Search

Begin New Search Topic European Union Political Geography Europe

91. Has the time come for European defence?

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
European defence has been a key issue since at least 1948, with the Treaty of Brussels between France, the United Kingdom and the three Benelux countries. At the time, the spirit of the signatories was still to guard against the threat posed by Germany, which was still fresh in people's minds (following on from the Franco-British alliance treaty of Dunkirk in 1947). But it was also increasingly aimed at responding to the threat of the USSR, which was tightening its iron grip on the eastern half of the European continent. As we know, this treaty was soon superseded by the Washington Treaty creating NATO, which is still, to this day, the political and military framework for European defence, coupled with that of the United States. Although the Brussels Treaty eventually disappeared, it survives, notably through the collective defence clause incorporated into the European treaties by the Lisbon Treaty. The idea, the project and the hope of a European defence are still alive, although they have not yet been realised. The war in Ukraine has changed the situation in several ways. Firstly, it places the question of war and peace firmly centre stage in Europe, an issue that had never completely went away, despite the end of the Cold War; however, it is now back at the top of the political agenda. Secondly, the war has led to profound unity in the response of the countries of the European Union to Vladimir Putin's open aggression against Ukraine, and the European Union has asserted itself as a major player complementing NATO and the United States. Finally, it raises the question of whether, should the United States change its policy on Ukraine following the presidential election in November 2024, Europeans would be in a position to take over assistance to Ukraine and move towards a genuine collective defence. To address this issue, it is necessary to take stock of European defence, with its achievements and limitations, and to reflect on the conditions under which a shift towards a genuine European defence could be envisaged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

92. Health for the Europeans, who cares?

Author:
Tiphaine Maloingne
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union adapts, moves with the times, and evolves. It is these small steps, often made in response to events, that help the European Union to move forward and create the "common narrative" that has kept it solid for 74 years. For several years now, the EU has been working to strengthen its health policy. In other words, the European Union is gradually building a new common narrative: European health. But in the gradual creation of this policy, what place is given to European citizens and their health? Through considerations that are at once temporal, justificatory, technical and imaginary, this paper offers readers an overview of the contours of a new health system for Europeans.
Topic:
Health, European Union, Citizenship, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
Europe

93. The European Union enlarged from 27 to 36 members? Towards an "Agenda 2030"

Author:
Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The Western Balkans today still confirm Bronislaw Geremek’s premonition in 1990: "Three dangers lurk in the post-communist transition: populism, authoritarian temptation and nationalism.” These three tendencies are converging in ethno-nationalisms that are stalling the process of stabilisation and association of the six countries with the European Union. The pursuit of the rule of law is being made all the more difficult because the Balkans are growing poorer while the European Union is getting richer. In the east, association with Ukraine and Moldova has progressed, but the Russian occupation continues. Russia has shattered the international legal order with its aggression in Ukraine and is fighting against the values that Europe promotes and whose echoes resonate in the Balkans. The European Union has responded by reviving the accession process with the Balkans and by opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and perhaps in time it will do the same with Georgia. The complexity of this dual commitment, which would see the European Union grow from 27 to 36 members, requires that its many challenges be openly set out in an "Agenda 2030", with gradual integration forming the core of a renewed process.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

94. New European Challenges: the "Schuman" lesson

Author:
Jean-Dominique Giuliani
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Since the health crisis, the European Union has changed. Since the Russian war in Ukraine, these changes have accelerated, to the extent that the face it presents today bears little resemblance to what it was just five years ago. The European institutions have had to adapt to the needs expressed by the Member States. They themselves have drawn their own conclusions from the changing geopolitical situation. These upheavals have led to spectacular advances, but also to some mistakes.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, Institutions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

95. The Regional Security Complex Theory and Energy Triangle of EU-TurkeyRussia

Author:
Mehmet Ferhat Fırat
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
This study explores the application of the regional security complex theory (RCST) to the energy relations between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. It underscores the critical role of energy security in shaping international relations and highlights the mutual interdependence among these actors in the energy issue. The study sheds light on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on energy security and emphasizes the need for diversification of energy sources to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. Turkey's active and neutral policy with Russia has formed a security complex in energy relations among these three actors. The claim that shared concerns or threat perceptions among actors assumed by the regional security complex theory constitutes a security complex has been used within the framework of this study to justify the existence of an energy security complex between Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Furthermore, given its strategic geographical position and energy infrastructure projects, this research outlines Turkey's potential as a critical isolator actor and energy hub in the region. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of energy relations and the evolving regional energy security landscape in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Security, Energy Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Turkey

96. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:
Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

97. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:
Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

98. Germany’s Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy: Balancing Sustainable Development and Energy Security

Author:
Jeanette Süß
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
With the war in Ukraine, Germany’s “traffic light” coalition government has had to adapt its climate policy to the upheavals caused by this war, which has turned its economic, energy, and military model upside down. Against a backdrop of high energy costs and increasing calls for reshoring in Europe, German industry is looking at how to maintain its competitiveness while decarbonizing its industry. To combat climate change and find new forms of energy cooperation that are more sustainable for the planet, the federal government has set up a Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy bringing together its collaborative actions with partner countries. Climate, energy, and development partnerships play a vital role in this context, and emerging countries are key partners for climate initiatives. They have a high demand for energy and exploit resources, though without always respecting environmental, social, and governance standards. Their renewable energy (RE) production potential is significant, and there are major opportunities for CO2 reduction thanks to modernization technologies that Germany is seeking to transfer to its partners. To this end, Germany is using a multitude of diplomatic tools and is leveraging a unique network of international agencies, chambers of commerce and climate finance players.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

99. When Life Gives You Lemons: How EU Citrus Standards Can Limit Trade

Author:
Trinity Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
In the early 2000s, the European Union (EU) created multiple standards on agricultural imports. This paper focuses on the effect of stricter maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides on citrus fruit exports to the EU after the limits went into effect in 2005. Using a regression model on overall citrus fruit exports and an interaction term for country-level income, the data shows that the EU’s stricter MRLs hurt exports from high-income, lower-middle-income, and low-income countries. Exports from low-income countries declined the most after 2005, while only upper-middle-income countries saw an increase in exports. For product-specific models, low-income countries saw a reduction in exports to the EU for all citrus fruits, while results varied by fruit for other income classifications. The results of these models demonstrate that the EU’s tightened pesticide regulation hurt low-income countries the most. While the regulation is meant to maintain a standard of food quality in the EU, its impact on low-income countries raises important questions about the unintended effects of import regulations. The EU could maintain its quality of food while alleviating the burden on low-income countries by relaxing its MRL standards or by providing more assistance to developing nations to meet its standards.
Topic:
Agriculture, European Union, Regulation, and Imports
Political Geography:
Europe

100. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany