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1. A Three-year War and Four Lessons for Europe

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The tragic third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022 witnesses the start of diplomatic talks between Russia and the United States on the possible end of the conflict. Three years of large-scale, high-intensity war of attrition in Europe, with over a million dead or injured soldiers, offers at least four politico-military lessons for European countries, the EU and NATO. Lessons to bear in mind through this negotiation for the future not only of Ukraine but of the security of the whole continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

2. Can France Provide European Allies with Nuclear Deterrence?

Author:
Roberto Zadra
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In his speech to fellow citizens on 5 March, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the opening of a “strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent”.[1] It is not the first time: already in the 1990s then-president François Mitterrand alluded to a vocation européenne of French nuclear deterrence.[2] Macron himself proposed, already in February 2020, the opening of a dialogue on the matter.[3] The initiative was not very successful at the time, essentially because European allies considered the security guarantees provided by the United States to Europe through NATO sufficient, together with the repeated reassurances of NATO communiqués that the British and French nuclear forces “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance”.[4] This time, however, the reactions by many European allied countries to the French initiative will probably be different. For a simple reason: excluding the deployment of its own forces to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire and denying security guarantees to Kyiv, the Trump administration fuels the fears of European allies that Washington’s commitment to collective defence is less solid than in the past. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis has shown the limitations of the traditional NATO distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 – that is, between those who are members of NATO and therefore protected by collective defence, and those who are not because collective defence is not valid for NATO partners – as it has laid bare how crisis management and cooperative security are having a direct impact on (the perceived lack of US commitment to) collective defence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and France

3. The New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) launched by Italy, Japan and the UK in 2022 represents a novel partnership among the three countries for the development and production of a next-generation crewed fighter aircraft. A partnership based on equality of rights for and investments by the founding partners, as well as on the principles of Freedom of Action and Freedom of Modification at national level – that means full operational and technological sovereignty on the core platform, differently from the F-35 experience. As such, GCAP presents new challenges and opportunities in political, military and industrial terms, in addition to the programme’s tight schedule and high level of technological ambitions. The cooperation accelerated in 2024 with the establishment of a dedicated international governmental organisation to manage the programme, and the agreement on a joint venture among the three major companies involved on equal foot from the respective countries. This study provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the specific British, Italian and Japanese ways to GCAP, of the programme’s politico-institutional governance and industrial architecture, as well as of training issue and the cross-sectorial implications for Italy. Moreover, a dedicated chapter focuses on the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the US Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programmes in a comparative perspective. The conclusions outline 15 policy recommendations for Italy concerning GCAP.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and F-35
Political Geography:
Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, and Italy

4. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

5. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

6. Local feminist perspectives as transformation levers for sustainable development in Ukraine in the context of ongoing defence

Author:
Olena Strelnyk, Liudmyla Yuzva, and Tamara Zlobina
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The research in this discussion paper explores the significant role of feminist perspectives and actions in fostering sustainable gender-transformative changes within Ukraine, particularly during the ongoing defence against Russian aggression. It highlights the ability of feminist movements to catalyse long-term shifts towards gender equality and social inclusion, with a focus on women’s and LGBT+ rights. Despite the challenges of war, feminist activists continue to push for transformative policies that not only address immediate wartime needs, but also lay the foundation for gender-responsive defence, inclusive recovery and post-war reconstruction. This study examines the impact of feminist actions and perspectives on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the barriers they face and the opportunities that remain for strengthening feminist policies during and after the war. The research timeline spans 2014-2024, corresponding to the duration of Russia’s war against Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the period of the full-scale invasion from 2022 to 2024.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Feminism, LGBT+, Russia-Ukraine War, Sustainable Development, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

7. A Turning Point, or Not? Principles for a New European Order

Author:
Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Despite repeated declarations of historic turning points, deep structural reforms to the European project remain elusive. While defense spending rises are welcome, EU governments must also pursue systemic changes to Europe’s political and security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

8. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision

Author:
Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

9. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:
Greg Weaver
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

10. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine