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51. Europe and the Middle East: Towards A Substantive Role in the Peace Process?

Author:
Roland Dannreuther
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Middle East is the region where Europeans have, arguably, most strongly felt their loss of great power status. During the nineteenth century, European powers encroached upon, occupied and annexed various territories in the Middle East. With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after World War 1, Britain, and to a lesser degree France, became the undisputed external actors in the region and in large part created the modern Middle Eastern state system. Although a certain degree of power was devolved to local leaders, Britain and France ensured their prerogatives over foreign and defence issues and assumed responsibility for regional stability. Other powers, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, were not absent from the region but did not essentially challenge the European hegemony. The Soviet Union's power projection had been greatly reduced in the aftermath of revolution, civil war and internal consolidation; the United States deliberately abstained from assuming a political role, with all its tainted colonial connotations, and only demanded an 'open doors' policy in relation to its trade and commercial interests. In this relatively unchallenged strategic environment, Britain had a remarkable freedom to act as the principal regional security actor. In practice, the period of British dominance was to be relatively brief, being characterised by one historian as 'Britain's moment' in the Middle East, and was also increasingly to be frustrated by the growing inter-ethnic conflict in Palestine.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, Middle East, France, and Soviet Union

52. Terrorism and Asymmetric Conflict in Southwest Asia

Author:
Shahram Chubin and Jerold D. Green
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
At previous RAND-GCSP workshops in 1999 and 2001, participants examined, respectively, possible roles for NATO in the Middle East and the challenges to Turkey as both a European and Middle Eastern actor. The 2002 workshop, scheduled for June 23-25, 2002, was originally intended to take a broad look at issues relating to Southwest Asia, where Europe and the United States have long grappled with a range of strategic and political differences. However, in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, the organisers decided to refocus the workshop around the specific theme of terrorism and asymmetric conflict in Southwest Asia. The workshop focused on both the global and regional aspects of the terrorist threat.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

53. Terrorism: Threat and Responses

Author:
Jean-Louis Bruguière
Publication Date:
10-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Along with the highly developed forms of organized crime, can terrorism be ranked in the category of the tough challenges which the world has to face? This question is worth asking, as too often the perception of that threat is a faint one.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe

54. The European Union as a Security Actor in the Mediterranean

Author:
Fred Tanner and Joanna Schemm
Publication Date:
10-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The publication of the proceedings of the GCSP workshop on the European Union and the Mediterranean is timely in more ways than one. First of all, the sudden emergence of European Security and Defence Policy from 1999 onwards has generated the need to examine the security and defence dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The partnership was obviously not established in connection with ESDP in mind – if only because ESDP did not exist yet at the time of the launching of the Barcelona process – but the Barcelona process clearly has security and defence implications and ESDP necessarily has a Mediterranean dimension. Secondly, and more tentatively, the ESDP is likely to increase its focus on the Mediterranean as the wars of succession in the former Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia are progressively brought to a close. Not unnaturally, the conflicts which have worked their way down the length of post-Tito Yugoslavia from Slovenia in June 1991 to Macedonia ten years later, have been the foremost security and defence concern of the members of the European Union. These wars have not yet played themselves out, as events in Macedonia demonstrate; nor is it likely that European forces deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo will be withdrawn anytime soon. By the time the ESDP Rapid Reaction Force is ready in 2003, the European strategic spotlight may well have shifted from the Balkan doorstep to the broader Mediterranean arena. Thirdly, a number of substantial material changes are due to occur within the European Union during the next two to four years. At the military end of the spectrum, we have the 2003 goal for the Rapid Reaction Force, for which a strategic rationale will need to be found above and beyond the important but exceedingly vague statement that it is supposed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, “including the most demanding” to use official European Council language. In institutional terms, the EU is preparing itself for the rendez-vous of 2004, which may or may not be a constitutional convention. Given the widely recognised need to give greater clarity and accountability to the EU's institutions – and this is a requirement which appears to be shared by Europhiles and Euroskeptics alike – chances are that this will not simply be an inter-governmental conference of the sort which led to the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. And then, of course, we have enlargement, which in EU terms will not only mesh in with the institutional debate, but which will also broaden the cast of players involved in the Euro-Med process. This applies even more to NATO enlargement: with something akin to a “Big Bang” beginning to take shape as NATO's current members prepare for the 2002 Prague Summit, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria will give a greater “Southern” tilt to the Alliance, before joining the European Union at a subsequent stage.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

55. The United States and Europe: Smooth Sailing or Storm Clouds Ahead?

Author:
William Hitchcock
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Two years ago, when many of us gathered together in the dramatic Alpine setting of Leukerbad to consider the recent past and the likely future of US-European relations, our group was full of dire prognostications. Russia was headed toward collapse, the EU looked weak after the Yugoslav war, NATO expansion appeared to be dividing Europe; the introduction of the euro looked liked a risky gamble that might worsen trans-Atlantic relations; and most disturbing for me as an American, my government was preoccupied with the Lewinsky scandal and the future of the Clinton presidency seemed at risk. Indeed, one of our colleagues, discussing the crisis over after-dinner drinks, declared that Clinton would resign from the presidency within matter of weeks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

56. Through the Glass Ceiling: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?

Author:
Anne Deighton
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 'St Malo process' which has being taking shape since December 1998, will bring a qualitative change in the EU's role as an international institution. Many of the big initiatives that the Union undertakes are not fully understood early on - unexpected, and sometimes unintended consequences can result from the changes that the EU agrees to. It takes time for the institutional implications of major changes to emerge: the Single Act was, in the mid 80s, often seen as the 'elephant that gave birth to a mouse'; and the Maastricht Treaty as at once called too federalist, and too timid. Likewise, the exact configuration of the changes that St Malo may bring will also take time to become clear. 'Militarising' the EU, however, ends one of the last policy taboos of a 'civilian-power' European Union and breaks through the 'glass ceiling' of the EU's self-denying ordinance against the adoption of the instruments of military force which has existed since its inception. This paper assesses how far these changes got by the summer of 2000 and asks whether the last eighteen months are one stage in the messy birth of a post-Cold War pan-European defence and security regime with institutions based around NATO and the EU. Europe's institutional configuration tends to matter more to Europeans than to our transatlantic partners; but institutions are the reality of contemporary European international politics. 'Multilateral institutionalism' too, is inescapable, and how institutions relate to each other has become an increasingly significant question. To accept this does not meant that states do not matter, for states also use institutions, as well as being shaped by institutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Switzerland

57. NATO's Past, NATO's Future

Author:
John Lewis Gaddis
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stands at a crossroads. Critical choices lie ahead that will determine its future. I begin my paper this way because it is customary to begin pronouncements on NATO with this kind of statement. Indeed papers and speeches on NATO have been beginning this way through the half-century of the alliance's existence - and yet NATO never quite reaches whatever crisis the speaker or writer has in mind. NATO seems to have a life of its own, which is remarkably detached from the shocks and surprises that dominate most of history, certainly Cold War history. And NATO's members, both actual and aspiring, seem bent on keeping it that way. So what is a crossroad anyway in historical terms? Most of my colleagues, I think, would say that it's a turning point: a moment at which it becomes clear that the status quo can no longer sustain itself, at which decisions have to be made about new courses of action, at which the results of those decisions shape what happens for years to come. The Cold War was full of such moments: the Korean War, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, the Hungarian and Suez crises, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six Day War, the Tet offensive, Nixon's trip to China, the invasion of Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War itself. What strikes me as a historian, though, is how little impact these turning points had on NATO's history - even General deGaulle, who tried to turn himself personally into a turning point. The structure and purposes of the alliance today are not greatly different from what they were when NATO was founded. Which is to say that NATO's history, compared to that of most other Cold War institutions, is uneventful, bland, and even (let us be frank) a little dull. That very uneventfulness, though, is turning out to be one of the more significant aspects of Cold War history. It surprised the historians, who have been able to cite no other example of a multi-national alliance that has had the robustness, the durability, the continuity, some might say the apparent immortality, of this one. It has also surprised the international relations theorists, for it is a fundamental principle of their discipline that alliances form when nations balance against threats. It follows, then, that as threats dissipate, alliances should also - and yet this one shows no signs of doing so. An instrument of statecraft, which is what an alliance normally is, has in this instance come to be regarded as a fundamental interest of statecraft. That requires explanation, which is what I should like to attempt here.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, Germany, and Berlin

58. U.S.-EU Relations after the Introduction of the Euro and the Reinvention of European Security and Defence

Author:
Pal Dunay
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The current phase and the prospects of U.S. - EU relations can be analysed from different vantage points. The most logical is to deal with the position of the main actors, the United States or the European Union. This paper makes an attempt to analyse the prospects of U.S. - EU relations in light of two major developments: the beginning of the third phase of the economic and monetary union, symbolised by the introduction of the Euro and the verbal (re-)establishment of European defence. The paper makes an attempt to pay attention to the arguments of the United States, though the emphasis is on the European perception of the possible complications of the new phase of evolution that European integration may generate in the relations between the two entities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

59. Beyond Enlargement: NATO's Role in Russia's Relations with the West

Author:
S. Neil MacFarlane
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In 1996, ex-NATO Defence College fellow Dmitrii Trenin wrote that "in spite of the numerous public declarations of intention by Russia and the United States, Russia and NATO, and Russia and the European Union, so far no reliable foundation for partnership has been laid." Although the remark is four years old, there is little to argue with here. The proposition remains equally valid today. Four years ago, one might have asked: so what? Given the state of affairs in Russia, it didn't matter much anyway. However, things are changing. For the first time in ten years, secessionist wars, submarine disasters and fires in television towers notwithstanding, NATO and the West face a pivotal moment in the effort to normalize the relationship with Russia. The executive has secured reasonable control over the legislature. It is moving towards the reestablishment of central authority vis-à-vis the regions. The government is restoring a disciplined and reasonably orderly approach to foreign and security policy. There is increasingly strong evidence of sustained Russian economic recovery. This is a moment, consequently, of both opportunity and risk in the West's relations with Russia. It is an appropriate time to review where we have been, where we are, where we want to be, and what the role of NATO is in getting us there.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

60. Kosovo's Evolving Contest: Security, Policy and Sovereignty

Author:
Charles H. Norchi
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
It will be recalled that Yugoslavia was created in 1918 in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new state was peopled by religiously distinct ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Muslims. After World War II and German occupation, Josip Broz Tito, the Croat leader of the Yugoslav resistance, reunited the country as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Member Republics of the SFRY were Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo. Kosovo had been incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1945, but unlike the five federal units of Yugoslavia, it did not have the constitutional right to secede from the federation. With its majority Albanian population, it held the same status of Vojvadina with its majority Hungarian population. Tito's rule was harsh. His aim was to establish a public order straddling capitalism and communism in a multi-ethnic society. His foreign policy direction was non-aligned. Tito died in 1980 and SFRY leadership was assumed by a Presidential Council intended to represent the republics and autonomous territories with council chairmanship rotating among members.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo