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21. A New Era in Iraq’s Relations with the West?

Author:
Selin Uysal and Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Amid growing pressure to dissolve the coalition and withdraw troops, the United States and its partners should continue pursuing good relations with Baghdad—but this time with a lighter footprint and increased regional cooperation. At Baghdad’s request, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has been ordered to cease operations in December 2025, following a previous decision to shut down the UN team charged with investigating the Islamic State’s crimes in Iraq (UNITAD). Meanwhile, Baghdad plans to close the country’s remaining camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), first opened at the height of the war against IS. More broadly, it seeks to normalize its diplomatic activism in the region, which recently included mediating rapprochement talks between Turkey and the Syrian regime. Despite the international support and military cooperation that have defined Western relations with Iraq in the post-Saddam era, Baghdad has begun to reevaluate longstanding arrangements. Washington and its partners should follow suit, scrutinizing the current basis of relations with Iraq amid changes in the local and regional environment, while simultaneously preserving the relationship's most beneficial aspects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Displacement, and Interstate Cooperation
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

22. Israel and the ICJ: Comparing International Court Cases During the Gaza War

Author:
Alexander Loengarov
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The current cycle of legal actions involving Israel is unprecedented in scope and politicization, but governments are still better off engaging with the process and lodging their objections there than dismissing it outright. On July 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will deliver an advisory opinion on the “legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” The opinion was requested by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) more than a year and a half ago—well before the Gaza war broke out—in the context of efforts to increase awareness of the Palestinian issue at various international forums, as well as more specific concerns about escalating “tensions and violence” with Israel. The timing of this week’s opinion might seem incongruous given how much has taken place since it was first requested in January 2023. Yet it is in keeping with a wartime trend in which more new cases are being brought before international courts, and pending cases are being rekindled and amplified. Distinguishing between these cases is instructive.
Topic:
Genocide, International Law, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

23. Oil: A Blessing for Politicians and a Curse for the People of Basra

Author:
Azhar Al-Rubaie
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The deterioration of public health in oil extraction cities requires tangible actions to end the suffering of the affected people by providing specialized treatment centers funded by the social benefits from petroleum profits. In June 2023, Iraq’s Council of Representatives approved the federal budget for 2023, 2024, and 2025. The state has allocated 198.9 trillion dinars ($153 billion) for each year, a staggering sum and the largest in the country’s history. Although Iraq is a top oil-producing country, observers have been alarmed at this uptick in spending, and they have good reason to believe that these vast sums will not reach the citizens but instead fill the pockets of the corrupt. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Iraq consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt governments, and despite the massive budgets approved in Baghdad, everyday Iraqis continue to suffer from weak infrastructure, lack of job opportunities, and poor services in essential sectors such as healthcare. In the oil-rich city of Basra in Iraq’s south, local residents living near oil sites complain about the high rates of cancer, respiratory illness, and nervous system diseases, along with the scarcity of medicines and poor healthcare in the public sector. The dearth of basic services frequently forces patients to travel abroad to countries like Iran, India, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, spending up to $6 million monthly to receive medical treatment. This contributes to the waste of public funds and their diversion abroad, which some might use to justify the smuggling of hard currency, especially to Iran.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Oil, Services, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Basra

24. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Strategic Role in ISIS Operations—A Crossroads of Conflict

Author:
Frzand Sherko
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Effective counter-narratives are required to weaken the group's ideological appeal, especially the propaganda targeting Kurdish populations. Since the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019, ISIS has undergone significant changes in its strategy and operations, especially in critical Iraqi provinces like Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh, which have historically been hotspots for insurgent activities and are now playing a pivotal role in the reorganization and operations of ISIS in Iraq. Iraq’s “disputed territories”–areas claimed by both the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)–have long been a haven for terrorist organizations. Terrorist leaders Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi operated and were eventually killed in hideouts adjacent to disputed areas, and other figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Quraishi, and Abu Hassan al-Quraishi took advantage of the shaky security situation to conduct operations in this locations. However, extremist groups do not thrive in these contested areas out of convenience alone; the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh all hold significant strategic, economic, and geographic importance. Due to its vast oil resources, Kirkuk has been an enticing target, while Salahuddin’s proximity to Baghdad gives it immense historical and strategic significance. Diyala’s shared border with Iran makes it valuable as a launch point for cross-border attacks. Nineveh remains a significant symbolic and operational center even after the loss of territorial control by ISIS, as the province is home to Mosul, the once de facto capital of the ISIS caliphate. The diverse ethnic makeup of each of these provinces has likewise been of interest to ISIS as it has looked to exploit potential cleavages. In addition to military operations, ISIS conducts psychological warfare aimed at destabilizing state authority and creating fear among the population. The ongoing instability in these regions, compounded by political disputes and poor governance, furthers the efficacy of these efforts. However, activity in Erbil and Sulimaniyah is also increasingly visible to Kurdish security and counterterrorism forces.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Conflict, Ideology, and Narrative
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

25. U.S. Policy in the Middle East Amid Great Power Competition

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The true U.S. strategy debate in the Middle East is not about whether we should stay or go; it’s about how to continue advancing the interests pursued by successive administrations even as hostile competitors and unresolved threats combine to throw U.S. regional policy off balance. By the end of the 2010s, two points of broad foreign policy consensus prevailed among Republicans and Democrats: The United States should not fight any more wars like Iraq, and the United States must shift to a focus on the Indo-Pacific given the threatening implications of China’s rise and demonstrated desire for hegemony in Asia. Both points seemed to imply a diminished U.S. commitment to the Middle East. Now, however, this consensus has evolved. American policymakers have arrived at the conclusion that strategic competition with China and Russia is global in scope, and the Middle East has a key role to play in it. That great power competition should draw the United States into—rather than out of—the Middle East is no historical anomaly. America was deeply engaged in the Middle East long before the Iraq War and the Global War on Terror. This engagement came not despite but because of the need to counter our great power competitor, the Soviet Union, which American policymakers worried might dominate the region’s resources and exert undue influence over its governance. Today, America’s competitors are once again contending for Middle Eastern influence. What’s more, unlike during the Cold War, the Middle East in turn is influencing events well beyond its boundaries...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

26. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 2)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Ankara’s push for “soft recentralization” in Iraq will likely include more intensive efforts to establish the Development Road and prioritize Baghdad’s interests, though without abandoning the Kurdistan Region. As discussed in Part 1 of this PolicyWatch, Turkey’s Syria strategy is rather circuitous, potentially involving simultaneous negotiations with the Assad regime and the United States while running the risk of damaging relations with Washington if the two governments fail to coordinate their moves. In contrast, Ankara’s Iraq strategy—which boils down to promoting Turkish money over Iranian guns—is more straightforward and likely to receive U.S. backing. To this end, Ankara has conceived the Development Road, a proposed trade network that would run across Iraq and Turkey, connecting Asian and European markets via the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Initially, the project ran counter to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S.-proposed route stretching from India through the Arabian Peninsula and Levant to Europe. Yet the Gaza war and ongoing Houthi maritime attacks have raised security concerns about commercial shipping through the Red Sea, suddenly boosting the prospects of the Development Road at IMEC’s expense. With Gulf money behind the project, Turkish policymakers predict the Development Road’s initial routes could open as early as 2027. Washington should consider throwing its support behind this initiative as well, particularly if it needs to counterbalance Iranian influence in Baghdad following a full or partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

27. Turkey Wants to Stitch Iraq and Syria Back Together (Part 1)

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Having observed two decades of instability across its southern borders and anticipating U.S. withdrawals, Ankara is planning steps to end the volatility, including potentially wide-ranging agreements with the Assad regime. Events in the Fertile Crescent since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have not been in favor of Turkish security interests. The ensuing Iraqi civil strife, the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), and Syria’s civil war collectively resulted in regional instability for over two decades, including numerous terrorist attacks against Turkey. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a NATO-designated terrorist entity that has been fighting Ankara for decades, took advantage of Iraq’s decentralization to establish itself along the border in the semiautonomous Kurdistan Region. On Turkey’s other southern border, the multinational campaign against IS led to a U.S. partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the PKK’s armed Syrian wing that later took a leading role in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and gained control over a large swath of the frontier. This partnership became the greatest impediment to a reset in U.S.-Turkey ties. Today, anticipating that the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria will decrease significantly, Ankara aims to promote soft recentralization in both neighbors, toward the broader goals of curbing instability across its borders and denying operational space to the PKK. Part 1 of this PolicyWatch discusses how these goals affect Turkish policy in Syria; Part 2 addresses the implications for Iraq.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, PKK, Regional Politics, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

28. Egypt’s Economy Amidst Regional Conflicts

Author:
Sahar Albazar
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Egypt, strategically positioned in the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, is grappling with significant economic pressures exacerbated by regional conflicts and geopolitical instability. The multifaceted crises stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian war, the Sudanese civil war, Libya’s political disarray, and the Russia-Ukraine war have collectively intensified the economic strains on Cairo. These challenges not only impact Egypt's economy but also threaten regional stability. Given the challenges facing Egypt and the region, Cairo is expecting from the United States to play a supportive role towards its strategic partner in the region. The international perception of regional instability is affecting Egypt’s domestic economy; tourism accounted for over 24% of GDP and employing over 2.5 million. However, the perception of insecurity in neighboring countries has deterred international visitors. Tourist arrivals declined by an estimated 25-30% between 2010-2022 compared to pre-conflicts levels. The resulting drop in tourism revenue has placed an additional strain on Egypt's foreign exchange reserves and employment relies heavily on this sector for foreign exchange earnings and employment.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

29. How Autocracy Prevailed in Tunisia

Author:
Sarah Yerkes and Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Any future democratic renewal will require an entirely new movement that goes much further toward addressing the country’s deepest economic and social injustices. Not long ago, Tunisia was considered one of the biggest success stories in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlike neighboring Arab countries that experienced massive popular uprisings in 2011, Tunisia did not immediately revert to authoritarianism or descend into civil war. Instead, after its longtime dictator fled, an interim government held free and fair elections. The new, democratically elected regime adopted a liberal constitution and allowed civil society and independent media to flourish. By now, however, that success has decisively unraveled. Last month, for the first time in 14 years, Tunisia held a sham presidential election, marked by extensive manipulation and repression...
Topic:
Arab Spring, Protests, Autocracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Tunisia

30. Winds of Change: Ankara’s Subtle Shifts Towards Reconciliation with Kurdish Elements in Turkey

Author:
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Signs that Ankara is interested in a potential reconciliation with the PKK could lead an end to a decades-long conflict and have ripple effects across the region, although numerous obstacles remain. On November 11, Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), backed an October proposal by hardliner Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to address the Turkish government’s longstanding tensions with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) —a left-wing militant group founded in the 1980s that emerged in response to Turkey’s ban on Kurdish identity and language. Several weeks earlier, Bahçeli had proposed that the jailed leader of the outlawed PKK Abdullah Öcalan could be released from his life sentence in exchange for announcing an end to the group’s insurgency, and could likewise be allowed to speak in Turkey’s parliament. In his statement, Kurtulmuş underlined that the place “where all these negotiations should take place is the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the seat of the national will. I hope that we will enter a period where terrorism is no longer discussed, where terrorism has been eradicated.” Kurtulmus’s statement highlighted that there may be broader governmental support for the process initially outlined by MHP head Bahçeli. During his initial announcement, Bahçeli also shook hands with the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), this while in the past he has repeatedly called for the closure of the predecessor of the DEM and opposed a peace process between the PKK and the state. After Bahçeli’s speech, Öcalan’s family was allowed to visit him for the first time since March 2020, and Öcalan indicated he is ready to play a role to find a solution. However, shortly after, a new three-month visit ban was imposed on Öcalan. Nevertheless, Bahçeli’s proposal—especially notable coming from the MHP, which formed the People’s Alliance with the AKP in 2018 and in the past always had a hardline policy on the PKK, including calling for Öcalan’s execution in 2007—has resulted in many discussions in Turkey over the potential of a new peace process. Erdogan (and the PKK) had pursued such a process during his early years in office, but it collapsed in 2015 and resulted in new fighting between the Turkish state and the PKK. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani noted In October 2024 at the MERI conference in Erbil that this would mark the beginning of a new process, adding that the remarks of Turkish government officials are promising. “They indicate that a process is underway and that the issues at hand will be addressed.” President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed the proposal on October 30 but underlined that Bahçeli’s appeal was not directed toward the "terror barons" in Iraq and Syria (PKK) and called on Kurds to accept Bahçeli’s proposal.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Kurds, Reconciliation, and PKK
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East