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61. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

62. Building national preparedness: A road map for Australia and what we should learn from Finland

Author:
Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces increasing threats from natural disasters, pandemics and geopolitical tensions—including the increasing likelihood of conflict and war—necessitating robust preparedness mechanisms. But Australia lacks a comprehensive national preparedness framework that’s fit for purpose against the broad range of threats that the nation is likely to face soon and in the foreseeable future. Beyond a narrow range of potential crises, Australia remains poorly prepared, and little government attention is currently paid to understanding or resourcing national preparedness for threats, beyond annually reviewed natural-disaster arrangements. The Australian Government isn’t doing enough to prepare Australian citizens for the more volatile and uncertain strategic environment that we face. There’s no regular public discourse about the national risks to Australia, there’s no planning or capability development for mitigating such risks, and there’s no regular program for educating, training or exercising Australia’s communities to deal with them. National preparedness isn’t just a task for a national government; it’s a truly whole-of-society activity and a shared responsibility of all within the nation, including all three levels of government, businesses, civil society and the citizenry at large. This report recommends a road map of immediate, near-term and longer term initiatives that the Australian Government should embrace as it builds the capabilities and capacities needed to fully prepare the nation. The roadmap is split into two parts, the first focuses on building an effective national preparedness system, while the second part focuses on the capabilities and capacities needed for national preparedness. The road maps contain recommendations for Australian policymakers, industry, civil society, critical infrastructure owners and operators, the Defence organisation and the defence industry. By implementing these initiatives across all sectors, Australia can build and maintain a robust national preparedness and resilience framework capable of meeting all threats, up to and including war, thereby safeguarding its security, prosperity and way of life. The Republic of Finland is an excellent exemplar of what a nation can do to build and maintain national resilience and national preparedness against all hazards, including the risk of conflict and war. Finland’s Comprehensive National Security model and ‘total defence’ strategy, which integrate civilian and military preparedness, offer valuable insights for strengthening Australia’s national preparedness framework. Australia and Finland have the opportunity to work together to build and maintain more robust national preparedness systems that help each country to address future crises. That can be done by fostering collaboration in knowledge exchange, policy development, intelligence sharing and bilateral cooperation on issues such as crisis management and civil defence; military preparedness and defence cooperation; disaster management and crisis response; cybersecurity; social resilience and public preparedness; and international collaboration and multilateral engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, European Union, Resilience, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Europe, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

63. Flawed by Design: What al-Sisi’s Egypt Reveals About the Myth of Authoritarian Efficiency

Author:
Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This policy analysis challenges the rising narrative that authoritarian regimes, despite their repressive nature, offer superior governance efficiency and contribute to regional stability. Using Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as a case study, it argues that the perception of authoritarian efficiency is not only analytically flawed but dangerously misleading for international policymakers. European and Western engagement with Egypt continues to rely on flawed assumptions about authoritarian capacity and stability. Financial support, arms sales, and diplomatic legitimacy are extended largely unconditionally, under the illusion that al-Sisi’s regime can deliver long-term order. This approach ignores the structural fragility baked into Egypt’s political economy, and risks enabling a trajectory toward fiscal implosion and social unrest. The paper argues for a strategic recalibration. European policymakers should shift from regime-centered engagement to resilience-centered investment, focusing on areas like education, climate adaptation, and local economic empowerment that outlast regime cycles. Europe’s current approach risks buying short-term quiet at the cost of long-term instability. A policy recalibration grounded in realism, not regime accommodation, is both necessary and overdue.
Topic:
Political Economy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, European Union, Regime Security, Regional Stability, and Regime Legitimation
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Egypt

64. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:
Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

65. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

66. From Belgrade to Tbilisi: How the EU Views Civil Protests

Author:
Ljiljana Kolarski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
From Belgrade to Tbilisi: How the EU Views Civil Protests The European Union (EU) has long positioned itself as a promoter of democratic values, human rights, and media freedom. However, its stance on opposition protests in different countries is often influenced by a complex interplay of geopolitical considerations and pragmatic interests. This paper examines the EU’s contrasting reactions to anti-government protests in Serbia and Georgia in 2024, emphasizing how these responses are shaped by the political alignments of the respective governments. On the one hand, the EU has brought a strong support to opposition in Georgia, whose government maintains close ties with its northern neighbor, Russia. On the other hand, Brussels has failed to actively support opposition groups in Serbia, which has visibly distanced itself from Moscow since the war began without moving towards greater democratization.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Protests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, and Georgia

67. The European Union and Critical Raw Materials: Juggling Geopolitical and Economic Realities

Author:
Dan Ziebarth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, critical raw materials (CRMs) have emerged as a crucial focus for governments and industries worldwide. These materials, which include rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and others, have gained strategic importance due to their essential role in modern technologies, particularly those related to clean energy, digitalization, and advanced manufacturing (CRM Alliance 2024). In particular, the essential role of CRMs in clean energy technologies and the global push for a green energy transition have led to a surge in demand for CRMs (World Economic Forum 24-05-2024). This surge has created substantial opportunities for green industrialization. According to the International Energy Agency, the market for these raw materials has more than doubled over the past five years, with expectations of "unprecedented growth" in the coming years (International Energy Agency 2023); current climate commitments could lead to a quadrupling of global demand for materials such as rare earths, cobalt, and nickel by 2040 (Findeisen & Wernert 30-06-2023). CRMs are of paramount importance for the European Union’s economy, industrial base, and strategic autonomy. These materials have a wide range of applications, contributing to the production of various goods across all supply-chain stages in Europe. The use of CRMs is also essential for the EU’s green transition goals, as these materials are necessary for technologies crucial to the EU’s green and digital transformations. This is particularly true for many technologies that support net-zero carbon emissions goals like wind turbines and electric vehicles. For example, the production of a typical electric car has been estimated to require six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car; an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant (International Energy Agency 2022). This surge in demand has led to increased concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities in western countries as many CRMs are concentrated in a small number of countries or are produced as by-products of other mining operations (U.S. Department of Energy 2023). The European Union, recognizing the economic and strategic significance of CRMs, responded by publishing a list of critical raw materials in 2011, updating it every three years to reflect changing economic importance and supply risks (Gislev & Grohol 2018), while the European Commission produced a foresight study of CRMs in 2020 for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU (Bobba et al. 2020). In 2023, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) was adopted, which aims to increase and diversify the EU’s critical raw materials supply, strengthen circularity and recycling efforts, and support research and innovation in resource efficiency and the development of substitutes (European Council 2024).
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Geopolitics, and Critical Raw Materials (CRM)
Political Geography:
Europe

68. Hybrid Threats and the Role of the Far Right

Author:
Daniela Pisoiu
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
On 16 December 2024, the Council of the European Union decided for the first time to sanction a number of individuals and entities as a response to Russian “hybrid activities of various kinds, including the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.” (Council of the EU 2024) The malicious activities invoked in the decision mainly relate to disinformation and misinformation campaigns in relation to the war in Ukraine but also include espionage and hate crimes such as the deliberate painting of Stars of David on the streets of Paris in October 2023. Russia’s hybrid war against the EU is not limited to misinformation, disinformation and low-level violence, but has also included sabotage and cyberattacks, as documented in detail in the press. The recent incident whereby power and internet cables were cut in the Baltic Sea by an anchor of a Russia-linked tanker (Bockmann 2024; Rasmussen and Kauranen 2025) is only one example. NATO officials estimate that such attacks have reached levels never seen before, along with numerous foiled plots (Clark 2024). In July 2024, two parcel bombs were detonated—one in a DHL plane in Leipzig and another in a warehouse near Birmingham—while several arson attacks were registered in the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia (Kayali et al. 2024). Some officials would go as far as to call these attacks acts of terrorism (ibid.), in what appears to be an all-out war on several fronts. In the background of this strategic situation in Europe, the recent advances of far-right parties in several key EU members become particularly relevant, especially considering their neutral or even positive attitudes towards Russia. While Hungary repeatedly opposed EU sanctions against Russia in the context of its aggression war in Ukraine, far-right parties in Austria and Germany consistently argue for a ‘neutral’ approach towards the war or even against their countries’ support for Ukraine (Hasselbach C. 2024; Lindorfer and Gebhart 2024). Russian overt and covert funding of far-right parties and actors in Europe has been clearly evidenced and analyzed as a tool to undermine liberal democracy in Europe and as “a reward for ideological alignment with Moscow and an incentive to advance Russian interests in the West.” (Datta 2022) Interference in national elections is a particularly effective and worrisome form of Russian hybrid warfare that has already occurred in Europe at least twice last year. According to a press release of the European Parliament in October 2024, Russia conducted a number of destabilizing actions in Moldova in order to influence the national vote through voter fraud schemes, cyberattacks and information warfare. For example, authorities foiled a voter fraud scheme involving “$15 million being transferred to 130,000 Moldovans as part of a voter bribery operation”. (European Parliament, 2024) Interestingly, and in spite of the overwhelming evidence presented, a resolution issuing a warning against Russian interference was met with 53 votes against and 104 abstentions (ibid.). The Romanian presidential election at the end of 2024 was also marked by strong Russian interference, again in support of an anti-EU and pro-Russian actor, this time also with clear far-right tendencies. Presidential candidate Calin Georgescu, having risen from 1% support to first ranked after the first round of presidential elections, publicly praised the Romanian fascist organization Iron Guard—as well as others responsible for assassinations and the systematic killing of Jews during World War II—and openly collaborates with alleged current Iron Guard members (Pro TV 2024). Sociolinguistic analysis furthermore concluded that his discourses heavily rely on the Iron Guard, but also communist rhetoric (Benea 2024). Public statements in relation to the war in Ukraine resemble the tenor of far-right parties in Germany and Austria in terms of advancing a neutral stance towards the war and promoting ‘peace’ (Ardelean 2024). On the background of previous activities in the esoteric scene, other statements advanced various conspiracy, New Age–colored theories, including those concerning a faked moon-landing, the energetic power of the pyramids, and an alternative chemical composition of water (Barbuta 2024). The Romanian presidential elections were canceled by the Constitutional Court after a number of declassified documents showed massive foreign interference through several hybrid tactics, namely cyber-attacks, sabotage, and disinformation, as well as various breaches of electoral legislation (Costita et al. 2024). The tactics used closely resembled the ones employed prior to the elections in Moldova and to the war in Ukraine. For example, according to documents released by the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service, Russia considers Romania as an enemy state that poses a threat through its NATO membership, and which constitutes ‘competition’ for Russia in Moldova. The scope of Russian hostile actions included propaganda and disinformation to affect political and economic preferences, support for anti-EU candidates and anti-establishment movements, affecting trust in national and European institutions, and creating discontent among the population to pressure the government towards changing its stance on the war in Ukraine (ibid.). Romanian presidential elections are scheduled to take place again in May 2025. The parliamentary elections in December 2024 failed to produce a rise of far-right/nationalist parties, which overall scored a little over 20% altogether (Digi24 2024), which seems to indicate the powerful effect of hybrid warfare when carefully orchestrated and funded. In the meantime, the public has been made somewhat aware of the online manipulations on social media, but further hostile actions can be expected in Romania and other EU countries. While initial measures have already been taken to address the Russian hybrid threat, further initiatives are needed to strengthen cooperation with social media platforms and to better adapt political communication strategies of mainstream parties to the particularities of social media platforms in order to limit the reach and effect of extremist messaging.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Far Right, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Europe and Romania

69. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

70. The European Union and the Sahel: the day after

Author:
Angela Meyer, Loïc Simonet, and Johannes Späth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Geopolitics are changing fast in the Sahel. Over the past three years, the region, one of the most impoverished and imperilled of the world, has undergone a dramatic cycle of regime change and alliance shift, which has significantly challenged the strategy and engagement of the European Union (EU) and its member states in the region. Against the background of this severe crisis in EU-Africa relations and growing anti-Western sentiments, new international players are appearing or increasing their influence, such as the Russian Federation, China and Turkey. It is now urgent for the EU to acknowledge the new situation in the Sahel region and rethink its approach. If Europe wants to remain engaged in the region, it should forge a new path guided by day-after policies, with a view to rebuilding trust in the EU as a reliable partner. This Policy Analysis draws on the Panel Discussion held at the oiip on 28 November 2024 on the same topic, in cooperation with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence (bmlv). This piece dives into the drivers of the Sahel region’s geopolitical dynamics and critically investigates the shortcomings of the EU’s approach to the region. It concludes with actionable recommendations for recalibrating the EU’s Sahel policy to address past mistakes, prevent further damage, and adapt to the region’s evolving realities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Sahel