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31. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Strategic Role in ISIS Operations—A Crossroads of Conflict

Author:
Frzand Sherko
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Effective counter-narratives are required to weaken the group's ideological appeal, especially the propaganda targeting Kurdish populations. Since the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019, ISIS has undergone significant changes in its strategy and operations, especially in critical Iraqi provinces like Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh, which have historically been hotspots for insurgent activities and are now playing a pivotal role in the reorganization and operations of ISIS in Iraq. Iraq’s “disputed territories”–areas claimed by both the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)–have long been a haven for terrorist organizations. Terrorist leaders Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi operated and were eventually killed in hideouts adjacent to disputed areas, and other figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Quraishi, and Abu Hassan al-Quraishi took advantage of the shaky security situation to conduct operations in this locations. However, extremist groups do not thrive in these contested areas out of convenience alone; the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh all hold significant strategic, economic, and geographic importance. Due to its vast oil resources, Kirkuk has been an enticing target, while Salahuddin’s proximity to Baghdad gives it immense historical and strategic significance. Diyala’s shared border with Iran makes it valuable as a launch point for cross-border attacks. Nineveh remains a significant symbolic and operational center even after the loss of territorial control by ISIS, as the province is home to Mosul, the once de facto capital of the ISIS caliphate. The diverse ethnic makeup of each of these provinces has likewise been of interest to ISIS as it has looked to exploit potential cleavages. In addition to military operations, ISIS conducts psychological warfare aimed at destabilizing state authority and creating fear among the population. The ongoing instability in these regions, compounded by political disputes and poor governance, furthers the efficacy of these efforts. However, activity in Erbil and Sulimaniyah is also increasingly visible to Kurdish security and counterterrorism forces.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Conflict, Ideology, and Narrative
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

32. U.S. Policy in the Middle East Amid Great Power Competition

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The true U.S. strategy debate in the Middle East is not about whether we should stay or go; it’s about how to continue advancing the interests pursued by successive administrations even as hostile competitors and unresolved threats combine to throw U.S. regional policy off balance. By the end of the 2010s, two points of broad foreign policy consensus prevailed among Republicans and Democrats: The United States should not fight any more wars like Iraq, and the United States must shift to a focus on the Indo-Pacific given the threatening implications of China’s rise and demonstrated desire for hegemony in Asia. Both points seemed to imply a diminished U.S. commitment to the Middle East. Now, however, this consensus has evolved. American policymakers have arrived at the conclusion that strategic competition with China and Russia is global in scope, and the Middle East has a key role to play in it. That great power competition should draw the United States into—rather than out of—the Middle East is no historical anomaly. America was deeply engaged in the Middle East long before the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror. This engagement came not despite but because of the need to counter our great power competitor, the Soviet Union, which American policymakers worried might dominate the region’s resources and exert undue influence over its governance. Today, America’s competitors are once again contending for Middle Eastern influence. What’s more, unlike during the Cold War, the Middle East in turn is influencing events well beyond its boundaries...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

33. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 2)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Ankara’s push for “soft recentralization” in Iraq will likely include more intensive efforts to establish the Development Road and prioritize Baghdad’s interests, though without abandoning the Kurdistan Region. As discussed in Part 1 of this PolicyWatch, Turkey’s Syria strategy is rather circuitous, potentially involving simultaneous negotiations with the Assad regime and the United States while running the risk of damaging relations with Washington if the two governments fail to coordinate their moves. In contrast, Ankara’s Iraq strategy—which boils down to promoting Turkish money over Iranian guns—is more straightforward and likely to receive U.S. backing. To this end, Ankara has conceived the Development Road, a proposed trade network that would run across Iraq and Turkey, connecting Asian and European markets via the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Initially, the project ran counter to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S.-proposed route stretching from India through the Arabian Peninsula and Levant to Europe. Yet the Gaza war and ongoing Houthi maritime attacks have raised security concerns about commercial shipping through the Red Sea, suddenly boosting the prospects of the Development Road at IMEC’s expense. With Gulf money behind the project, Turkish policymakers predict the Development Road’s initial routes could open as early as 2027. Washington should consider throwing its support behind this initiative as well, particularly if it needs to counterbalance Iranian influence in Baghdad following a full or partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

34. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 1)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Having observed two decades of instability across its southern borders and anticipating U.S. withdrawals, Ankara is planning steps to end the volatility, including potentially wide-ranging agreements with the Assad regime. Events in the Fertile Crescent since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have not been in favor of Turkish security interests. The ensuing Iraqi civil strife, the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), and Syria’s civil war collectively resulted in regional instability for over two decades, including numerous terrorist attacks against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a NATO-designated terrorist entity that has been fighting Ankara for decades, took advantage of Iraq’s decentralization to establish itself along the border in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region. On Turkey’s other southern border, the multinational campaign against IS led to a U.S. partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the PKK’s armed Syrian wing that later took a leading role in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and gained control over a large swath of the frontier. This partnership became the greatest impediment to a reset in U.S.-Turkey ties. Today, anticipating that the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria will decrease significantly, Ankara aims to promote soft recentralization in both neighbors, toward the broader goals of curbing instability across its borders and denying operational space to the PKK. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discusses how these goals affect Turkish policy in Syria; Part 2 addresses the implications for Iraq.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, PKK, Regional Politics, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

35. Egypt’s Economy Amidst Regional Conflicts

Author:
Sahar Albazar
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Egypt, strategically positioned in the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, is grappling with significant economic pressures exacerbated by regional conflicts and geopolitical instability. The multifaceted crises stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian war, the Sudanese civil war, Libya’s political disarray, and the Russia-Ukraine war have collectively intensified the economic strains on Cairo. These challenges not only impact Egypt's economy but also threaten regional stability. Given the challenges facing Egypt and the region, Cairo is expecting from the United States to play a supportive role towards its strategic partner in the region. The international perception of regional instability is affecting Egypt’s domestic economy; tourism accounted for over 24% of GDP and employing over 2.5 million. However, the perception of insecurity in neighboring countries has deterred international visitors. Tourist arrivals declined by an estimated 25-30% between 2010-2022 compared to pre-conflicts levels. The resulting drop in tourism revenue has placed an additional strain on Egypt's foreign exchange reserves and employment relies heavily on this sector for foreign exchange earnings and employment.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

36. How Autocracy Prevailed in Tunisia

Author:
Sarah Yerkes and Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Any future democratic renewal will require an entirely new movement that goes much further toward addressing the country’s deepest economic and social injustices. Not long ago, Tunisia was considered one of the biggest success stories in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlike neighboring Arab countries that experienced massive popular uprisings in 2011, Tunisia did not immediately revert to authoritarianism or descend into civil war. Instead, after its longtime dictator fled, an interim government held free and fair elections. The new, democratically elected regime adopted a liberal constitution and allowed civil society and independent media to flourish. By now, however, that success has decisively unraveled. Last month, for the first time in 14 years, Tunisia held a sham presidential election, marked by extensive manipulation and repression...
Topic:
Arab Spring, Protests, Autocracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Tunisia

37. Winds of Change: Ankara’s Subtle Shifts Towards Reconciliation with Kurdish Elements in Turkey

Author:
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Signs that Ankara is interested in a potential reconciliation with the PKK could lead an end to a decades-long conflict and have ripple effects across the region, although numerous obstacles remain. On November 11, Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), backed an October proposal by hardliner Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to address the Turkish government’s longstanding tensions with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) —a left-wing militant group founded in the 1980s that emerged in response to Turkey’s ban on Kurdish identity and language. Several weeks earlier, Bahçeli had proposed that the jailed leader of the outlawed PKK Abdullah Öcalan could be released from his life sentence in exchange for announcing an end to the group’s insurgency, and could likewise be allowed to speak in Turkey’s parliament. In his statement, Kurtulmuş underlined that the place “where all these negotiations should take place is the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the seat of the national will. I hope that we will enter a period where terrorism is no longer discussed, where terrorism has been eradicated.” Kurtulmus’s statement highlighted that there may be broader governmental support for the process initially outlined by MHP head Bahçeli. During his initial announcement, Bahçeli also shook hands with the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), this while in the past he has repeatedly called for the closure of the predecessor of the DEM and opposed a peace process between the PKK and the state. After Bahçeli’s speech, Öcalan’s family was allowed to visit him for the first time since March 2020, and Öcalan indicated he is ready to play a role to find a solution. However, shortly after, a new three-month visit ban was imposed on Öcalan. Nevertheless, Bahçeli’s proposal—especially notable coming from the MHP, which formed the People’s Alliance with the AKP in 2018 and in the past always had a hardline policy on the PKK, including calling for Öcalan’s execution in 2007—has resulted in many discussions in Turkey over the potential of a new peace process. Erdogan (and the PKK) had pursued such a process during his early years in office, but it collapsed in 2015 and resulted in new fighting between the Turkish state and the PKK. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani noted In October 2024 at the MERI conference in Erbil that this would mark the beginning of a new process, adding that the remarks of Turkish government officials are promising. “They indicate that a process is underway and that the issues at hand will be addressed.” President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed the proposal on October 30 but underlined that Bahçeli’s appeal was not directed toward the "terror barons" in Iraq and Syria (PKK) and called on Kurds to accept Bahçeli’s proposal.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Kurds, Reconciliation, and PKK
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

38. Supporting the SDF in Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To preserve its only reliable and capable partner in the fight against the Islamic State, the United States must help the SDF deter HTS and fend off Turkey-backed militias. Bashar al-Assad’s fall has quickly changed the map of Syria. While the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies swept out of their base in Idlib to seize major regime strongholds en route to the capital, other opposition groups moved to take territory in the southeastern provinces of Deraa and Quneitra. In the central and southern Badia desert region, the U.S.-backed opposition faction Maghawir al-Thawra has expanded its control around the American garrison at al-Tanf. Remnants of the Islamic State (IS) prowl the desert too, liable to strike at any moment. And in the northeast, the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) moved deeper into Raqqa but lost ground in Tal Rifaat and Manbij due to advances by the Syrian National Army (SNA), the local coalition of Turkey-backed militias. At this fragile moment, U.S. officials must reassess the SDF’s needs to ensure it has the support required to continue the mission that brought the two partners together in the first place—the shared fight against IS, which now includes defending the many northeastern detention facilities that hold thousands of IS members and supporters. This task also entails keeping SNA militias at bay and ensuring that the SDF is prepared to face a renewed HTS offensive if the jihadists decide to push into the northeast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

39. Washington Returns to Damascus with High Stakes for Syria’s Transition

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The delegation’s findings on key political and security issues will have a major impact on future U.S. engagement with Syria’s new leaders, including the decision on whether or not to remove sanctions. For the first time since October 2011, when Ambassador Robert Ford was pulled from Syria amid U.S. concerns about the Assad regime’s crackdown on protesters, Washington is back in Damascus—this time to engage with the new transitional government led by rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Earlier today, U.S. officials met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (aka Ahmed al-Sharaa) to uncover information on missing Americans Austin Tice, Majd Kamalmaz, and others; they were also scheduled to meet with civil society figures, activists, and representatives of various minority communities. The delegation includes Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs; Roger Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs; and Daniel Rubinstein, a long-time Arabist and retired ambassador recently recalled to duty. Their visit comes on the heels of a Pentagon announcement that the U.S. military presence in Syria has jumped from 900 to 2,000 soldiers, illustrating concerns about how the Islamic State (IS) might take advantage of the new situation. The delegation arrives at a momentous time in Syria’s transition process, which is officially scheduled to last until March 1. Local sources suggest that the second phase of the transition will begin in the coming days, during which HTS is supposed to open the process to more representatives from all of Syrian society, rather than just the HTS loyalists who have overseen the first phase. Therefore, much is at stake for the current U.S. delegation and Washington’s broader efforts to redevelop a Syria policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transitional Government
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

40. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria