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11. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan's Interests and Policy Options 9

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
There is a complete political deadlock and the leaderships in Afghanistan and Pakistan apparently also do not seem very much interested in getting out of it. At the same time, no one appears convinced to recognize the Taliban’s de facto government including Pakistan. The biggest bilateral problem, which concerns Pakistan the most, is the banned TTP and its cross-border terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s current stance is that it will not talk to the TTP, but to the Afghan government; the country lays the responsibility of checking the TTP incursions on the Afghan Taliban. However, the Taliban see the TTP as Pakistan’s internal issue, which not only adds to Pakistan’s frustration but also emboldens the militant group, which has already increased its terrorist attacks in Pakistan manifold. These are some of the findings of the PIPS-led 9th consultation on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on August 10, 2023 in Islamabad.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, Taliban, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

12. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

13. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime

Author:
Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

14. Powered by Twitter? The Taliban's Takeover of Afghanistan

Author:
Laura Courchesne, Bahar Rasikh, Brian McQuinn, and Cody Buntain
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
On August 15, 2021, a spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban’s self- proclaimed state, declared on Twitter: “With the help of God, and the support of the nation, we are now in control of all parts of the country. We would like to congratulate our nation on this big achievement.” After 20 years of conflict with U.S. and NATO coalition forces, no one predicted the speed with which the Taliban would consolidate power and precipitate the collapse of the Afghan government and military. Presenting research conducted by the newly established Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Conflict (CAIDAC), this report explores social media’s central role in the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and the strategies used by the group to manipulate international and domestic audiences. It examines the Taliban’s social media strategy on Twitter throughout their takeover of Afghanistan, which culminated in the storming of Kabul on August 15, 2021. Specifically, we studied the activity of 63 accounts claimed by the Taliban leadership, spokespersons, and avowed members from April 1 to September 16, 2021. These accounts had more than 2 million followers on Twitter in September 2021. As of May 8, 2022, Taliban content reaches more than 3.3 million accounts. We also examined the broader Taliban ecosystem, which included more than 126,000 Twitter accounts that either retweeted Taliban content or posted content subsequently shared by the Taliban’s core network. We found clear patterns in the group’s communication strategies, visual imagery deployed, and the timing and content of social media activity and events on the ground.
Topic:
NATO, Terrorism, Taliban, Social Media, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

15. Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of Kabul

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The group’s international profile has risen substantially with help from China, Turkey, and other states, but Western leaders should curtail their engagement so long as Kabul keeps gaslighting them about its al-Qaeda ties. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized its “Islamic Emirate.” Yet while no country has officially recognized the new government established after the group recaptured Kabul one year ago, the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration. In March, for example, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called for international recognition of the Islamic Emirate, while his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov argued that it should be granted a seat at the United Nations. Just how extensive is this diplomatic momentum? And how might it be affected by the July 31 targeted killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was reportedly being sheltered in Kabul by Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Reform, Taliban, Democracy, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

16. The Killing of Al-Zawahiri and the Future of Al-Qaeda

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In the afternoon of 1 August, Joe Biden gave a speech from the White House confirming the killing of Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan. According to senior sources from the administration, Zawahiri was killed by “a precise tailored airstrike” conducted at around 06:30 am local time in the Sherpur neighbourhood of Kabul.[1] The strike was carried out via two Hellfire missiles (allegedly, two R9X missiles) fired from a drone.[2] The area in which the attack was carried out is particularly significant: the Sherpur neighbourhood is located in a deeply protected area of the capital, in which many Taliban leaders now live. Al-Zawahiri was reportedly killed in the house owned by a top aide to senior Taliban leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani.[3]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and Ayman al-Zawahiri
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

17. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto

Author:
Abdul Sayed
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The changing narratives and operations of al-Qaeda and its Pakistani ally, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in recent years indicate that the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan will not end with a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 or thereafter (The News, March 1). Recent speeches by the TTP emir, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, to a coalition of senior TTP commanders on the future goals of the war in Pakistan is not the only piece of evidence signifying that this war will continue (Umar Media, August 18, 2020; Umar Media, December 15, 2020). Rather, history also shows this war still has a long way to go. Pakistani Islamists are widely believed to have originally supported al-Qaeda’s war against the Pakistani state due to post-9/11 changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy, which supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that expelled the Taliban regime from Kabul. However, the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan is deeply rooted in the pre-9/11 complexities of Pakistani politics, which culminated in Islamists enabling al-Qaeda operations within Pakistan immediately after 9/11. The war against the Pakistani government is so deeply entrenched that it will remain a challenge for the country even if the widely accepted jihad against the U.S. “infidel occupier” in Afghanistan and its allies, including Pakistan, is no longer a factor.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamism, Jihad, and Benazir Bhutto
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

18. The Overseen Factors Impacting the Afghan Peace Process

Author:
Sahar Khan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The international community is focused on the ongoing intra-Afghan peace process, which has steadied despite several challenges. There are two developments, however, that will have a lasting impact on the process: The International Criminal Court’s investigation into war crimes committed by the Taliban, Afghan forces, and US forces, and the strategic evolution of the Taliban as a legitimate political actor.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Terrorism, Taliban, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

19. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

20. March 2021 Issue

Author:
Audrey Alexander, Kristina Hummel, Brian Michael Jenkins, Thomas Ruttig, and Douglas Weeks
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
President Biden soon has to decide whether to withdraw the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops from Afghanistan to meet a May 1 deadline agreed to by the previous administration. With time ticking down, the Biden administration has launched a major diplomatic push to broker a peace settlement for Afghanistan. As noted by Thomas Ruttig in this month’s feature article, “Whether and how much the Taliban have changed since their repressive rule over Afghanistan before the fall of 2001 is key to whether a potential peace settlement can create a social and political landscape in Afghanistan that is acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, as well as the United States and NATO allies.” Ruttig assesses that “While the Taliban have softened their rhetoric on some issues (for example, on women’s rights and education) and there is evidence of real policy change in certain areas (for example, on the use of media, in the education sector, a greater acceptance of NGOs, and an acceptance that a future political system will need to accommodate at least some of their political rivals), their policy adjustments appear to have been largely driven by political imperatives rather than any fundamental changes in ideology.” He assesses that “Whether some changes in approach will be perpetuated will depend on the ability of Afghan communities and political groups to maintain pressure on the Taliban. This, in turn, depends on continued international attention toward Afghanistan.” Brian Michael Jenkins, in a feature commentary, examines several possible courses of action the Biden administration could take if the U.S. efforts to broker a peace settlement in Afghanistan do not result in a major breakthrough in the coming weeks. He writes: “What makes a decision on which path to follow so difficult is that each option carries a high risk of resulting in bad outcomes.” He notes that “Decisive action always looks good, but a turbulent world also means calculating risks, avoiding unintended consequences, and hedging bets.” This month’s interview is with Mary McCord, the executive director of the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at the Georgetown University Law Center, whose previous service in government included working as Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice from 2016 to 2017. She offers insights on the heightened threat of far-right extremist violence in the United States and how the country’s legal architecture could evolve to counter it. Douglas Weeks argues that there is “too much pessimism” in the United Kingdom about the possibility of deradicalizing terrorist offenders. He writes: “To address the root causes of the threat, the United Kingdom needs to learn lessons from what has worked for successful ‘deradicalization’ mentors and empower their efforts.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, and Radicalization
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United Kingdom, and United States of America