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271. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

Author:
Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Despite heightened expectations for significant change in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy— the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review changes little from the past. The NPR's declaratory policy retains the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons first in a variety of circumstances, including in a first strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia and chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attacks from states such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and North Korea

272. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, North Atlantic, and Moscow

273. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

274. Strengthening Oversight of the Security Sector in Georgia: an Agenda

Author:
Erik Sportel (ed) and Vasili Tchkoidze (ed)
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Centre for European Security Studies
Abstract:
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia has undertaken serious reforms, moving the country towards becoming a democracy anda market economy. Instead of proceeding at a steady pace, Georgia haschosen to take an accelerated path to reform. Since coming to office,the Saakashvili administration has underlined its ambition to bring Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures. After an energetic start, Georgia ran into difficulties in late 2007 and 2008. During this period, the democratic credentials of the Saakashvili government were put to the test for the first time.The government was faced with massive public demonstrations, to which it responded in a heavy-handed fashion. The security forces attacked protesters, and the government declared a state of emergency, blaming the unrest on Russia. Many domestic and foreign observers feared that Georgia was abandoning the road to democracy. However, the state of emergency was soon lifted, and the government called an early presidential election. International observers judged the election to be largely democratic, despite some irregularities, but opposition forces claimed that the president's results had been boosted by fraud. Mr Saakashvili won an absolute majority in the first round of polling. The subsequent parliamentary elections in the spring of 2008 gave the ruling United National Movement party a landslide victory. With 119 out of 150 seats, theparty currently holds a two-thirds majority in parliament. The two major opposition parties (winning 17 and six seats respectively) refused to take their seatsin parliament.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Democratization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

275. Hello Missile Defence–Goodbye Nuclear Sharing?

Author:
Trine Flockhart
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
It appears likely that NATO's new strategic concept, although largely only confirming the status quo on nuclear policy, will also set out the bold decision to adopt a Ballistic Missile Defence System.Through this combination the new strategic concept looks set to herald radical change in long cherished principles about nuclear sharing and to directly address sensitive issues of Alliance cohesion and deterrence posture.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

276. Missile Defense in NATO: A French Perspective

Author:
Bruno Gruselle
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In France, missile defense comes with a long and complicated history. When the U.S. Congress passed the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999," which called for the development and deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system, Paris reacted negatively. At that time, France still considered missile defense to be both unnecessary and destabilizing. French policy makers still considered the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to be the cornerstones of strategic stability. French thinkers viewed missile defense as jeopardizing both the doctrine and the Treaty, as well as risking a new arms race with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, France, and North America

277. Medvedev's amendments to the law on defence: The consequences for Europe

Author:
Yury E. Fedorov
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
In November 2009, the 'Law on Amendments to the “Law on Defence”' proposed by President Medvedev entered into force. It allows the Kremlin to dispatch troops outside Russia for four purposes: to counter armed attacks against Russian armed forces, other troops and bodies deployed beyond its borders; to counter or prevent an armed attack against another country if this country has requested Russia to do so; to protect Russian citizens abroad from an armed attack; and to combat piracy and guarantee the safety of shipping. The law is an attempt to close the gap between Moscow's strategic goals, primarily the establishment of its geopolitical dominance over the former Soviet republics, and Russia's legislation, which restricted its ability to deploy armed forces beyond national borders. In effect, the amended legislation enables the Kremlin to deploy its armed forces abroad in a wide range of situations, precisely because of a lack of clear criteria. The wording of 'Medvedev's amendments' sheds light on some plans and scenarios that may be taking shape in Moscow. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that Russia may plan to ignite large-scale disturbances and ethnic clashes in Sevastopol or in Latvia and Estonia, which may be used as a pretext for Russian military intervention. A Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Crimea would pose not so much a military as a political challenge for Europe and the West. Even though Ukraine does not belong to these organizations, if NATO and the EU failed to respond to Russian intervention in Crimea with strong political and economic measures, their strategic relevance would be seriously undermined. If NATO did not defend its member states in the Baltic, the strategic role of the Alliance would be reduced to zero. The aforementioned scenarios fall into the worst-case category, yet there are numerous precedents in Russia's history which demonstrate that worst-case scenarios can become reality. European dependence on Russian energy supplies and interest in Russia's support in resolving the Iranian nuclear problem and the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as the Obama administration's interest in Russia's partnership in nuclear issues, constrain Western ability to respond. However, the West could and should make it quite clear that new Russia's military interventions will result in the country's political ostracization. Furthermore, the West could propose and develop an internationally recognised mechanism regulating the most important aspects of humanitarian intervention. In particular, it should minimise the ability of individual states to make unilateral decisions to intervene militarily if the UN Security Council were unable to make firm decisions. Such mechanisms could be discussed and developed in the frameworks of the UN, the OSCE, the so-called Corfu process and similar international forums.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Law
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

278. The Defense Monitor, Volume XXXVIII - July/August/September 2009

Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
The international Global Zero Commission, a group of political and military leaders from the United States, Russia and other key countries, held an intensive two-day meeting in Washington, D.C. on June 28-29, 2009 - where they presented a practical and comprehensive plan calling for the phased and verified elimination of all nuclear weapons over the next 20 years, and briefed senior Obama administration officials on their recommendations in advance of the July 6-8 Moscow Summit.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

279. The Georgia Crisis: Implications for the Partnership for Peace

Author:
Graeme P. Herd and Daniel A. Flesch
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
On 7 August 2008, Georgia attacked Tskhinvali, the capital city of South Ossetia, with heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and ground troops in an attempt to take control of the breakaway republic, which contained bases of both Russian and OSCE peacekeepers. Russia, claiming to be acting under the mandate of peace enforcement, pushed Georgia out of both South Ossetia and another breakaway Georgian republic, Abkhazia, and deep into Georgian territory. This created the potential for regime change, as the Russian Army appeared to be moving on Tbilisi with the intent of overthrowing Georgia's democratically elected government. On 8 August 2008, Russian military forces crossed the Georgian border into South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a successful effort to repulse Georgian troops. The immediate casus belli for Russia was genocide, with claims that “over two thousand” South Ossetians had been killed by Georgian troops, along with the shooting of ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, which necessitated a humanitarian and peace enforcement operation. The Russian advance included ground troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers, and air and sea operations, combined with coordinated kinetic and cyber attacks. Russian forces also crossed into Abkhazia in defense of their compatriots – 70 percent of the Abkhaz population of 220,000 are Russian passport holders, and 90 percent of the South Ossetian population of 70,000 are also Russian citizens.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Affairs, and Population
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Georgia, and South Ossetia

280. The Defense Monitor, U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe: The Putin Alternative

Author:
Philip E. Coyle, Whitney Parker, Theresa Hitchens, and Richard May
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
At the G-8 Summit in early June, the difficulties and complexities of proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe were on full display. In the weeks preceding the G-8 Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin had set the Bush administration – and the world – back on its heels with talk of Russian missiles aimed at Europe in retaliation for proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. This set the stage for what the Bush administration thought might be a G-8 confrontation over its proposed missile defense system. Then, on June 7, Putin proposed a smart missile defense technical and policy solution that the Pentagon should have thought of first: establishing a missile defense radar site at the existing Qabala early warning radar station in Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia