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31. Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. Yet, it turned out to be the last major gasp of the aerial war between Riyadh and the Sanaa-based government that had started in 2015. A few days later, on 2 April, a United Nations (UN)-mediated truce came into effect, which lasted until 2 October and, as of the time of writing, has effectively terminated Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi and Emirati territories. In the current situation of relative stability, Saudi-Houthi talks are ongoing to renew and expand the truce.
Topic:
Deterrence, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

32. ACLED Year in Review Global Disorder in 2022

Author:
Timothy Lay
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine escalated the war to a level that dwarfed all other conflicts in 2022, both in the sheer scale of violence and its deadliness. It also obscured a significant overall deterioration of the security situation in most other regions worldwide. Driven by heightened levels of conflict in both new and longstanding hotspots, political violence increased substantially over the course of the year. While 2022 saw some positive developments – including a significant reduction in total violent events in places like Afghanistan and Yemen after years of war – these gains only represent qualified improvements. Despite the aggregate decline in events in Afghanistan and Yemen, for example, they remain home to two of the most complex and severe conflict environments in the world. Globally, political violence targeting civilians became not only more common but also more deadly in 2022, underscoring the fact that it is civilian communities that are increasingly shouldering the burden of rising conflict levels around the world.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Global Focus

33. Shades of grey: The evolving links between the Houthi and Iran

Author:
Mona Saif
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding, voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate (in part) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due to the growth of its relation with the Houthi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Houthis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Yemen

34. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

35. Does the Present Interpretation of the UN Principles Cause Harm in Syria and Yemen?

Author:
Tayseer Alkarim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
This policy brief takes a comparative examination of how the United Nations has adopted a paradoxical interpretation of its guiding principles to address the complex humanitarian crises in Syria and Yemen. It offers approaches that could change the course of international humanitarian operations and protect them from further politicization, weaponization, and diversion. The consequences of the February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria extend far beyond physical destruction and loss of life, particularly in northwestern Syria (NWS). Immediately after the earthquake, extensive debates erupted within the local and international humanitarian community, criticizing the United Nations (UN) for its inadequate response. These debates quickly broadened to include concerns that UN humanitarian assistance had become a powerful tool for the Assad regime in its strategy to make political and military gains in war-torn Syria. The dilemma of international humanitarian assistance in Syria is not just a matter of timing or funding but, more importantly, of delivery mechanisms. Syria’s endless humanitarian nightmare revolves around the controversial interpretation of the guiding principles of the UN.
Topic:
United Nations, Humanitarian Crisis, and Aid Effectiveness
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

36. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

37. Saudi-Houthi Talks Move Toward Ceasefire – The Yemen Review, March 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks regained traction over the course of March, and the announcement of a ceasefire is expected as Riyadh looks to wind down its direct military involvement in Yemen. At month’s end, Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi and his government were summoned to the Saudi capital to be briefed on the negotiations. Despite the flurry of activity, there has been little information given on how the Saudis intend to resolve some of the longstanding issues that have bedeviled earlier rounds of talks. The negotiations have not forestalled continued fighting, with clashes escalating clashes across multiple frontlines. The Houthis made gains in southern Marib and along the Al-Bayda-Shabwa border, and heavy fighting took place in Al-Dhalea and southern Hudaydah. Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, Minister of Defense Mohsen al-Daeri, and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz survived separate assassination attempts in Taiz governorate believed to have been undertaken by Houthi forces. The Houthi-controlled parliament in Sana’a has banned the payment of interest as a “usurious transaction,” in an attempt to Islamicize the financial sector. Implementation could have disastrous effects on Yemen’s faltering economy, contributing to its isolation and discouraging international investment. The law could rapidly limit the ability to finance basic imports and cut off access to foreign financing.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

38. Saudis Visit Sana’a as Warring Parties Conduct Prisoner Exchange

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks in Sana’a during Ramadan failed to produce a final agreement on a roadmap for final status peace talks and a permanent ceasefire. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) leaders in Riyadh were left out of the loop although the Saudis continued to insist that the Houthis co-sign any deal with the internationally recognized government. A major prisoner exchange took place in mid-April following a deal reached in March in which the government and Houthis agreed to the release of 973 detainees. Included among the prisoners released were former defense minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and Samira Marish, a woman accused of planning several bombings and assassinations on behalf of the Houthi movement. A senior government military commander, Faisal Rajab, was released in a separate deal following a mediation in Sana’a between an Abyan tribal delegation and Houthi officials. Fighting continued on several frontlines, most significantly in Marib governorate, where Houthi forces are trying to capitalize on their gains in March. On the economic front, the government-held port of Aden received a commercial ship without it being subject to inspection in Jeddah, and more than 500 types of goods were removed from a list of banned products, including fertilizers and batteries. The government is still struggling to cover the cost of public sector salaries after losing oil revenues following Houthi drone attacks late last year and Houthi pressure on importers to redirect shipments from Aden to Hudaydah, while the Houthi authorities drew in revenue from various informal taxes and duties imposed during Ramadan.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

39. A Southern Reshuffle – The Yemen Review, May 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Political news in May was dominated by the reorganization and resurgence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Seemingly sidelined by the Saudi-Houthi talks and the Kingdom’s support of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, the Emirati-backed group extended its influence through the recruitment of powerful politicians, an internal reorganization, and a conference resulting in a new ‘Southern National Charter.’ Saudi-Houthi negotiations appear to have stalled over disagreement on a number of long-standing issues, but the recent involvement of China could bring additional resources and leverage to the table. The STC’s revived fortunes have led to renewed political and military mobilization in Hadramawt. The Nation’s Shield forces, paid for and supplied by Saudi Arabia, but under the nominal control of President Al-Alimi, increased their presence in the governorate, and were visited by the Saudi coalition commander before assuming control of an important border crossing. For their part, STC-affiliated forces took up positions on the strategic Ataq-Al-Abr road linking Hadramawt and Shabwa, including a key stretch used by Islah-affiliated forces. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also stepped up its activity, conducting at least two drone strikes in Shabwa as it publicly condemned the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis launched their latest offensive in the economic war, banning the sale of domestically produced cooking gas in favor of imports. Imported gas is more expensive, but the brunt of the impact will be felt by the internationally recognized government and its production facilities in Marib. Having shut down the government’s oil exports and rerouted trade to deprive it of customs fees, the sanction will further cripple the government’s finances. It is already having trouble purchasing sufficient fuel to keep the lights on – May saw an extension of rolling blackouts in Aden as a Saudi grant has expired without extension. Summer sees the highest demand for electricity, but a number of generators in the interim capital have already shut down due to the shortage.
Topic:
Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

40. Temperatures, Tensions Roil Government – The Yemen Review, June & July 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Summer has been dominated by rising tensions among the Saudi-led coalition, as competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continues to undermine the internationally recognized government. The current phase of the rivalry is centered on Hadramawt, the vast eastern governorate bordering Saudi Arabia that has seen repeated bouts of political and military agitation. Saudi talks with the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) are currently on hold, hung up on now-familiar disagreements over the kingdom’s belligerent status and payment of public sector salaries. Perhaps stung by its lack of progress in the negotiations, Saudi Arabia announced new support for the government, totaling some US$1.2 billion. The funding rescued a government in financial crisis: battered by an effective Houthi blockade of oil and gas exports, it could not even afford to keep the lights on. Lengthening blackouts during the hottest months of the year and the cratering value of the Yemeni rial led to protests and political recriminations as the situation grew more desperate. But the faltering peace talks may also augur new rounds of violence. Houthi forces have deployed in increasing numbers outside Marib, and may yet renew their aspirations to capture the city and nearby oilfields. Foreign observers and senior Houthi military commanders have been on hand at maneuvers in the governorate. Tensions are also building on the Red Sea Coast, where the Houthis are mobilizing naval forces on islands near international shipping lanes. Pro-government forces have also moved to the sea, competing to occupy bases near the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations