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1. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

2. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

3. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

4. Significant, but Not Systemic: The Challenge of China’s Efforts to Rival Western Financial Predominance

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Lukas Spielberger
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Despite worldwide concerns about the US dollar, the Chinese renminbi is not yet ready to be a serious contender for leading international currency status. This Policy Brief examines three of the most important Chinese approaches to increasing the renminbi’s role as an international settlement currency: promote bilateral swap agreements between the People's Bank of China and other central banks; create international payment systems that do not involve the dollar, most notably the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System; and develop a central bank digital currency for alternative payment infrastructures. The authors find that Beijing’s efforts fall short of posing a systemic challenge to the dollar or to infrastructures like SWIFT. Nevertheless, these approaches have enabled China to use its currency for bilateral foreign policy. US and European policymakers should consider countering or attenuating these efforts, even though they have had limited success in increasing renminbi usage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Central Bank, Currency, Digital Currency, and SWIFT
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:
Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:
Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Asia

7. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

8. Chinese Foreign Policy in 2025: Absorbing Blows & Profiting from Others’ Mistakes

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2025, decision-makers in Austria and the EU should prioritize three highly topical questions that are at the forefront for China researchers: Will China respond severely to US tariffs? Will China contribute to peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine War? Will China fill the vacuum as the US retreats from global governance leadership? Among other trends in China research, there will be further work on how China’s technological and industrial progress—including on electric vehicles, AI, and quantum computing—will impact relations with the US and EU (ReConnect China 2025). Moreover, there will be more research on how integrated the Chinese economy is with the EU and others, and how resilient Europe is in this context (China Horizons 2025). Lastly, among rising regional focal areas, scholars will publish more on China’s rise as a research, economic, and geopolitical actor in the polar regions (Funaiole et al 2024; Paul 2024).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Tariffs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Austria

9. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea