has progressively developed a comprehensive legal framework that has systematically enhanced the rights of platform workers. This development culminated in six pivotal agreements, addressing some of the most challenging aspects of working conditions on digital platforms, such as account deactivation and minimum revenue. These agreements were reached under the auspices of the Autorité des Relations Sociales des Plateformes d’Emploi (ARPE), a public entity instrumental in facilitating effective social dialogue between digital platforms and trade unions. The establishment of clear administrative procedures governing the negotiations within ARPE has been crucial in formulating measures that digital platforms can effectively implement. Estonia’s primary focus is on ensuring adequate working conditions for all freelancers, including platform workers. A considerable number of platform workers in Estonia engage in a contract-for-services (töövõtuleping) with digital platforms. This contract offers a social safety net, including unemployment benefits, sick pay, and healthcare services, while retaining the self-employed status of platform workers. Moreover, this framework provides clarity regarding the rights and responsibilities of both platform workers and digital platforms, facilitating the implementation of a clear and unambiguous regulatory system.
Topic:
Labor Issues, European Union, Regulation, Digital Economy, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Calling on the EU-US Trade and Technology Council: How to Deliver for the Planet and the Economy

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Vanika Sharma, Philipp Lamprecht, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This Policy Brief proposes the establishment of an agreement on conformity assessment between the EU and the US that covers machinery and electrical equipment. The initiative aims to increase the number of European and US conformity assessment bodies authorized to test and certify EU and US machinery and electrical equipment for exports into each other’s markets, without recognizing the equivalency or otherwise altering the product requirements in regulation, standards, or other normative documents on either side. While this study focuses on the economic effects of an agreement on conformity assessment that includes machinery and electrical equipment, the scope of such an agreement could potentially be extended to several additional product categories, particularly those that are subject to requirements for mandatory third-party conformity assessment in both the EU and the US. The increase in the number of conformity assessment bodies is expected to reduce the costs and the time required to demonstrate conformity. If this policy succeeds as expected in achieving a reduction in trade costs between 2 and 6 percent, US exports to the EU are projected to increase between US$ 11 billion and US$ 32.5 billion while EU exports to the US are estimated to grow by between US$ 13.8 billion and US$ 42.2 billion. In percentage terms, US firms are anticipated to experience a larger increase in exports of machinery and electrical equipment than their EU counterparts. The increase in trade flows as a result of this agreement is estimated to be larger than the rise in trade flows achieved in other Free Trade Agreements signed by the EU or the US. Moreover, as an increasing number of EU regulations begin to mandate third-party conformity assessment, US firms will increasingly benefit from this agreement when exporting to the EU. Given China’s status as the largest supplier of machinery and electrical equipment to both the EU and the US, the implementation of an EU-US agreement on conformity assessment would not only improve conditions for transatlantic trade but also lead to reduced trade dependence for the EU and the US on China. The reduction in trade costs between the EU and the US on machinery and electrical equipment due to the agreement could lower Chinese exports to the EU and the US by between US$ 6.5 billion and US$ 19.4 billion. Importantly, machinery and electrical equipment are crucial inputs for some of the key technologies in which the EU and the US Administrations have identified trade dependencies on China. However, in contrast with other policies aimed at reducing reliance on Chinese imports, an agreement on conformity assessment for machinery and electrical equipment will not require public subsidies or impose any financial burden on taxpayers. This agreement also has the potential to benefit the environment. Machinery and electrical equipment are essential inputs for green technologies. Therefore, a reduction in the cost and time of conformity assessment in these industries will accelerate the adoption of green technologies. An agreement on conformity assessment between the EU and the US covering green goods and clean technologies could increase transatlantic exports between US$ 3.1 billion and US$ 9.2 billion. While this increase in exports is significant, broadening the scope of the agreement to include the entirety of machinery and electrical equipment, rather than just a subset, is projected to lead to trade effects eight times larger. Moreover, as green technologies rapidly evolve, an agreement on conformity assessment has the potential to serve as a dynamic instrument that evolves to accommodate future regulatory and economic developments on climate and the environment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

10. Trading Up: An EU Trade Policy for Better Market Access and Resilient Sourcing

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Oscar du Roy, Elena Sisto, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s competitiveness could be substantially improved by a trade policy that facilitates more trade and other forms of cross-border exchange. The evidence is clear: the EU trades less with the rest of the world than would be expected given the size of its economy. With 85 percent of global growth happening outside of the EU – and with an increasing share of all new technologies, innovations, patents, human capital, and R&D expenditure emerging in other parts of the world than Europe – the EU needs to find better ways to integrate with international markets. It is now becoming urgent for the EU to revive its international trade policy. Europe’s increasing detachment from global markets lead to two major economic concerns: deteriorating market access and less capability to build economic resilience. Market access can be defined as an export challenge, as EU firms face increasing trade barriers that hinder their ability to sell products and services abroad. These barriers ultimately limit the EU’s ability to scale up production, specialise, and increase R&D spending. Economic resilience is an import challenge. To become more resilient, the EU must diversify its sources of supply, particularly for critical raw materials, and secure a stable and frictionless access to foreign high-end goods, services, and technologies. The next five years present a critical opportunity for the EU to address the challenges limiting the contribution of international trade to EU’s competitiveness. This Policy Brief outlines seven trade policy recommendations that tackle the lack of market access and address the need for economic resilience. These policy recommendations are there for the EU to take: they are realistic and achievable. The EU has the power to make these seven policy recommendations a reality.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe