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61. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

62. Armenia Adapts to New Postwar Realities

Author:
Richard Giragosian
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
To many observers, Armenia’s non‑violent change of government in 2018 represented an unusual victory of “people power.” In what became heralded as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan surprised many with the relative ease with which he displaced an entrenched elite and emerged as the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. After an important free and fair election in December 2018 cemented Pashinyan as Armenia’s new leader, the country ushered in a new period of democracy and reform. Endowed with a rare degree of legitimacy bolstered by popular support, the new democratically‑elected government promised a critical reassessment of a number of critical issues, ranging from Armenian relations with Russia to its policy regarding the conflict over Karabakh. Yet despite these important gains in democratic change and advances in reform, the Armenian leadership faced a looming challenge that was largely obscured by a legacy of arrogance and complacency. With a focus overwhelmingly devoted to domestic reform priorities, the Pashinyan government seemed increasingly ill‑prepared for the inescapable geopolitical and foreign policy demands that loomed large over Armenia. And through much of the period between mid‑2018 and early 2020, Armenia embarked on a foreign policy course characterized more by overconfidence than any realistic reassessment, marked by sporadic mistakes and missteps in its approach toward Russia but also Azerbaijan. Although somewhat explainable by a combination of inexperience and simplistic idealism, Armenia greatly overvalued the advantages of democracy and reform while also overstating its strategic significance. Against that backdrop, such diplomatic overconfidence only exacerbated a mounting crisis over Karabakh, as tensions increased and vulnerability intensified.
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Europe and Armenia

63. How Russia Fights

Author:
Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

64. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:
International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

65. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. Enlargement of the European Union: Lessons from the Western Balkans

Author:
Tefta Kelmendi
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a new momentum for the European Union to review its political and security strategy for the neighborhood. Its enlargement policy – which has become yet another divisive issue in Europe over the past years – is now forced back into the EU’s foreign policy priorities. With Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova officially requesting membership in the EU, deciding how to go about it has become an even greater challenge. Over the past 20 years, we have evidenced a failure of the EU to show results in the Western Balkans – both in terms of driving democratic reforms and the rule of law, as well as in delivering on its promises in the accession process. The war in Ukraine might be the EU’s last chance to reinvigorate its enlargement policy and reposition itself geopolitically in eastern and southeastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

67. War, Peace, and (in)Justice in the Nuclear Age

Author:
Ulrich Kűhn
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has created a watershed moment for Europe. The coming weeks and months will decide what kind of peace and security order will shape the old continent. The prominence of nuclear weapons will likely increase in the years ahead. Mutual deterrence between NATO and Russia will be the military component to what may soon turn out to be a new Cold War dividing Europe. While this is already bad news news, Ukraine’s fate has again exposed the system of nuclear deterrence as highly unjust and precarious. The consequences of that sorry state of affairs might soon create additional injustices on a global scale. A realistic view must come to the conclusion that we do not have the time to fight another Cold War
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

68. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

69. Russia Against Ukraine Before the European Court of Human Rights. The Empire Strikes Back?

Author:
Milena Ingelevic-Citak
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
In July 2021, Russia submitted its first inter-state complaint against Ukraine to the European Court of Human Rights. It was an unexpected and intriguing step of the Russian government, especially since many of the presented allegations are linked to the events that initiated the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Referring to the hostilities that began in 2014, the international community was, in principle, unanimous in assessing who the aggressor was. The focus of this research is the strategy of the Russian Federation in its recently initiated legal battle before the Strasbourg Court. This paper presents an attempt to outline the possible motives for taking such a step. Moscow's position on this case is particularly puzzling, as some of the allegations concern the Crimean Peninsula, widely recognized under international law as territory occupied by Russia. In spite of that, doubt arises about the strategic objectives of the Russian authorities in the conflict with Ukraine; the question is whether the actions taken by Russia fall within the scope of its previous strategy or if there has been a new turn in the matter. The first part of this paper outlines the background of the given conflict, the second details Russian policy after the annexation of Crimea, and the third, which is crucial for the formulating of conclusions, presents considerations on Russia's possible motivation and goals in filing a complaint to the European Court Human Rights. The research was conducted mainly based on the merits of the complaint, the statements of the representatives of Russia and Ukraine in the matter, the author's observations, and practitioners' considerations.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

70. Europe at War

Author:
Robert Cox
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
For the moment as western Europeans watch the nightly media display of Russian brutality in Ukraine, many instinctively feel it’s a long way away. An echo of British Premier Neville Chamberlain’s dismissal of Hitler’s threats to Czechoslovakia in 1938 as a “quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.” One Czech emigrée saw the fatuousness of Chamberlain’s stance—Madeleine Albright. Balts and Poles, their memories fresh of Russian occupation, are clearly nervous. At greater distance, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians feel less threatened. French people show more concern with cost-of-living hikes—albeit driven by Russia’s actions. Yet the violence is happening on all Europeans’ doorstep. One false move, deliberate or careless, and NATO’s Article 5 activates. Perhaps. Let us look at the complexities of the context in which this war has come to pass.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe