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81. A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen

Author:
Gabriel Koehler-Derrick
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The report attempts to disaggregate the threat posed by al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula from the sources of instability surrounding it, by examining the group’s strategy, tactics and objectives from a local perspective. The report specifically concentrates on events and actors in Yemen’s Eastern governorates, often described as the most “tribal” parts of Yemen and an epicenter of AQAP activity. This discussion of the tribes of Marib and al-Jawf is informed by 12 months of research conducted in Yemen including fieldwork in the governorate of Marib. The author’s network of contacts and dozens of interviews with tribal leaders and tribesmen suggest that although tribes have long been cited as a primary resiliency mechanism for AQAP, the group enjoys no formal alliance with tribes in either Marib or al-Jawf and there is ample evidence to suggest that, contrary to popular analysis, the group’s strength and durability does not stem from Yemen’s tribes. By refocusing the emphasis on the group’s operations in Yemen, this report provides a new assessment of AQAP’s sources of resiliency, the constraints and opportunities inherent in the local political context and implications for the group’s regional and global ambitions.
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Arabian Peninsula

82. The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia

Author:
Thomas Hegghammer
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This paper traces and assesses al-Qa'ida''s efforts to launch an insurgency in Saudi Arabia from the mid-1990s until today. It examines the background of Usama bin Ladin's 1996 declaration of jihad, al-Qa'ida's activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2002, and the causes and evolution of the campaign waged by the group “al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) from 2003 to 2006.
Topic:
Terrorism and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and Sinai Peninsula

83. Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq's Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. Anger over AQI's brutal radicalism infused the Sunni backlash against jihadists, but AQI also made two fundamental strategic overreaches that exacerbated its alienation from Sunnis in Iraq. First, it incited a sectarian backlash from Iraqi Shi'a without the means to defend Iraq's Sunnis from the onslaught it provoked. Second, AQI created a formal political entity, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), to dominate Iraq after a U.S. withdrawal without adequate support from Iraq's Sunni population.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

84. Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab

Author:
David H. Shinn
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
After the september 11 attacks, the Bush administration's foreign policy toward Somalia focused primarily on counterterrorism. This focus was a result of Somalia's proximity to the Middle East, U.S. concern that al-Qa'ida might relocate to the country, a history of terrorist bombings targeting Western interests in nearby Kenya and Tanzania and early contact between al-Qa'ida and individuals in Somalia. Although ties exist between al-Qa'ida and Somalia's al-Shabab militant group, the overwhelming objective of U.S. policy in Somalia should not be confronting international terrorist activity. Instead, the United States should contribute to creating a moderate government of national unity in Somalia, which offers the best hope of minimizing Somali links to international terrorism. Long-term U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa will not be served by a policy that is consumed with military action to the detriment of supporting economic development and a broad based Somali government.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, Middle East, Tanzania, and Somalia

85. Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and "Other Means"

Author:
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power-projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iran also projects influence through economic initiatives and various religious programs. Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti‐government militias.
Topic:
International Political Economy and War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

86. Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi'a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi'a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid-to-high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open-ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi'a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi'a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi'a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi-Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi'a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi'a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high-casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi-Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect's extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi'a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower-key approach.
Topic:
International Relations, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
America and Middle East

87. Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout

Author:
Brian Fishman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph Felter, Peter Bergen, and Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report is the second to assess the demographics, procedures, finances, and leadership of al-Qa`ida’s foreign fighters, especially those currently fighting in Iraq. It analyzes al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) operations from spring 2006 to summer 2007 and includes almost 600 AQI personnel records for foreign fighters crossing into Iraq, AQI contracts for suicide bombers, AQI contracts for fighters leaving Iraq, narratives written by al-Qa`ida’s Syrian smugglers, and AQI financial records.
Topic:
Radicalization, Islamic State, Recruitment, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

88. Iranian Strategy in Iraq

Author:
Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means” assesses Iran’s strategy to project influence in Iraq and the means it uses to do so. This report addresses Iran’s dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties. Although the report details the scope and nature of Iranian support to Iraqi militias, it concludes that Iran’s political efforts are the core of its effort to project influence in Iraq. This report provides an overview of Iran’s multi-faceted efforts to pursue its national interests by influencing the political and security dynamics in Iraq from the Iranian Revolution to the present day. Although the report describes Iran’s direct and indirect lethal aid to surrogates in Iraq since the U.S. led invasion, it ultimately concludes that U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. The report also concludes that Iran has recently worked to reduce the level of violence in Iraq while concentrating on a political campaign to shape the SFA and SOFA agreements to its strategic ends.
Topic:
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Quds Force, and Jaysh al-Mahdi
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

89. Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa`ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities

Author:
James J. F. Forest, Jarret Brachman, and Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In the text of newly-released al-Qa’ida documents captured during recent operations in support of the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database, readers will see how explicit al-Qa’ida has been in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well as with tensions that emerged within the leadership. The first part of the report draws on scholarly approaches including organization and agency theory, to predict where we should expect terrorist groups to face their greatest challenges in conducting operations. This theoretical framework is informed as much as possible by the captured documents, and provides a foundation upon which scholars can build as more of these documents are declassified and released to the public. Our analysis stresses that, by their nature, terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida face difficulties in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and preventing local authorities from degrading the group’s capabilities. But they also face problems common to other types of organizations. Agency problems created by the divergent preferences among terrorist group members present operational challenges, which can be exploited as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal challenges and vulnerabilities is key to developing effective—and efficient—responses to the threats they pose and to degrade these groups’ ability to kill. The captured al Qa’ida documents contribute significantly to this type of understanding. The analysis contained in this report emphasizes that effective strategies to combat threats posed by al-Qa’ida will create and exacerbate schisms within its membership. Members have different goals and objectives, and preferred strategies for achieving these ends. Defining and exploiting existing fissures within al-Qa’ida as a broadly defined organization must reflect this intra-organizational variation in preferences and commitment in order to efficiently bring all available resources to bear in degrading its potential threat. Many of our prescriptions are intended to induce debilitating problems that increase existing organizational dysfunction and reduce al-Qa’ida’s potential for political impact. This theoretically informed analysis, along with assessments of the individual captured documents themselves, contributes to existing bodies of research on al-Qa’ida. It provides several tools for identifying and exacerbating existing fissures as well as locating new insertion points for counterterrorism operations. It presents an analytical model that we hope lays the foundation for a more intellectually informed approach to counterterrorism. And perhaps, most importantly, this assessment demonstrates the integral role that scholars can play in understanding the nature of this movement and in generating smarter, more effective ways to impede its growth and nurture the means for its eventual disintegration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Al Qaeda, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria