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361. Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Speech: Reactions from China, Civil Unrest in Taiwan

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,1 Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement2 have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda. This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.
Topic:
Protests, Presidential Elections, Regional Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

362. Politics First: The Key to Understanding China’s Third Plenum

Author:
Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members. The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development. However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee. This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

363. Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security

Author:
Daria Impiombato, Nathan Attrill, Albert Zhang, Fergus Ryan, and Bethany Allen
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users. Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose. China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities. ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include: Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4). Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17). Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting t
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Persuasion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

364. When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia

Author:
Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
China’s covert foreign interference activities in the Pacific are a very important, and yet under-researched, topic. This report uses New Caledonia as the case study to examine China’s hidden front, 隐蔽战线, throughout the wider Pacific. Successive months of violence and unrest in New Caledonia in 2024, have heightened regional and international awareness of the uncertain future of the territory, and the role of China in that future. The unrest erupted after France pushed through legislation extending voting rights in the territory. The CCP has engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over many decades, targeting political and economic elites, and attempting to utilise the ethnic Chinese diaspora and PRC companies as tools of CCP interests. Local elites have at times actively courted China’s assistance, willingly working with CCP front organisations. Assessing the extent of China’s foreign interference in New Caledonia is a legitimate and necessary inquiry. The debate about China’s interests, intentions and activities in the territory has lacked concrete, publicly available evidence until now. This study aims to help fill that lacuna. The report draws on open-source data collection and analysis in Chinese, French and English. It was also informed by interviews and discussions that took place during my visits to New Caledonia and France in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023, as well as conversations in New Zealand. My research shows that the French Government and New Caledonian authorities are working to manage risks in the China – New Caledonia relationship. Moreover, civil society, the New Caledonian media, many politicians, and Kanak traditional leadership have also had a role in restraining the extent of the CCP’s foreign interference activities in New Caledonia. Few Pacific Island peoples would welcome a relationship of dependency with China or having the Pacific become part of a China-centred order. The report concludes by recommending that New Caledonia be included in all regional security discussions as an equal partner. New Caledonia needs to rebalance its economy and it needs help with the rebuild from the riots. Supportive partner states should work with France and New Caledonia to facilitate this.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, United Nations, Foreign Interference, Regional Security, Risk Assessment, and Political Unrest
Political Geography:
China, Europe, France, Australia, New Caledonia, and Indo-Pacific

365. A Taiwan crisis is a China crisis

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European Union needs a China contingency. Government and corporate decision-makers may be preparing for a possible Chinese military attack on Taiwan, but they must also focus on how a Taiwan crisis will impact China and, consequently, the EU’s economic security. Largely on account of Taiwan’s prominent position in the global semiconductor industry, a Chinese attack on the island will inflict trillions of dollars in costs on the global economy. But a Taiwan crisis also threatens to disrupt China-centered production and supply chains for green technologies, such as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, as well as create unprecedented geopolitical risk for European companies in China.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

366. Pragmatic Considerations: Analyzing Why is China Concerned About North Korea-Russia Growing Military Cooperation?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On November 11, 2024, North Korea’s Central News Agency reported that Pyongyang had ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia. This agreement, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, stipulates that both parties will provide support to each other in the event of an armed attack. In October 2024, reports suggested that North Korea dispatched several thousand troops to Russia to assist in its war effort in Ukraine. Although both Moscow and Pyongyang have neither confirmed nor denied this action outright, China’s silence and ambiguous stance on the matter have been equally enigmatic. The increasing military alignment between North Korea and Russia has raised significant concerns in China, a key strategic ally of both nations. These concerns stem from the potential repercussions on Beijing’s regional and global influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

367. Voters Consider, Trump Comes, China Coercion Cools

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Australia’s politicians prepare for the national election that must be held by May. In judging the first term of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government, the key concern for Australia voters is the cost of living, while international issues are bracketed by the United States and China—the return of President Donald Trump and the cooling of China’s trade coercion of Australia. The Albanese government tells Australians they face “fraught and fragile global conditions” in a “a time of great global uncertainty,” in “the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” Canberra’s approach to the Trump administration will emphasize traditional alliance ties while reinforcing new elements: AUKUS nuclear submarines, the Quad, the increase of US forces on Australian soil, and steps toward free trade in defense equipment and technology to achieve more integration between US and Australian industries.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Strategic Interests, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

368. Moscow and Beijing at the Dawn of A Grave New World of Trump 2.0

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

369. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

370. China and the Two Koreas’ Triangular Games

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea