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231. Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and "Other Means"

Author:
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power-projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iran also projects influence through economic initiatives and various religious programs. Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti‐government militias.
Topic:
International Political Economy and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

232. Volume 1, Issue 11 - Full Issue

Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
One of the most striking aspects of operations in Iraq during the “surge” of 2007 was the growing tribal uprising against al-Qa`ida. In late 2006 and 2007, this uprising began to transform the war. I spent considerable time on the ground throughout May and June 2007 in Baghdad and the surrounding districts working with U.S. and Iraqi units, tribal and community leaders and fighters engaged in the uprising. Listening to them talk, watching their operations and participating in planning and execution alongside American commanders supporting them provided insight into their motivations and thought processes. Moreover, during this process of participant observation I was able to gather some field data on the relationship between globally-oriented terrorists in Iraq (primarily al-Qa`ida) and the locally-focused militants who found themselves fighting as “accidental” guerrillas in the early part of the war, only to turn against the terrorists in 2007.
Topic:
Terrorism and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Baghdad

233. Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi'a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi'a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid-to-high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open-ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi'a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi'a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi'a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi-Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi'a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi'a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high-casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi-Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect's extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi'a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower-key approach.
Topic:
International Relations, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
America and Middle East

234. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph Felter, Peter Bergen, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is the second to assess the demographics, procedures, finances, and leadership of al-Qa`ida’s foreign fighters, especially those currently fighting in Iraq. It analyzes al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and includes almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records.
Topic:
Radicalization, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

235. Iranian Strategy in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means” assesses Iran’s strategy to project influence in Iraq and the means it uses to do so. This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. This report provides an overview of Iran’s multi-faceted efforts to pursue its national interests by influencing the political and security dynamics in Iraq from the Iranian Revolution to the present day. Although the report describes Iran’s direct and indirect lethal aid to surrogates in Iraq since the U.S. led invasion, it ultimately concludes that U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends.
Topic:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Quds Force, and Jaysh al-Mahdi
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

236. Full Issue - Volume 1, Issue 1

Publication Date:
12-2007
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point is privileged to present the CTC Sentinel, a new monthly online journal devoted to understanding and confronting contemporary threats posed by terrorism, insurgency and other forms of political violence. The CTC Sentinel draws from the Center's network of scholars and practitioners dedicated to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism to provide the most well-informed forum for the analysis of these most pressing security challenges facing the United States and its allies.
Topic:
Terrorism and War
Political Geography:
United States

237. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

Author:
Clint Watts, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
During the early 1990s, al-Qa’ida was beginning to coalesce as an organization, honing its operational techniques and dealing with its first internal conflicts. Its private deliberations during this period are revealed by a trove of documents captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database. Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa draws on recently declassified Harmony documents, predominately from the 1992-1994 time period, original field work by CTC personnel, and careful country studies. The Horn provides the backdrop for an intriguing tale of al-Qa’ida’s first efforts to expand beyond Afghanistan and Sudan. As recounted by its leaders and operatives, al- Qa’ida’s efforts to establish a presence in this region and use it as a base for attacks against Western targets elsewhere were largely a failure. Conventional wisdom suggests that Somalia, a failed state, would be an ideal safe haven for al-Qa’ida. Our analysis, however, indicates that weakly governed regions such as coastal Kenya, not failed states like Somalia, provide an environment more conducive to al-Qa’ida’s activities. In Somalia, al-Qa’ida’s members fell victim to many of the same challenges that plague Western interventions in the Horn. They were prone to extortion and betrayal, found themselves trapped in the middle of incomprehensible (to them) clan conflicts, faced suspicion from the indigenous population, had to overcome significant logistical constraints and were subject to the constant risk of Western military interdiction. This report assesses al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn of Africa by identifying the organizational challenges al-Qa’ida faced in managing the jihad in the Horn. We also examine the individual motivations of the Somali clans and people that largely resisted al-Qa’ida’s recruitment efforts in the region. After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism forces. We conclude this study by identifying concepts and techniques that may be applicable in other regions based upon al-Qa’ida’s experiences in the Horn. Our primary conclusion is that the U.S. and its coalition partners should prioritize counterterrorism efforts on weak states–not failed ones. Both types of states demand attention but require different policy solutions. Effective and sustainable counterterrorism in failed states requires engaging with sub-state authorities to give them the means and the motivation to resist foreign intrusion. In weak states, successful counterterrorism policies must address core institutional and governance problems that render such states unable or unwilling to fully deal with the threat. Perversely, U.S. support to state and local counterterrorism efforts can create incentives to tolerate low levels of terrorism, a problem best addressed by conditioning aid on counterterrorism effort rather than on the presence of a threat.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, and Somalia

238. Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI. Both statements are part of al-Qa’ida’s ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI’s foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law. In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter’s country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter’s recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq’s Syrian border. The data reveals several critical findings: Saudis made up the largest contingent of foreign fighters entering Iraq. Libyans were second and Syrians third. Recent political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the prevalence of Libyan fighters in Iraq, and evidence of a well-established smuggling route for Libyans through Egypt, suggests that Libyan factions are increasingly important in al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq. Many of the foreign fighters entering Iraq arrived with a group from their hometown, suggesting that al-Qa’ida’s recruiters try to attract groups of friends simultaneously. The majority of fighters that listed their occupation before traveling to Iraq were students. Universities have become a critical recruiting field for al-Qa’ida. The Sinjar Records reveal several weaknesses that the United States and other governments can exploit: Al-Qa’ida’s reliance on criminal and smuggling networks exposes it to the greed of mercenaries. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s unification with al-Qa’ida and its apparent decision to prioritize providing logistical support to the Islamic State of Iraq is likely controversial within the organization. The Islamic State of Iraq has failed politically because it has been unable to balance the practical demands of its local Iraqi constituency and the religious demands of its foreign supporters. The Syrian and Libyan governments share the United States’ concerns about violent salafi-jihadi ideology and the violence perpetrated by its adherents. The authors assert that the United States may be able to increase cooperation from governments to stem the flow of fighters into Iraq by addressing their concerns about domestic jihadi violence.
Topic:
Radicalization, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia

239. Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa`ida From 1989-2006

Author:
Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Though it has long been known that al-Qa’ida has suffered from disunity at the leadership level, analysis of documents declassified from the Harmony Database allow us to gain a fresh insight into the engine driving those conflicts and illuminate the vulnerabilities that these conflicts have created for the organization. Al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. Al-Qa’ida’s preference for branding, the military incompetence of its autocratic leaders, and the unanticipated ferocity of the United States’ response to the attacks of 9/11, have together left the brand managers the only ones standing. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida has not been able to threaten American interests; it has. But its real strength has never been as a fighting force, but rather its ability to transform what have traditionally been the local or national concerns of Islamist activism into a vision of apocalyptic inter-civilizational conflict. This report, grounded in the data from the Harmony documents, charts the history of this transformation and of the internal divisions that surrounded it. The Harmony documents shed light on cohesion problems that have been bedeviling Salafi Jihadi organizations going back more than thirty years. While the branding-versus-bureaucracy crux outlined above has consistently been the driving force, at different points in the development of al-Qa’ida the scope and consequences of this leadership struggle have changed. During the first phase, from the founding of the organization at the close of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the return of the leadership to South Asia after its misadventures in Africa, al-Qa’ida had failed in both areas, creating neither an effective guerrilla organization nor a consistent jihadi message. In the second phase, from al-Qa’ida’s re-establishment in Afghanistan to its dispersal from that refuge by American-led attacks, al-Qa’ida was able to exploit the relative security provided by its uneasy alliance with the Taliban to develop and begin to “market” its anti-American message. Though it was during this period that it was able to carry out the large-scale acts of terror for which it is famous – the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in Africa and the attacks of September 11, 2001 – internal divisions over the decision to target the United States severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacity. During the third and current phase, which began with the United States’ response to 9/11, al-Qa’ida as a centrally-controlled bureaucracy all but disappeared, with most of its key military and strategic leaders dispersed, captured or killed. In this period al- Qa’ida Central has been largely reduced to a media organization, while the Iraq war has created a market for its message, a field in which jihadis with little or no connection to the remnants of al-Qa’ida’s central bureaucracy can take up (and thus alter) the al-Qa’ida banner.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia

240. Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements

Author:
David Cook
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2005, veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Musa`b al-Suri released a study of the jihadi movement entitled The Call for Global Islamic Resistance. In order to better appreciate the jihadi movement’s strategic objectives and mindset, the Combating Terrorism Center invited David Cook, an expert on Islamic history and jihad, to provide deeper background on four of Suri’s identified paradigmatic jihads: The Harakat al-Shabiba in Morocco; The Harakat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya in Algeria; The Afghani Arabs in Lebanon under Abu `A’isha al Lubnani; The Islamic Army of Aden Abyan in Yemen. Here are some of the most significant findings from Cook’s survey: Yemen is a critical step in the jihadi march towards a global caliphate. Suri and others believe that Yemen is ripe for a jihadi revolution because of the country’s proximity to the apostate regimes, and high levels of anti-American sentiment, population growth, and weapons proliferation. The Sunni jihadi movement has gained little traction in Lebanon. Suri is embarrassed by the fact that few Lebanese jihadis have been involved in the global movement, and by the fact that jihadi groups have found little historical success in waging jihad in Lebanon. Jihadi organizations should be global in their thinking but careful to build a broad constituency in their homeland. Suri seems to favor those movements that, even if they found little success in reality, had the proper motives and methodology. Jihadis should not excommunicate other Muslims. Suri argues that the slaughter of civilians by the GIA in Algeria, which was legitimated by excommunicating them, was a colossal strategic error that should never be repeated.
Topic:
Terrorism, Ideology, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco