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1. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:
Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Mining for Defense: Unlocking the Potential for U.S.-Canada Collaboration on Critical Minerals

Author:
Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, and Alejandra Toro
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
China’s near monopolistic control of many critical minerals, which are essential for both for consumer products and defense production, represents an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States at a time of heightened geopolitical tension. Canada, which already supplies the United States with large quantities of certain essential metals, is well positioned as an alternative source for many of the critical minerals controlled by China, thus contributing to North American national and economic security. Bolstering cooperation on critical minerals for the defense industry furthermore offers a way for both countries to find common ground amid frustrations surrounding trade and security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Mining, Collaboration, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

3. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:
Greg Weaver
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future

Author:
Yam Atir
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
Topic:
Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Origins and Outcomes of U S Defense Policy Toward Israel with Josh Paul

Author:
Josh Paul
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
The United States describes its commitment to support Israel as “iron clad” to the extent that our nation is providing diplomatic and military support while Israel conducts what the ICJ has described as a “plausible genocide” in Gaza. Former U.S. State Department official, Josh Paul, will examine how U.S. security and defense policy undermines American interests abroad and its most fundamental values at home.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Genocide, Strategic Interests, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

7. NATO PA's Role in Consolidating Article 2 of the Atlantic Alliance Treaty

Author:
Nuno Alberto Rodrigues Santos Loureiro
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, stipulates that international relations between member states should be conducted peacefully and with mutual respect, based on free institutions, thus creating conditions of stability, security, and satisfaction within the Alliance. It also promotes the elimination of opposition factors about international economic policies, which, in turn, are based on a collaborative foundation. Despite this more peaceful premise, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is, above all, a collective defence alliance, and over its 74-year history, there have been no further commitments that would allow for more integration despite the shared common values that were at its inception. The Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO PA) is an Interparliamentary Organisation (IPO) that acts independently of the North Atlantic Alliance but brings together parliamentarians from its member states and associates. Although its resolutions are merely recommendatory and advisory in nature, they have provided crucial strategic input into NATO's action, allowing parliaments to properly reflect on the organization's interests and strategies in national debates.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

8. The new NATO Force Model: ready for launch?

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO Allies are in the process of a dramatic change to the Alliance’s force structure, which will see the NATO Response Force (NRF) replaced with a threetiered structure of Allied forces, to include an Allied Reaction Force (ARF), all of which is designed to better defend and deter. This new NATO Force Model faces a variety of challenges, from whether Allies will have suffi cient forces at appropriate readiness levels to fulfi l their own objectives to whether SACEUR will still have the authority to “alert, stage and prepare” Allied forces as a crisis emerges, through whether and how the Alliance’s command structure now needs a re-examination as well. To avoid the potential pitfalls and ensure the Alliance fulfi ls its own vision, NATO and its member nations ought to consider an array of mitigating steps, such as using snap exercises and inspection visits to ensure forces are indeed manned, trained and equipped, and emphasizing mass and capacity in Allied acquisition plans and capability targets.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Force Model
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

9. Subsidizing the Military-Industrial Complex: A Review of the Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) Program

Author:
Brett Heinz and Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
For nearly 30 years, an obscure Department of Defense (DoD) program has given Pentagon contractors a taxpayer-subsidized opportunity to influence U.S. military policy, creating massive conflicts of interest — yet little scrutiny. This research brief offers a first of its kind look at the DoD’s Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) program, which sends U.S. military officers to work at major corporations for a year, and then return and provide recommendations to the DoD for how it might improve. Military contractors benefit disproportionately from the SDEF program. Twenty-nine percent of all SDEF fellows have gone to the nation’s top 50 government contractors, with 15 percent going to the “big five” military contractors alone. None of the 317 fellows in the program’s history has ever served at a public sector institution. Decades of SDEF recommendations have consistently focused on reforms that would both benefit corporations and bolster their influence over the DoD, including calls for a greater share of the agency’s budget to be given to military contractors, reduced oversight, greater private outsourcing of agency responsibilites, and the loosening of international arms trade regulations. SDEF also keeps the revolving door between public service and private profit spinning. Forty-three percent of SDEF fellows went on to work for a government contractor at some point in their post-military career. In consistently failing to distinguish between what’s best for corporate executives and what’s best for the American people, the SDEF program represents a dangerous embrace of the military-industrial complex. Whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence” can be seen in “every office of the Federal Government,” the SDEF program explicitly advocates for it. SDEF has become a reliable method for corporations to disguise self–interested policy aspirations as helpful recommendations for DoD. If this program is to continue, DoD must act forcefully to address and minimize the unsettling conflicts of interest embedded within SDEF by: Enforcing a “one defense contractor per year” rule; Barring fellows from working in “government relations” roles; Exploring post–employment restrictions for former fellows; Re–balancing orientations away from undue corporate influence and political bias; Rationalizing program size.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military-Industrial Complex, and Militarism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. Grand Strategy: Shield of the republic

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Leaders must decide how to best translate scarce means into political objectives. Limited resources and the high stakes of national survival force leaders to prioritize. Military power is dependent on wealth, industry, geographical endowments, population size, and effective domestic institutions. The various conditions in which states find themselves help motivate and constrain the grand strategy formulated by their leaders. The United States is still the most powerful, secure, and prosperous country in the world, with a favorable geographic position and many internal advantages. U.S. grand strategy has historically been concerned with preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia by maintaining the balance of power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only great power in the world. Unfortunately, it squandered the “unipolar moment” by pursuing a costly and counterproductive grand strategy of “liberal hegemony,” which has left it overextended. The United States’ secure geostrategic position and the improbability of a Eurasian hegemon allows it to adopt a grand strategy of restraint. This shift will help the United States to preserve its power, minimize risks, and adapt to the rise of new great powers. This strategy requires the United States to adopt a more rigorous definition of its vital interests and to shift to its allies the main burden of defending themselves.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America