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21. Multilateralism Index 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
There are growing calls to transform the multilateral system, which is widely seen as being in crisis. Yet solving the crisis of multilateralism requires understanding what that crisis entails. What parts of the multilateral system are in crisis, and what parts are still functioning? Where is commitment to multilateralism flagging, and where does it remain strong? Where is multilateral action failing to translate into concrete results, and where is it delivering? Who is being left out of multilateral engagement, and who is being included? And what are the trends over time? To help answer these questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) developed the Multilateralism Index. This 2024 edition of the Index assesses changes in international cooperation between 2013 and 2023 across five domains: Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade. Each domain is evaluated across three dimensions: Participation, Performance, and Inclusivity
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Human Rights, Multilateralism, Peace, Trade, Public Health, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Legality of the Use of Cluster Bombs in International Law: A Short Overview

Author:
Vesna Poposka and Abdulmecit Nuredin
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine brought the collective security system towards a dead-end street. After raising the question of nuclear threat, another long-time forgotten question arises again, waking up the ghosts that slept for more than a half-century- the use of cluster bombs. Although an international convention prohibits this type of weapon, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor the United States are part of it, which leads back to the agony of fragmentation of international law versus the erga omnes concept of universally applicable norms and customary rules. Since the war is official and intensive, the law of armed conflict applies no matter which of the states involved denies it or names it differently. The use of cluster munitions from both sides is highly contested in international law—the paper aimed to provide an overview of the applicable legal framework through analytical and comparative methods. Although there is a general notion that cluster munition is banned under international law, the paper’s results show this is not the ultimate case. Contextualisation relies on the four basic principles of humanitarian law.
Topic:
Security, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Global Focus

23. Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Military Alliances

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances, focusing on the perspectives of the so-called umbrella states—that is, allied states that do not have their own nuclear weapons but are part of the ‘extended nuclear deterrence arrangements’ of a nuclear-armed patron. After analysing allied security thinking and highlighting the underlying assumptions about nuclear deterrence, the paper subjects some of those assumptions to critical scrutiny. Taking into account regional military balances and escalation risks related to nuclear deterrence, it challenges the perceived security benefits of forward-deployed non-strategic weapons, continued support for allied nuclear doctrines based on readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons, and the assumed inevitability of nuclear second strike that underlies the practices of nuclear assurance. The goal is to open discussion on the development of a more measured approach to deterrence that would allow for minimizing the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. Security Studies: Classic to Post-Modern Approaches

Author:
Vildan Meydan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
What kinds of security threats do states currently face in international relations? What areas do security studies cover in the discipline? Contrary to the military security-oriented structure of the Cold War period, the new era requires a more inclusive and alternative approach to security studies due to the effects of globalization. Therefore, many areas that were seen as low politics issues in the early years of the discipline have begun to play an important role in shaping today’s international system and the security perception of states. For someone seeking to answer the above questions, Security Studies: Classic to Post-Modern Approaches, edited by Arda Özkan and Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, is a good starting point. Within the framework of its eighteen chapters, the book is an important reference that not only deals with the classical approaches of the discipline, such as military issues, but also explores post-modern approaches and contemporary topics, such as energy, environment, migration, and so on.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Book Review
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. The role of military morale as an essential dimension of combat power

Author:
Mioara Șerban
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the principles and values that guide human behaviour as well as judgements about what is considered ethical. The objectives of this analysis are threefold: (1) to explore the role of morale as an essential dimension of combat power, (2) to identify perceptions and representations related to the importance of military morale in managing stress during wartime or on a field mission, and (3) to identify possible ways to improve the resilience of military personnel deployed on the battlefield within the organisational culture. This study adopts a mixed-methods approach, including qualitative methodologies to examine the role and impact of psychological training and self-confidence in military settings along with quantitative methodologies that include specific questions regarding demographics and military experiences. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with thirty-two military personnel with direct experience in missions, conflict zones, or theatres of operations. Soldiers’ perceptions, formed by their states of necessity and subjective character, contribute to satisfaction, shaping the scope of motivation, and confirming that soldiers’ morale directly influences their actions on the battlefield. Accomplishing a mission requires not only the precise definition of objectives and the provision of the necessary tools but also an appeal to factors that stimulate, raise awareness, and activate personnel. The findings reveal measures that can be taken to manage stress in combat, including subjective ones, deriving from the military’s confidence and conviction in the legitimacy of the cause and the justice of the war, group integration, personal beliefs and hopes as well as objective ones, such as external mass influences, the media or the states involved, which affect the security of the military. The results of the study emphasise the importance of the initial training of the military at individual and group levels, or under leadership of superiors, together with the solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union member states in supporting the families of the military and improving their situation from various perspectives: economic, material, orale, civil protection, and child protection.
Topic:
Security, Motivation, Morale, Combat Power, and Military Security
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Security scenarios: 3D Printed Firearms

Author:
Samu Rautio and Mika Broms
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The aim of this study was to determine possible future scenarios if 3D printed firearms were to be manufactured in society. These scenarios provide a closer examination of the factors influencing the use of this relatively new method of firearms production. We reviewed the factors in 3D printed firearms that are relevant to various security authorities. Scenario analysis enables the examination of problem-solving for this multi-dimensional, multi-layered and multi-scale phenomenon. The topic was approached from a systemic perspective based on complexity thinking. The scenario-creation method employed five forecasting techniques applicable to the Playbook for Strategic Foresight and Innovation (Carleton, 2013). A context map created the basis for factor analysis, generational arcs, white spots and expert panel. The scenarios were developed into a structural format, allowing for the description of coherent entities. Upon analysing the scenarios, it was found that the ease of manufacturing 3D printed firearms could lead to a rapid increase in their numbers, potentially resulting in decreased internal and external security. The networking of manufacturers could also enable the production of weapons for individuals who previously did not have access to firearms. On the other hand, 3D printed firearms could open up new legal uses and possibilities. The networking of manufacturers could also enable the production of weapons for individuals who previously did not have access to firearms. On the other hand, 3D-printed firearms could open up new legal uses and possibilities.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Forecast, Manufacturing, and 3D Printing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

27. The Copenhagen School’s widening security theory in relation to cybersecurity. Applicability and Implications

Author:
Mihai Olteanu
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper critically examines the relationship between cybersecurity and Copenhagen School’s widening security theory, with the aim of assessing the possibility of applying this theoretical framework to the cyber realm. As cybersecurity is a relatively recent addition to the security discourse, this research explores whether the Copenhagen School’s traditional framework, which was primarily focused on securitisation processes in the five main sectors (military, political, economic, environmental, and societal), adequately encompasses the unique aspects and dynamics of cyber domain. The research question is: Why the cybersecurity field can’t become a separate constructivist sector? The study begins with a detailed overview of both cybersecurity landscape and Copenhagen School’s fundamental principles to provide the context for a comparative analysis of the Copenhagen theory and contemporary cybersecurity literature. In doing so, the research delves into the features of cybersecurity, with a focus on the evolving nature of cyber threats and vulnerabilities. By performing a qualitative analysis of the existing literature, the paper assesses the limitations of integrating these two concepts, ultimately concluding that cybersecurity lacks the distinct characteristics required to be considered a separate sector under the Copenhagen School’s framework. The findings contribute to the ongoing discussions regarding the adaptation of traditional security theories to address contemporary security challenges in the digital age.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Copenhagen School
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Health Security of Low-Wage Migrant Workers Post-COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Danielle Lynn Goh
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the importance of addressing the welfare of low-wage migrant workers. This includes improving their working and living conditions, better access to healthcare, and more social interactions with local communities.
Topic:
Security, Health, COVID-19, and Migrant Workers
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. Corrupt behavior and the safety of organizational units of the Prison Service

Author:
Marta Jaroszewska
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Corruption in a broad, general sense is perceived as an important social problem that occurs in all spheres of human activity. This phenomenon develops according to the dynamics of changes in a given society. What remains unchanged over the years is that the purpose of corruption is material goods and personal benefits. The subject of this article is the phenomenon of corruption occurring in penitentiary units in the context of their security. When considering the issue of corruption, particular attention should be paid to the judicial authorities and places where perpetrators of crimes, including persons convicted for bribery, are serving sentences, i.e. prisons or detention centers.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Prisons/Penal Systems, Organized Crime, and Resocialization
Political Geography:
Poland and Global Focus

30. AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

Author:
Bill Drexel and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Not long after COVID-19 gave the world a glimpse of the catastrophic potential of biological events, experts began warning that rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could augur a world of bioterrorism, unprecedented superviruses, and novel targeted bioweapons. These dire warnings have risen to the highest levels of industry and government, from the CEOs of the world's leading AI labs raising alarms about new technical capabilities for would-be bioterrorists, to Vice President Kamala Harris’s concern that AI-enabled bioweapons “could endanger the very existence of humanity.”1 If true, such developments would expose the United States to unprecedented catastrophic threats well beyond COVID-19’s scope of destruction. But assessing the degree to which these concerns are warranted—and what to do about them—requires weighing a range of complex factors, including: The history and current state of American biosecurity The diverse ways in which AI could alter existing biosecurity risks Which emerging technical AI capabilities would impact these risks Where interventions today are needed This report considers these factors to provide policymakers with a broad understanding of the evolving intersection of AI and biotechnology, along with actionable recommendations to curb the worst risks to national security from biological threats. The sources of catastrophic biological risks are varied. Historically, policymakers have underappreciated the risks posed by the routine activities of well-intentioned scientists, even as the number of high-risk biosecurity labs and the frequency of dangerous incidents—perhaps including COVID-19 itself—continue to grow. State actors have traditionally been a source of considerable biosecurity risk, not least the Soviet Union’s shockingly large bioweapons program. But the unwieldiness and imprecision of bioweapons has meant that states remain unlikely to field large-scale biological attacks in the near term, even though the U.S. State Department expresses concerns about the potential bioweapons capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. On the other hand, nonstate actors—including lone wolves, terrorists, and apocalyptic groups—have an unnerving track record of attempting biological attacks, but with limited success due to the intrinsic complexity of building and wielding such delicate capabilities. Today, fast-moving advancements in biotechnology—independent of AI developments—are changing many of these risks. A combination of new gene editing techniques, gene sequencing methods, and DNA synthesis tools is opening a new world of possibilities in synthetic biology for greater precision in genetic manipulation and, with it, a new world of risks from the development of powerful bioweapons and biological accidents alike. Cloud labs, which conduct experiments on others’ behalf, could enable nonstate actors by allowing them to outsource some of the experimental expertise that has historically acted as a barrier to dangerous uses. Though most cloud labs screen orders for malicious activity, not all do, and the constellation of existing bioweapons norms, conventions, and safeguards leaves open a range of pathways for bad actors to make significant progress in acquiring viable bioweapons. But experts’ opinions on the overall state of U.S. biosecurity range widely, especially with regard to fears of nonstate actors fielding bioweapons. Those less concerned contend that even if viable paths to building bioweapons exist, the practicalities of constructing, storing, and disseminating them are far more complex than most realize, with numerous potential points of failure that concerned parties either fail to recognize or underemphasize. They also point to a lack of a major bioattacks in recent decades, despite chronic warnings. A more pessimistic camp points to experiments that have demonstrated the seeming ease of successfully constructing powerful viruses using commercially available inputs, and seemingly diminishing barriers to the knowledge and technical capabilities needed to create bioweapons. Less controversial is the insufficiency of U.S. biodefenses to adequately address large-scale biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. Despite COVID-19’s demonstration of the U.S. government’s inability to contain the effects of a major outbreak, the nation has made limited progress in mitigating the likelihood and potential harm of another, more dangerous biological catastrophe. New AI capabilities may reshape the risk landscape for biothreats in several ways. AI is enabling new capabilities that might, in theory, allow advanced actors to optimize bioweapons for more precise effects, such as targeting specific genetic groups or geographies. Though such capabilities remain speculative, if realized they would dramatically alter states’ incentives to use bioweapons for strategic ends. Instead of risking their own militaries’ or populations’ health with the unwieldy weapons, states could sabotage other nations’ food security or incapacitate enemies with public health crises from which they would be unlikely to rebound. Relatedly, the same techniques could create superviruses optimized for transmissibility and lethality, which may considerably expand the destructive potential of bioweapons. Tempering these fears, however, are several technical challenges that scientists would need to overcome—if they can be solved at all. The most pressing concern for biological risks related to AI stems from tools that may soon be able to accelerate the procurement of biological agents by nonstate actors. Recent studies have suggested that foundation models may soon be able to help accelerate bad actors’ ability to acquire weaponizable biological agents, even if the degree to which these AI tools can currently help them remains marginal.2 Of particular concern are AI systems’ budding abilities to help troubleshoot where experiments have gone wrong, speeding the design-build-test-learn feedback loop that is essential to developing working biological agents. If made more effective, emerging AI tools could provide a boon to would-be bioweapons creators by more dynamically providing some of the knowledge needed to produce and use bioweapons, though such actors would still face other significant hurdles to bioweapons development that are often underappreciated. AI could also impact biological risks in other ways. Technical faults in AI tools could fail to constrain foundation models from relaying hazardous biological information to potential bad actors, or inadvertently encourage researchers to pursue promising medicinal agents with unexpected negative side effects. Using AI to create more advanced automated labs could expose these labs to many of the risks of automation that have historically plagued other complex automated systems, and make it easier for nonspecialists to concoct biological agents (depending upon the safety mechanisms that automated labs institute). Finally, heavy investment in companies and nations seeking to capitalize on AI’s potential for biotechnology could be creating competition dynamics that prioritize speed over safety. These risks are particularly acute in relation to China, where a variety of other factors shaping the country’s biotech ecosystem also further escalate risks of costly accidents.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Biosecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus