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22. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory
- Author:
- Yeliz Kulali Martin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland
23. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War
- Author:
- Alessandro Marrone
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
- Topic:
- Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
24. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges
- Author:
- Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
- Topic:
- NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
25. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe
- Author:
- Pierre Andrieu
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Europe
26. The South Caucasus and Great Power Confrontation: Is There a Silver Lining on the Horizon?
- Author:
- Gulshan Pashayeva
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- The onset of the present stage in the conflict over Ukraine in February 2022 further heightened an already tense geopolitical standoff. Although this war has now entered into its third year, there is no clear sign that a peaceful settlement could be within reach. Rather, each passing day makes the situation more complicated and drags both sides towards a dead end in which neither one nor the other of the two direct belligerents is likely to emerge better off than each was before the full-scale fighting began again in earnest. Today, this war in which two major geopolitical actors—the West and Russia—have become trapped is also having an impact on other regions around the globe. The European Union is one, obviously: its ambitions to achieve geopolitical autonomy (at least within the West, as a distinct pole), for instance, have been set back, and Brussels has had to scramble mightily to reconfigure the terms of its energy security. Another is the Silk Road region in general, and the South Caucasus in particular. This essay will examine the latest developments in this latter area through an inquiry into whether (and how) the evolving geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia affects that part of the world. It will culminate with a consideration of whether there is any silver lining that could result from this situation, whereby the South Caucasus could become a politically and economically united region in the time ahead.
- Topic:
- Power Politics, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Balkans, Georgia, and South Caucasus
27. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War
- Author:
- Luis Gouveia Junior
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
- Institution:
- Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
- Abstract:
- Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
- Topic:
- International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil
28. NATO's New Ambitions for Space
- Author:
- Béatrice Hainaut
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
- Topic:
- NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and Space
29. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Marlène Laruelle
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
- Topic:
- Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
30. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Nicholas L. Miller
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America