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51. Taking Stock of 2023 and Looking Ahead to 2024: How to Combine Realism with Hope?

Author:
Center on International Cooperation
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The final months of 2023 were extraordinarily grim. The world had already weathered four years of repeated crises. The horrific attack on Israel carried out by Hamas on October 7 has resulted in a response by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) that has ignored all norms of international humanitarian and human rights law. This has resulted in an estimated 20,000+ deaths to date. CIC’s annual 2023-2024 analysis outlines takeaways from the previous year and key trends for the new year. Notably, it delves into major global conflicts impacting international peace, lesser-known trends, and economic disparities. Additionally, it explores prospects for 2024, including potential peace breakthroughs and advancements in revamping outdated multilateral approaches. In Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel, and the appalling suffering caused by Israel’s attempt to wipe out Hamas in Gaza, it is evident that double standards have been applied in matters concerning human rights and that, despite the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, societies still struggle to recognize the common humanity of their adversaries. At the same time, crises in other regions and long-term challenges, such as debt and socioeconomic pressures, struggle to garner any attention. This has spurred visceral political responses in many countries, turning inward and perhaps “sleepwalking” toward greater global catastrophe, as we have seen in the past in less interconnected times.
Topic:
Conflict, Peacebuilding, Russia-Ukraine War, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

52. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

53. Why the Biden Cease-fire Proposal Will Not End the Gaza War Despite UN Approval

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The proposal that the Biden administration attributes to Israel does not promise an end to the war, much less Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. While claiming to support the proposal, Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserts that “we have maintained the goals of the war, first of them the destruction of Hamas.” Is this consistent with the proposal? It is. How?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Hamas, Ceasefire, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

54. The Impact of the War in Gaza on Israel-Jordan Cooperation

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities. The war in Gaza has cast a dark shadow over the promising water and energy cooperation projects between Jordan and Israel. Water and energy are among the most economically and politically sensitive sectors in contemporary Jordan due to the country’s chronic water shortage and the difficulty of securing energy sources for local use. Jordan imports more than 96 percent of its energy needs, with an annual import bill exceeding $3 billion, according to official statistics. The Gaza war has had a direct impact on Jordanian public opinion, with increasing demands that the country withdraws from all its commitments, treaties, and agreements with Israel and halt all forms of cooperation. So far, however, it appears these demands have disrupted only one project, Project Prosperity—or energy for water agreement—which is sponsored by the United Arab Emirates with U.S. approval. Although the project has been suspended, it will likely resume after the war ends, since both parties have an interest in this type of cooperation. Indeed, despite the current tensions, this type of coordination is almost inevitable given the respective situations of both countries, and as one of the most important means of interconnection and networking that can help mitigate armed crises and conflicts between them.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Water, Public Opinion, Energy, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Jordan

55. Egypt Polling Shows Rise in Positive Views of Hamas; Iran-Backed Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood Remain Unpopular

Author:
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians. Arecent public opinion survey of Egyptian citizens, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in November/December by a regional commercial firm, revealed that after years of adopting a negative view towards Hamas, three-quarters of Egyptians now view the movement positively, demonstrating the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on Egyptian public opinion. The majority of Egyptians continue to reject ties with Israel and Israelis, while Iran’s proxies remain unpopular, while the majority of Egyptians believe that the United States can put an end to the war in Gaza. Regarding the United States’ role in the ongoing war in Gaza, the current poll showed that more than three-quarters of Egyptians agreed that “the U.S. is still in the best position to help end the war in Gaza, even if I disagree with its policies.” However, Egyptians are currently divided on the proposition that “We cannot count on the U.S. these days, so we should look more to other nations like Russia or China as partners.” While 57% of Egyptians agreed with this proposition, 42% disagreed. In terms of the role that Arab countries should play in the ongoing conflict, the current poll showed mixed views. A significant majority of Egyptians (97%) demanded that Arab states take a tough stand against Israel and “immediately sever all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Yet although not unanimous, over two thirds (69%) of Egyptians likewise agreed that “Arab governments should take a more active role in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, offering both sides incentives to take more moderate positions.” Moreover, an overwhelming majority (96%) of Egyptians believed that their country should provide more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even if that requires some practical coordination with Israel. Notably, while Hamas has experienced a surge of popularity—in line with significant jumps among other Arab publics polled—these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The current Egyptian government finds both the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its Palestinian offshoot threatening to domestic politics. For almost eight years, since the release of the Fall 2015 poll results, where Hamas received negative scores, the majority of Egyptians demonstrated a negative attitude towards Hamas. In contrast, the current poll shows that three-quarters of Egyptians view Hamas positively, while less than a quarter hold a negative view. Likewise, the large majority expressed agreement with the view that the war in
Topic:
Public Opinion, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Polls, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, and Egypt

56. How Washington Emboldened the Houthis

Author:
Noam Raydan and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Greater decisiveness would have shortened the conflict, lessened the toll on global maritime trade, and reassured U.S. partners in the region and beyond. Since the Houthis launched their assault on global shipping in November, the United States and its partners have scrambled for ways to restore calm and commerce to the Red Sea. First, on December 18, Washington assembled a maritime coalition designed to boost the U.S. presence in the area and promote regional security. Then, in January, the United States started intercepting Iranian military shipments bound for the Houthis and issued multiple warnings to the group. Finally, after nearly two months of continuous attacks in the Red Sea, the United States and the United Kingdom launched a barrage of strikes against the Houthis’ facilities. But these attacks have not halted or seemingly slowed the onslaught. The group has continued to lob missiles and drones, prompting continued strikes by Washington and its allies...
Topic:
Maritime, Houthis, Shipping, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

57. Israel and the ICJ: Comparing International Court Cases During the Gaza War

Author:
Alexander Loengarov
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The current cycle of legal actions involving Israel is unprecedented in scope and politicization, but governments are still better off engaging with the process and lodging their objections there than dismissing it outright. On July 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will deliver an advisory opinion on the “legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” The opinion was requested by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) more than a year and a half ago—well before the Gaza war broke out—in the context of efforts to increase awareness of the Palestinian issue at various international forums, as well as more specific concerns about escalating “tensions and violence” with Israel. The timing of this week’s opinion might seem incongruous given how much has taken place since it was first requested in January 2023. Yet it is in keeping with a wartime trend in which more new cases are being brought before international courts, and pending cases are being rekindled and amplified. Distinguishing between these cases is instructive.
Topic:
Genocide, International Law, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

58. Tackling the proxy problem: Mitigating the threat posed by Iran's "Axis of Resistance"

Author:
Alex Vatanka, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, and Sabri Ates
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza has revealed much about the relationships Iran maintains with its proxy forces across the region, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iraq. While the various militant groups in the “Axis of Resistance” all receive support from the Islamic Republic, each has its own objectives and strategic focus, a point underlined by the Houthis’ emergence as a key new regional player. The group has fired on commercial ships, attacked military vessels, and shut down maritime traffic on one of the world’s most significant trade arteries. If the situation escalates, Iran-backed groups could unleash far greater havoc, both within the region and well beyond its borders. What steps can the US and its partners take now to ensure that additional Iranian-supported forces do not join the Gaza conflict? And how can Iran’s proxies be deterred from acting to help de-escalate tensions across the region? And what, if anything, can Washington do to change the strategic calculations in Tehran?
Topic:
Proxy Groups, Axis of Resistance, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria

59. Silencing the guns: Bringing the war in Gaza to a sustainable end

Author:
Brian Katulis, Khaled Elgindy, and James F. Hollifield
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
More than six months on from Hamas’ brutal attack on Oct. 7, the war in Gaza shows few signs of slowing down. In the devastated coastal strip tens of thousands have died, over a million are internally displaced, aid delivery remains exceedingly difficult, and famine is beginning to spread. Meanwhile, other than a brief, two-week pause that expired in December, repeated efforts to negotiate another cease-fire have failed. US, Egyptian, and Qatari diplomats have been hard at work for half a year, but over 130 hostages remain in captivity with no real indication of how many are still alive. Rising tensions between Israel and Iran are only likely to exacerbate the situation, with unpredictable consequences. How can the US and its regional and international partners help bring the war to a sustainable end? What does Washington want the region to look like after the dust settles? And what steps must it take to reach that goal?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

60. American diplomacy toward Lebanon with Amb. David Hale

Author:
David Hale and Fadi Nicholas Nassar
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Ambassador David Hale joins MEI's US-Lebanon Fellow Fadi Nicholas Nassar to discuss his book American Diplomacy Toward Lebanon: Lessons in Foreign Policy and the Middle East. They cover takeaways from his time as ambassador and the state of US-Lebanon and regional diplomacy following the Gaza war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Australia and Lebanon