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81. Is There Life After NATO?

Author:
Marc Trachtenberg
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
It is often claimed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 requires the United States to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. The historical evidence, however, shows that this is not the case at all. It is also commonly claimed that until Donald Trump came along, no American president would have dreamed of threatening not to defend the European allies. This too, it turns out, is not supported by the evidence. But it is not just a question of getting the history right. Those historical claims are important because they support the more fundamental claim that the NATO system is so obviously in America’s interest that it needs to be treated as sacrosanct. But has it been such a phenomenal success?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

82. UK-EU foreign, security and defence co-operation

Author:
Joelle Grogan, Jannike Wachowiak, and Richard Whitman
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
With an election looming in the UK, war raging in Ukraine, and the prospect of another Trump presidency in the United States, the possible evolution of the foreign and security policy relationship between the UK and EU has taken on additional salience. The response to Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown that global events can increase UK-EU cooperation on foreign policy. However, while such major events could in future reinforce the sense of the shared challenges faced by the EU and the UK, they may not be sufficient to propel the EU and the UK towards a truly bespoke security and defence agreement. This new report highlights how Labour and the Conservatives differ in their approach to foreign policy with the EU, and what this could mean for the future relationship. It finds that the EU has well-established models for relationships with third countries for cooperation on foreign and security policy. None of these, however, seem appropriate for a country with the foreign policy and military heft of the UK. This in-depth study of UK-EU relations finds that there is scope for a new relationship, but the EU sees the ball as being ‘in the UK’s court’ to push for closer cooperation. It finds that while the EU is likely to welcome further cooperation on foreign policy and crisis management, it is developing a defence industrial strategy focussed on single market members and Ukraine. A bespoke deal involving UK and EU defence industries therefore will encounter significant hurdles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

83. UK-EU climate and energy relations

Author:
Camilla Born and Joël Reland
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
As the new UK government sets out its plans for a ‘reset’ of EU relations, plenty of attention has been paid to the security and trade aspects of the bilateral relationship. Much less discussed has been the issue of climate and energy cooperation. But, as this report sets out, these policies are inextricably linked to issues of security and trade. What’s more, there is an unusually high degree of potential to deepen UK-EU cooperation on climate and energy. The European Commission actively wants a closer partnership, and there is plenty of low hanging fruit to picked under the current trade agreement. The report covers energy and climate cooperation under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, highlighting the significant untapped potential for closer relations in terms of pre-existing commitments which have lain dormant. The report also looks at areas where cooperation could be deepened beyond the TCA, such as around trade and supply chains, regulatory divergence, and climate diplomacy. It also considers the politics on both the UK and EU side.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

84. Preparing for a rainy day: What can EU member states learn from Finland’s approach to resilience?

Author:
Tiina Kähkönen and Robin Forsberg
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The EU faces growing threats from geopolitical tensions, pandemics, hybrid warfare, and climate change. These challenges require resilience that extends beyond military readiness to include robust civilian preparedness. In the 21st century, the need for rapid responses to complex threats has increased, demanding civilian sector involvement to ensure national security. Finland’s Comprehensive Security Model provides a valuable framework for crafting a unified EU resilience strategy.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Resilience, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
Europe

85. Niger coup forces a rethink of EU and US security strategies

Author:
Andrew Lebovich
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
For a decade the European Union (EU) and the United States saw Niger as their most valuable and cooperative partner in the Sahel, but the military coup that struck Niger in 2023 changed that. As European states rethink their options in the Sahel, an understanding of what went wrong in Niger can shed light on how to rethink security assistance in the Sahel and in coastal West Africa. ‘Last man standing, last chance’ is how a European diplomat described Niger’s regional status less than two weeks before the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023. The French departure from Mali in late 2022 and Burkina Faso in 2023, along with increasing pressure on United Nations forces and the European civilian and security training missions EU Training Mission (EUTM) and EU Capacity Assistance Programme (EUCAP) in Mali, left Niger as the last stronghold for the EU and international community to maintain regional counterterrorism operations and influence with a willing partner. This shift raised concerns that the relatively better security situation in Niger, compared to its central Sahelian neighbours, was at risk should Niger falter in its security stance and commitments and, since the coup, many of the worst fears of European and American actors have come true. Attacks have increased, with some of them disturbingly close to Niger’s capital Niamey. The Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP), the military junta which assumed control after the coup, swiftly cut ties with the country’s prior security partnerships, opting for a different direction that includes Russian trainers, equipment and possibly other security assistance, although there is no evidence that Russia had a hand in the coup itself. Thus far this presence is significantly smaller than in Mali, where Russian-financed mercenaries operate in significant numbers. Most strikingly, French soldiers were ordered to leave the country within weeks of the coup. Following an unsuccessful meeting between a high-level American delegation and Nigérien junta leaders in March 2024, American forces were also pushed out, with their withdrawal to be completed by September 2024.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, European Union, and Coup
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Sahel, and Niger

86. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

87. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

88. EU Energy Security & the Maghreb

Author:
Intissar Fakir and Alberto Rizzi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
North Africa and the Sahel Program Director Intissar Fakir speaks to Alberto Rizzi - pan-European fellow at the Rome Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations - about existing and future energy partnerships between the European Union and the Maghreb. In the wake of energy market disruption caused by the conflict in Ukraine, what alternative fuel sources are the EU looking towards - and how does this align with current production capacities in Maghreb countries?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Morocco

89. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

90. European Security and Defence: Don’t Get Your Hopes Up Just Yet

Author:
Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“2022 will be the year of European defence”.[1] These were the words of European Council President Charles Michel in October 2021. When he gave his speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award Ceremony in Aachen, no one expected that his statement would materialise in the way it did. Yes, headway was to be expected with the adoption of the Strategic Compass and European countries demonstrating commitment to investing more in defence cooperation. Although there is still a world of difference between ambitions and reality, the degree of progress accomplished in the past twelve months was not foreseen.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe