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42. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine
- Author:
- Joris Van Bladel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
43. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?
- Author:
- Bruno Angelet
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
44. Western financial warfare and Russia’s de-dollarization strategy: How sanctions on Russia might reshape the global financial system
- Author:
- Maria Shagina
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Since 2014, Russia’s de-dollarization plan has been guided by security and geopolitical considerations. By dumping the US dollar from its foreign currency reserves, Russia diverted from the traditional approach where liquidity and the credibility of the issuer determine the choice of currency. In 2022, Russia has doubled down on its efforts to de-dollarize the economy. What started as de-dollarization in 2014, transformed into full-blown rouble-ization in 2022. Following the dynamic of an emerging multipolar world order, the global financial system is also gravitating towards fragmentation and currency multipolarity. The overuse of sanctions could strengthen revisionist countries’ desire to increasingly conduct their trade in non-dollar currencies in an attempt to avoid US oversight. If current trends continue, the de-dollarization effort could gain ground and undermine the primacy of the US dollar.
- Topic:
- Monetary Policy, Sanctions, Finance, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Global Focus
45. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly
- Author:
- Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
- Abstract:
- Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
46. Transformation Challenges for the International Humanitarian Law System: Migration Crisis as the Latest Tool For Hybrid Warfare. (A Vision From Ukraine)
- Author:
- Vitaliy Kovalchuk, Iryna Zharovska, Mykhailo Mykievych, Malvina Hrushko, and Mykhailo I. Hrabynskyi
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- The article tries to present a theoretical-legal and international-practical analysis of the migration crisis as a tool for hybrid warfare, analysing the features of such a war and the peculiarities of using the flow of migrants and refugees as "living" weapons in a military conflict. The authors try to prove that a migration crisis can be provoked by an aggressor country using the hybrid warfare methodology attempting to destabilize the political situation, avoiding the resistance of the civil society of the target country without engaging in open hostilities. The authors stress the uncertainty surrounding the term "hybrid warfare" and propose their own classification of the modern hybrid warfare´ features. Based on the analysis of the use of migration crisis in Syria, Venezuela and Belarus, the article singles out the stages of employment of such a tool for warfare.
- Topic:
- Migration, Refugees, Conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and Hybrid Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
47. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine
- Author:
- Björn Alexander Düben
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
48. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region
- Author:
- Claudia Ditel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
- Political Geography:
- Europe
49. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict
- Author:
- Jeffrey Mankoff
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
50. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine