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41. EU Conflict Prevention Revisited

Author:
Jonas Claes
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
So far the European Union has not operated as the leading actor on prevention that it aims to be. The recent launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in December 2010 could present a breakthrough in this regard. Most of the existing prevention instruments will be relocated to the new Service. A tentative organogram of the EEAS also reveals the establishment of a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy. It remains to be seen whether this institutional innovation can address the challenges that have constrained the EU's role in prevention so far, including the EU's coherence, consensus, conceptual clarity and ambition.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

42. The United States in Iraq: Options for 2012

Author:
Sean Kane and William Taylor
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
With U.S. military forces scheduled to depart Iraq in December of this year, the State Department and other civilian agencies are being asked to assume a scale of operational and programmatic responsibilities far beyond any other embassy in recent memory. The capacity of the U.S. civilian agencies to assume these responsibilities does not now fully exist. Notably, securing and moving U.S. civilians will require more than 5,000 security contractors. A limited U.S. military contingent post-2011 may well be more cost-effective than private security guards and could also relieve State and other civilian agencies of logistical and security responsibilities. This would enable them to focus on their comparative advantages: diplomacy and development assistance. Planning for the post-2011 U.S. mission in Iraq, however, remains hampered by uncertainty as to whether the Iraqi government will request an extension of the American military presence in the country. A small follow-on U.S. military force would appear to safeguard Iraqi stability and make the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq more likely, but cannot be counted on. Should such a request not be received from the Iraqi government, the U.S. may need to reduce the planned scale and scope of its operations and goals in Iraq.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Security
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

43. Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) aims to reintegrate insurgents in return for security, jobs and other incentives, but has seen limited results. Rapid implementation of the program has failed to address adequately a variety of political, employment and security concerns.
Topic:
Security, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

44. Istanbul and Bonn Conferences: Building Blocks of the Afghan Transition Process

Author:
Hodei Sultan
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Istanbul Conference slated for November 2, 2011 aims to bring to the discussion table issues relating to the transition in Afghanistan, including Afghan security, recruitment, training and equipment of Afghan security forces, as well as the reconciliation process. The conference will also focus on regional economic cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Peace Studies, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

45. The Iraq Federal Police

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In 2004, the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi security forces faced a growing challenge from insurgents and militia groups as the country drifted toward civil war. In street battles with heavily armed insurgent and militia groups, Iraq's fledgling police units mutinied under fire and resigned en masse, pointing out shortfalls in the U.S. police training program. In response, the U.S. government transferred leadership of the U.S. police assistance program from the State Department to the Defense Department, which created heavy police tactical units capable of dealing with armed groups. At the same time, the Iraqi interior ministry independently organized police commando units composed of former Iraqi soldiers that successfully fought alongside U.S. military forces. In 2005, the installation of a new Iraqi government and the escalation of sectarian violence brought a change in the composition of the Iraqi police commando units. The new interior minister, a senior Shiite party official, enabled members of Shiite militia groups to take over the police commando units and engage in the kidnap, torture, and murder of Sunnis. To control police death squads, the U.S. military combined all of Iraq's heavy police and police commando units into a new entity, the Iraq National Police (INP). In October 2006, the U.S. military began a program to retrain police commando units that were engaged in sectarian violence. Over the following year, Iraq's new interior minister, Jawad al-Bolani, undertook a program to reform the INP, appointing a new commanding general, purging the officer corps, and inviting a training team from the Italian Carabinieri to provide advanced instruction for INP units. In 2007, INP units successfully partnered with U.S. combat brigade teams that were deployed to Baghdad as part of President Bush's surge of U.S. military force into Iraq. Over the next two years, the valor of Iraqi constabulary units and their acceptance in both Sunni and Shiite areas brought a new name, the Iraq Federal Police (IFP), and the deployment of an IFP unit to every province in the country. Lessons learned in the development of an indigenous police constabulary in Iraq should be applied to current and future stability operation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Law Enforcement, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

46. Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq

Author:
John K. Naland
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department- led units inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level. During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful-but harder to quantify-work in mentoring local officials. Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals. Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance. Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia

47. The Politics of Dispute Resolution and Continued Instability in Afghanistan

Author:
Noah Coburn
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
There are numerous sources of local conflict in Afghanistan today, but the majority cluster around a few issues: disputes over land and water rights; family disputes, particularly inheritance; and disputes over control of local positions of authority. Lack of capacity or resources in the formal justice systems has been blamed for the lack of effective dispute resolution. But the fact that disputes were resolved more regularly in Afghanistan before the war years, when the formal justice system had even fewer resources, indicates that other causes are involved. Lack of political and personal security of dispute-resolution practitioners and the increased power of local commanders, whose authority is not community-based, have undermined the traditional dispute-resolution system. At the same time, corruption and inefficiency have delegitimized the formal justice system in the eyes of many disputants. Afghans and foreign donors alike note that Afghanistan has both state (court-based) and nonstate (based upon a combination of customary and religious law) justice sectors, and it is often assumed that these systems solely compete with each other for dispute-resolution authority. USIP research shows that, contrary to assumptions, successfully resolved disputes rely on a combination of formal and informal actors. Indeed, it is common for disputes to move between formal and informal venues and to be considered by a series of local elders and, more rarely, government officials.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

48. From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR

Author:
Alison Laporte-Oshiro
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Consolidating the legitimate use of force in the hands of the state is a vital first step in post-conflict peacebuilding. Transitional governments must move quickly to neutralize rival armed groups and provide a basic level of security for citizens. Two processes are vital to securing a monopoly of force: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) involve disbanding armed groups that challenge the government's monopoly of force. Security sector reform (SSR) means reforming and rebuilding the national security forces so that they are professional and accountable. U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo yielded three crosscutting lessons: go in heavy, tackle DDR and SSR in tandem, and consolidate U.S. capacity to implement both tasks in a coordinated, scalable way.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Liberia

49. Watching from the Sidelines: Israel and the Syrian Uprising

Author:
Ehud Eiran
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Israel has been generally quiet regarding the recent turmoil in Syria, a reflection of the issue\'s relative low priority, as well as Israel\'s limited influence on internal Syrian matters. Israel\'s preferred outcome would be a stable Syrian regime that disassociates itself from the “axis of resistance,” poses no bilateral threats, and controls the border area—though Israel sees no clear path for achieving these aims. The view in Israel is that the basic structure of deterrence still holds vis-à-vis Syria and the regime—even in its desperate circumstances—is unlikely to provoke Israel in dramatic ways.
Topic:
Security and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Arab Countries, and Syria

50. Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria

Author:
Edward W. Gnehm Jr
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Government of Jordan is deeply concerned about the turmoil in Syria, fearing the spillover effect and knowing Syria's historic capacity to undermine Jordanian internal stability. Initial official Jordanian reaction has been cautious, to avoid antagonizing Syria and provoking retaliation. There is great anxiety over what may follow the collapse of the Assad regime. Jordan is under increased pressure from both internal elements and external powers to toughen its public posture toward Damascus. Ultimately, Amman will react carefully to events in Syria, taking actions that best ensure the security of the state and the survival of the monarchy.
Topic:
Security, Regime Change, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria