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411. Iran’s Involvement in Syria during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Continuity or Change?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran is trying to maintain its political and military position in Syria until it recovers from the impact of COVID-19. Protection of its interests via securing Damascus, driving out the military forces of the United States, and maintaining control of the areas that allow access to Lebanon (and the Eastern Mediterranean) are still priorities. The deteriorating economic situation and the slump in oil prices will most likely relax Iran’s control over its proxies in Syria, such as the Fatemiyoun and local tribes existing in Deir ez-Zor. The consolidation of the Turkish military presence in Idlib and the northeast will only make Iran more determined to expel American forces after the COVID-19 crisis subsides. The real challenge for Iran is losing the competition with Russia over influence in the security and economic sectors in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

412. The Impact of COVID-19 on Russia’s Middle East and Syria Policies

Author:
Leonid Isaev and Andrey Sakharov
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast. The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy. Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

413. The UAE’s Role in Syria’s Stability

Author:
Najla al-Qasemi
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued a careful policy towards the Syrian conflict based on keeping Syrian state institutions intact and simultaneously supporting Syrian people’s aspirations. In order to maintain this balance, Abu Dhabi has relied in part on a legacy of pragmatic relations with Damascus since the 1990s. This legacy allowed Abu Dhabi to resume its diplomatic ties with Damascus with the aim of drawing it closer to its Arab neighbours when Iran’s influence over the country’s decision-making increased. In order to keep its engagement constructive, the UAE has utilised humanitarian aid since 2011 to support the Syrian people in refugee camps outside the country and within Syria especially amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The UAE however faces challenges from regional and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and UAE

414. Is the “New Normal” in Idlib Different from the “Old Normal”?: How the COVID-19 Pandemic has Affected Idlib

Author:
Serhat Erkman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Topic:
Conflict, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

415. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Military Dynamics in Northern Syria

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

416. COVID-19 in Turkish Controlled Areas and Idlib

Author:
Başak Yavçan
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The safe zones in the northern part of Syria have been established following three operations in the region, namely: the Euphrates Shield in 2016, the Olive Branch in 2018, and the Peace Spring in 2019. Before the outbreak of pandemic, the healthcare capacity was semisufficient with urgent cases being treated in Turkey and with frequent hospital transfers being conducted. In terms of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian aid was predominantly channelled through Turkey with limited involvement of Western and international organisations. Trade with the outside world was limited due to the sanctions imposed on Syria. The infrastructural investment in the region was predominantly made by the Turkish state and NGOs in the form of renovations and building of schools, hospitals, as well as water and energy supply. As of May 28th, 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in both regions yet living conditions have deteriorated due to the conditions in Turkey, Syria and rest of the world.
Topic:
Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

417. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability

Author:
Alexander Decina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
Topic:
Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

418. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

419. Syrian National Army: Russian View

Author:
Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In autumn 2017, the Council of the Syrian Islamic Scholars devised an initiative to unite all groups of the Syrian moderate opposition into the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was supposed to become FSA 2.0. At that time, 80% of the Syrian opposition factions, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, as well as the majority of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) armed groups were prepared to join the SNA. It was the first time since 2012 that the FSA had managed to bring all opposition forces under its banner, and the creation of a unified military network with a common structure and command gained a new impetus. However, the SNA project was five years too late and, by the time the rebels began to merge into this new unified army, the Syrian opposition had already lost the war.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

420. Russia and Issues of HTS and Tanzim Hurras ad-Din

Author:
Anton Mardasov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria