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512. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity
- Author:
- Seongho Sheen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
513. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
514. Toward a Smart Alliance: The ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 11-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Asia is the region where a quarter of the total of American products is consumed, major bilateral allies exist, various networks of mul-tilateral institutions operate, and new powers are rising. President Obama, during his first Asia trip, tried to emphasize that America is an Asia-Pacific power that will continue its commitment through a renewed East Asia strategy of “power of balance.” Now at the crossroads of China’s foreign policy of “har-mony,” Japan’s new concept of “fraternity,” and South Korea’s catchphrase of “pragmatic for-eign policy,” the United States needs to refresh its role which has been defined as a “regional stabilizer.” People in Asia are eager to see Pres-ident Obama’s new approach to his East Asia strategy, because he inherited from his prede-cessor a triple crisis in the areas of security, soft power, and economy. President Obama’s recent Asia trip has certainly attracted the minds of many people in Asia with his concepts of strong “partnership,” and a positive-sum Asian future, as expressed in his address at the Suntory Hall, Japan. As the communication power of a network becomes more important in 21st century international politics, President Obama’s Asia trip means a lot with his efforts for public diplomacy. Putting aside images and metaphors, the strategic orientation of the United States’ East Asia strategy still needs to be more specified. People in Asia are concerned about four areas: 1) how the United States will cooperate with a rising China in producing a consensus in many sensitive and difficult areas such as mili-tary competition, economic interdependence, climate change, and ideational orientation; 2) how the United States will redefine the role of bilateral alliances which should go beyond the task of military cooperation, stretching to re-gional security and non-traditional security issues; 3) how the United States will facilitate the creation and the development of multila-teral cooperative institutions by actively par-ticipating in them; 4) and how the US will deal with security threats such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, cross-Strait relations, East Asian nationalism, and, most of all, regional power transition. So far, the United States seems to be more focused upon recovery from the economic crisis and getting help from various Asian partners in this effort. That leaves open the question of how to redefine the United States’ role in the rapidly changing environment of Asian international relations. Despite a relatively short stay in Seoul for about 20 hours, President Obama confirmed his commitment to South Korea with renewed words and statements: he underscored the importance of the KORUS FTA not just from an economic perspective, but also from a stra-tegic standpoint; he promised to provide con-tinued extended nuclear deterrence; he basi-cally agreed with South Korea’s approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through a more comprehensive deal; and he highlighted new areas of cooperation at the global level such as climate change, Afghanis-tan, economic recovery, and the development of the G-20. South Koreans expect that the KORUS FTA will be the stepping stone for strengthening bilateral economic and strategic relations, recovery of both countries’ econo-mies, and improving interdependent regional economic relations. Regarding the North Ko-rean nuclear crisis, it seems that there is still a lot more to be done in making North Korea give up completely its nuclear program. This will require more intense and creative dialo-gue between Seoul and Washington. As North Korea has not made any strategic decision regarding its nuclear program and any future national strategic orientation, its return to the Six-Party Talks will only just be the beginning in yet another difficult series of negotiations. South Korea, as a strong American ally and a potential global middle power, will continue to work closely with the United States. The two countries need to search for new tasks and functions for bilateral cooperation in a world of rapidly changing international relations, where “smart” alliance and “21st century international statecraft” are required.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
515. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff
- Author:
- William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
516. Wilson and the Founders: The Roots of Liberal Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Ted Widmer
- Publication Date:
- 04-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- We can’t do much better than reclaiming the Declaration of Independence as a fundamental foreign policy document in American history. We have a tendency to read it in a simplistic way, and to think of it only as a sort of airy declaration of what were then human rights, and a declaration of separation from England. But, in fact, the founders had a fairly well-articulated sense of what they were doing with foreign policy, and a fairly revolutionary sense of their foreign policy. So I’m quite interested in how Woodrow Wilson rediscovers the founders and makes them relevant for his time. This thinking about Wilson began for me about ten years ago when I came to be a speechwriter in the second term of Bill Clinton’s presidency. I was quite interested in which presidents were considered historically interesting to Clinton and quickly figured out it was John F. Kennedy, obviously, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. a little less obviously, and Teddy Roosevelt, who was a huge influence on Bill Clinton, and always has been. It was a time in the 1990s when a lot of very favorable books were coming out about Teddy Roosevelt, and it was an attractive time to be thinking about him. At the same time, I felt Wilson was completely ignored. I don’t remember Clinton ever talking about Wilson. In the collected speeches of Bill Clinton—it’s something like eighteen very fat volumes, the man enjoys speaking—if we looked up Wilson, I’m sure we could find a few references, but very few.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Liberalism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
517. Wilson, Bush, and the Evolution of Liberal Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Tony Smith
- Publication Date:
- 04-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- The first subject to discuss in considering the future of the liberal inter- nationalist agenda is the importance of the democratization project to the definition of Wilsonianism. The second is the meaning of multilat- eralism. In the first case, Thomas Knock and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue in a forthcoming volume that democratization was never an important part of Wilsonianism; that, instead, multilateralism is the key to liberal interna- tionalism. On the basis of this argument, they come to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine is not in the Wilsonian tradition. In my contribution to this volume,1 I object to this denigration of the place of democracy in liberal internationalism as being fundamentally illogical. Accordingly, I find the Bush Doctrine easily identifiable as Wilsonian. I argue for the centrality of democracy to the Wilsonian project because it seems clear that the microfoundations for a regime in society are critical to the ability of those states that participate in multilateral organizations to do so effectively. That is, in order to function effectively, ultimately to provide for a peaceful world order, a multilateral organization needs to be dominated by democratic states, known for their rule-abiding behavior, their transparency, predictability, and accountability. Wilson wanted the League of Nations to be a League under the control of democracies and concerned with expanding this form of government,2 but then in late February 1919 at Versailles, he abandoned that idea. From a liberal internationalist perspective, the result of the League’s character was that it was undermined not only by the failure of the United States to join, but also by the role played in it by autocratic states. It is worth adding that in his drafts of the Pan American Union some three years earlier, Wilson had also looked forward to a community of American states based on the consent of the governed. In a word, a world of peace was necessarily a world dominated by what today is often called “market democracies,” a type of social, economic, and political order that Wilson argued was fundamentally different from and better than any alternative order. In such an order the place of democratic governments was central.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Liberalism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
518. Does the “Surge” Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?
- Author:
- Jon R. Lindsay
- Publication Date:
- 09-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Sen. John McCain has long advocated “sustained and substantial” troop increases,1 attacking Sen. Barack Obama’s position on drawing down forces. Obama for his part recently stated that the surge has “succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated” and “beyond our wildest dreams.”2 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi- National Corps Iraq during the surge, told a Heritage Foundation audience in March 2008, “I think it’s safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces—and how we employed those forces—have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.”3 While the surge was quite controversial in its inception,4 it now seems that “success has a thou- sand fathers.” Indeed, since the deployment starting in January 2007 of an additional 30,000 troops (five addi- tional Army brigades primarily in and around Baghdad and 4,000 Marines in Anbar Province, rising to a high-water mark of 171,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by October 2007), the drop in vio- lence has been remarkable. From December 2006 to August 2008, monthly insurgent-initiated attacks have dropped from over 5,600 to 800, U.S. troop fatalities from 112 to 23, and Iraqi civilian fatalities from 3,500 to 500. Even though we’re hardly out of the woods, the troop surge is clearly correlated with a major decrease in violence.5 Correlation, of course, is not causation. Lt. Gen. Odierno is right to highlight the employment of surge forces in addition to the increase in their numbers. The renewed focus on providing security to the Iraqi population—by pushing troops out of sprawling Forward Operating Bases and proactively controlling movement within major cities—has truly been a change for the bet- ter. Nevertheless, there are factors above and beyond additional troops and better counter-insur- gency tactics that may account for the drop in violence. These include the Sunni Awakening movements that emerged in Anbar province prior to the surge, the tragic efficacy of sectarian killing in 2006, the Shia Mahdi Army cease-fire announced and renewed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and operations by other U.S. organizations not associated with the surge.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
519. The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry
- Author:
- Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich
- Publication Date:
- 10-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
520. Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know
- Author:
- Peter Krause
- Publication Date:
- 02-2007
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Troop levels in Iraq have been one of the most hotly contested issues om American foreign policy over the past three years, from debates over the initial deployment in 2003 to those surrounding the troop surge in 2007. The Bush administration has faced significant criticism for ignoring the conventional wisdom regarding the number of soldiers required to secure Iraq, and recent attempts to change course in this area are seen by some as too little, too late. Specifically, the Pentagon’s deployment of only 120,000 American troops for the invasion and the decision by Paul Bremer, U.S. Administrator in Iraq, to disband the Iraqi army and police has kept the ratio of security forces to Iraqi civilians well below the 20 per 1,000 seen as the basic ante required to play the high stakes stabilization game. Many supporters of higher troop levels blame these missteps for the emergence of the robust insurgency and the coalition’s failure to defeat it. But where exactly does the 20 per 1,000 figure come from, how strong is the evidence sup- porting it, and what steps are being taken to assess and improve the conventional wisdom in this area? While the answer to the first part of the question is relatively accessible, the latter are more difficult. They address a daunting problem, but unveil a disconnect between the objectives and methods of policy and social science.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Iraq War, and Troop Deployment
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North America