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181. Challenges in Iraq: Learning from Yemen?

Author:
Jonathan Schanzer
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Yemeni media recently reported that thousands of Iraqis who fled Saddam Husayn's brutal regime and have lived in Yemen for more than a decade are now thinking about returning home. Many of these individuals are encouraged by signs of new infrastructure and a recovering economy in Iraq. If and when they return, they will see a number of stark similarities between their old homeland and Yemen, including primordial federalism, a "triangle" of terrorism, and questions of Sunni-Shi'i relations. Although Yemen is certainly not a model to which Iraq should aspire, San'a does have experience in dealing with challenges similar to those currently facing Iraq. Yemen's handling of these challenges provides reasons for cautious optimism about Iraq's future.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, and Arabia

182. Why German-US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance—One Year after War in Iraq

Author:
Michaela C. Hertkorn
Publication Date:
12-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia International Affairs Online
Abstract:
A declaration on NATO transformation of October 6, 2002 stated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needed to be “capable of taking action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people” the deterrent element of Alliance strategy was strengthened. The North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices. The declaration stressed high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defense against terrorism. This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates. National commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight. Priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and European Union capabilities initiatives needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness. NATO should redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology. The alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO' s interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO' s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both, old and new threats. NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson referred to the experience NATO had with post-conflict stabilization, as in Kosovo and Macedonia. On October 8, 2002 Robertson declared, an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the greatest possible communication and coordination among Europeans and North Americans. The November 2002 Prague Summit would be a transforming event for the Alliance. It covered a wide range from terrorism, NATO' s military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to a further development of Partnership. The most visible issues referred to enlargement and improvements to NATO' s military capabilities. The question of capabilities concerned the member countries of NATO and of the European Union (EU). Because each nation had only one set of forces, it was necessary to make the best use possible of the scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps. The message was very clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO' s Prague Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative, if EUNATO impasse was to be avoided or ended.
Topic:
Terrorism and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Kosovo, Germany, United Nations, and Macedonia

183. Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges

Publication Date:
02-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Since the end of the Iraq war, Washington and Damascus have been locked in a dialogue of the deaf. U.S. policy has been reduced to a series of demands and threats. Syrian policy, with President Bashar still struggling to formulate and implement a coherent strategy, has been mainly wait-and-see – offering a few concessions and hoping to weather the storm while refusing to relinquish what it sees as trump cards (support for Hizbollah and radical Palestinian groups) so long as the conflict with Israel continues. Despite the current deadlock, however, the current regional situation presents an opportunity for an intensive, U.S.-led diplomatic effort to revive the Israeli-Syrian peace process and thereby achieve significant changes in Syrian policy.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Washington, Israel, Arabia, and Syria

184. The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and Security Services - Challenges and Developments

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid
Publication Date:
08-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Both Saudi Arabia's security situation, and the Saudi security apparatus, are undergoing major changes. Saudi Arabia no longer faces a major threat from Iraq, but must deal with the growing risk that Iran will become a nuclear power. This confronts Saudi Arabia with hard strategic choices as to whether to ignore Iran's efforts to proliferate, seek US military assistance in deterring Iran and possibly in some form of missile defense, or to acquire more modern missiles and its own weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Development, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Arabia

185. Iran's Security Sector: An Overview

Author:
Wilfried Buchta
Publication Date:
08-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The intention of this paper is to give an overview of the internal structure of the security sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), one of the few states in the Islamic world in which in general the security sector is submitted to the control of the civilian leadership. This paper will not deal with the issues of WMD, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran's open and covert support for militant Islamic groups abroad, the system's fight against exiled militant opposition groups or Tehran's policy towards Iraq prior to and after the US invasion, although some aspects of the security sectors' tasks are connected to these issues. Instead the paper will focus on the relationship between civilian leadership and the influential heads of the different branches of the security sector, a relationship which is extremely complex and often defies explanation. Therefore it is vital to offer some explanatory remarks on the overall political structure of the system and its main features.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

186. Mini-Nukes and Preemptive Policy: A Dangerous Combination

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Currently, the United States relies on conventional bunker-busting bombs—such as the GBU-28, which was used in both Afghanistan and Iraq—to destroy hardened, underground targets. Legislation is pending in Congress that would provide funding for research—but not engineering or development—for low-yield, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons for targets that cannot be destroyed by conventional bunker busters.
Topic:
Terrorism, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

187. Placing Iraq and Zarqawi in the Terror Web

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Following Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 6 address to the United Nations Security Council, some questioned his description of the "sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network." In fact, the relationship between Baghdad and terrorism mirrors the way in which today's international terrorist groups function: not as tightly structured hierarchies, but rather as shadowy networks that, when necessary, strike ad hoc tactical alliances bridging religious and ideological schisms. Osama bin Laden's recent call on Muslims to come to Iraq's defense, even as he derided the "infidel" regime in Baghdad, is a case in point.
Topic:
Security, Religion, Terrorism, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Arabia

188. Iraq's Shiites Under Occupation

Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The massive car bomb in Najaf on 29 August 2003, which took the lives of over 90 Iraqis, including the prominent cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, has put renewed focus on the fate of the country's Shiites. The attack comes in the wake of the attempted killing of other prominent clerics, including Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Saed Al-Tabatab'i al-Hakim, al-Hakim's uncle. Although it is too soon to assign blame, it is not too soon to assess potential consequences: a heightened sense of insecurity; anger, directed both at the former regime and at the current occupiers; intensified intra-Shiite rivalry; and a growing risk of sectarian conflict as militias loyal to different groups vie for control.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Iraq and Arabia

189. Governing Iraq

Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The horrific bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 has focused renewed attention on the question of who, if anyone, is capable of governing Iraq in the current highly volatile environment and, in particular, on what ought to be the respective roles, during the occupation period, of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Interim Governing Council and the United Nations. This report proposes a new distribution of authority between the three - potentially acceptable to the United States, the wider international community and the majority of Iraqis - which would enable Iraq's transitional problems, including the critical issue of security, to be much more effectively addressed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Ethnic Conflict, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Baghdad, and Arabia

190. The Defense Monitor: The World At War

Author:
Col. Daniel Smith
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
At the start of 2003, the United States remains focused on fighting global terrorism in general even as it zeroes in on Iraq as the nexus of evil. But a number of factors in play today make international support for such a venture less effusive than in 1990-91, when the last anti-Saddam “coalition of the willing” formed. Many economies, including those of three of the four big financial supporters of the 1990-91 war — Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia — are weaker. Any war would be relatively more expensive. Suspicions about U.S. motives, fueled by the Bush administration's initial unilateralism, remain alive despite Washington's patient work in obtaining a UN Security Council resolution on new inspections. Germany has declared it will provide no forces; use of Saudi Arabian airbases to launch combat missions against Iraq remains unclear; and troop contributions, as well as moral support, from other Arab states such as Egypt and Syria may not materialize.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Iraq, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt