Search

Begin New Search Topic Russia-Ukraine War Publication Year within 1 Year

11. Between the Baltic and the Balkans, the new geopolitics of gas

Author:
Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On December 31, 2024, the gas transit agreement signed in 2019 between the Ukrainian grid operator and Russia expired. As the Ukrainian government had refused to negotiate a renewal of the agreement in advance, gas flows to European markets were suspended. Announced several months ago, Ukraine's opposition to extend its gas transit agreement with Russia (Kyiv is now self-sufficient in gas) marks a new stage in the reshaping of Central Europe's natural gas geography. This process was initiated in the early 1990s and gathered pace with the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia halted gas exports via the Nord Stream pipeline and via Belarus in the summer of 2022, and flows through Ukraine were significantly reduced before ceasing altogether. Since January 1st 2025, only the Turk Stream pipeline supplies European countries with Russian gas by land. Central Europe has been particularly hard hit by the gas crisis that started in 2022. Gas plays an important role in this region, not least because of the need for heating and the importance of the manufacturing sector in the region's economies. Gas production is growing slightly in Hungary, Poland and, above all, Romania. But the volumes extracted make only a modest contribution to the region's energy security. Moreover, several central European countries have for several decades enjoyed transit fee revenues. Finally, most of them are landlocked or have short coastlines. All of these factors make Central Europe a unique region. Added to this is the legacy of the Communist period, when energy policies favoured coal, and for which gas is now a often seen as an alternative. In this particular context, energy flows between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea are changing. This is reflected not only in a contraction of flows from Russia, but also in an intensification of north-south or south-north flows, and a growing interdependence between the states of the region, as well as with certain member states of the European Union.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Gas, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Balkans, Central Europe, and Baltic States

12. Russia’s Deterrence Strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:
Miguel Paradela López
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The article analyzes the two-part strategy Russia developed to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. First, the country helped to weaken Armenia’s position in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidate Azerbaijan’s. Second, the Russian military deployed peacekeeping troops to the border of the two countries to stabilize the conflict, deter any new Azeri military advance in the region and improve the Russian influence in the Caucasus. Although this strategy was initially successful, as it increased Russia’s military capacity in the region, the unexpected complications Russia experienced during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 severely weakened its role as peacekeeper and deterrence power. Russia’s involvement in a highly demanding conflict has led to considerable suffering, increased international pressure, and a deteriorated perception of its military power, precluding it from deterring the expansion of a Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia’s deterring capacity failed as it was uncapable of sending a credible threat to Azerbaijan and this country could achieve historic goals in the region. Consequently, Russia severely compromised its own position in the Caucasus, and increasing pressure over Armenia should be expected.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

13. Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis and the Belt and Road Initiative: Russia’s Growing Dependence on China in the Aftermath of the Ukraine War

Author:
Hanna Samir Kassab
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This paper focuses on Russia’s current economic isolation due to the war in Ukraine. The more western states punish Russia, the more likely it will become economically dependent on China. H. J. Mackinder argues that whoever controls, or organises, the heartland of the Eurasian continent, controls the world’s political system. The more dependent Russia is on China, the more China will exercise control over Russia. If China were to gain this political leverage over Russia, it would be in a good position to organise the heartland, and possible become global hegemon.
Topic:
Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-Ukraine War, International Politics, and Dependence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

14. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:
Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:
Volodymyr Kudrytskyi and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine: Tuesday, March 11, 2025. The Russian assault on Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity and transmission grid as part of its full-scale war against Ukraine, is unprecedented in the history of warfare. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO of Ukraine’s electric grid operator Ukrenergo, discussed the challenges of securing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the war, lessons for mitigating grid vulnerabilities, and prospects for rebuilding a more resilient energy system in Ukraine and Europe. Speaker: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi served as the CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator Ukrenergo from February 2020 until September 2024. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s electrical grid has undergone preparations for synchronization with the power system of Continental Europe ENTSO-E and emergency synchronization with ENTSO-E in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From February 24, 2022, Mr. Kudrytskyi and his team at Ukrenergo managed the Ukrainian power grid through unprecedented Russian attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Kudrytskyi held leadership roles in key Ukrainian energy sector companies, including Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta. Mr. Kudrytskyi holds a degree in international finance from Kyiv National Economic University. Moderator: Mariana Budjeryn is the author of Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) and a winner of the 2024 William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award, the first female in the award’s 25-year history. Dr. Budjeryn is a member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academies of Sciences and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Topic:
Electricity, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. Round Two: Trump’s Foreign Policy Takes on New Challenges

Author:
William B. Quandt
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Trump will have to manage the continuing conflict in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the rising power of China as he navigates the beginning of his second term
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Middle East, and United States of America

17. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. The 8 Percent Approach: A Big Bang in Resources and Capacity for Europe’s Economy and Defence

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Ismail Abdi
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe has become a region of feeble economic performance and military frailty. Its share of the world economy is rapidly shrinking, and the region is struggling to keep up with economies at the modern technological frontier. Countries in the European Union have for decades talked about the importance of raising Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and allow greater space for an entrepreneurial business sector that is prospering on the back of innovation. However, the results are poor. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have largely been stagnant, business investment and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have tanked. Rates of new business formation and growth are paltry, partly as a result of gross overregulation. Productivity growth has continued its decades-long path of deceleration, and the EU is increasingly behind international leaders. Fortunately, Europe is beginning to wake up from its strategic slumber. Defence expenditures are now growing faster than in previous decades – and some countries, like Poland, are becoming serious powers. Yet, the region’s own military capacity remains poor. Europe must rebuild core conventional capacities at a time when defence modernisation requires substantial resources and focus. Russia may be bogged down by its war against Ukraine, but it is rebuilding its capacities fast and is increasingly aided by partnerships with other countries that want to break down what remains of a liberal world order. Many European NATO-members are now hitting the 2-percent spending target but must spend vastly more to acquire sufficient capacities to defend themselves and their interests.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

19. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

20. Playing the long game: Russia in the Mediterranean

Author:
Giangiuseppe Pili, Alessio Armenzoni, Gary C. Kessler, and Diane M. Zorri
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia has fi rmly re-established its presence in the Mediterranean. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis reveal that Russia is currently more active in North Africa and the Middle East, including operating a shadow fl eet of tankers that economically sustains Putin’s regime and its war eff orts in Ukraine. Given its size and capabilities, the current Russian squadron is not intended to engage in a full-scale naval battle against any NATO fl eet. Instead, it is deliberately kept weak enough to avoid being perceived as a major military threat.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Navy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean