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21. March 2022 Issue

Author:
Bennett Clifford, Daniel H. Heinke, Audrey Alexander, Teddy Macdonald, and Richard M. Yon
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“The January 15, 2022, hostage crisis at a Jewish synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, resurfaced a longstanding jihadi cause when the armed hostage-taker demanded the release of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani neuroscientist-turned-al-Qa`ida-operative currently serving an 86-year-sentence in an American prison for attempting to murder U.S. troops in Afghanistan,” writes Bennett Clifford in this month’s feature article, which looks at how her case continues to motivate jihadi terror plots in the United States. Clifford argues that “the factors that initially skyrocketed her case as a cause célèbre for jihadis have grown in importance. The jihadi movement, particularly in the West, has had a particularly intense focus on the plight of Western women jihadis behind bars during the past several years … [and] Siddiqui is the prototype for the ‘aseerat,’ the female prisoners of the jihadi movement who are constantly the subject of propaganda pushes, crowdfunding campaigns, and jihadi operational activities.” Our interview is with David Caulfield, who served as Chief of the Defense Combating Terrorism Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency before his retirement earlier this year. Daniel Heinke assesses that the Querdenken protest movement in Germany, which emerged in 2020 in opposition to government COVID-19 measures, is “apparently open to conspiracy theories and right-wing extremism” and has become “a serious threat to public security.” He notes that not only did Querdenken protestors attempt to storm Germany’s parliament building in August 2020, prefiguring the January 6 U.S. Capitol riot, but an alleged 2021 plot to assassinate Saxony’s premier was “reportedly fueled by corona-skeptic grievances and apparently had linkages to the broader Querdenken movement.” He writes: “The threat posed by the movement is that it can fuel anti-government sentiments and thus may form a gateway for the acceptance of more extremist views and ultimately for the belief that resorting to violence may be acceptable or even necessary to defend rights.” Audrey Alexander and Teddy MacDonald examine how jihadi terrorists in Syria move, hide, and access funds using digital currencies. They assess that “All in all, digital currencies are not replacing other methods of terror finance. Instead, terrorists in Syria often use digital currencies in conjunction with other money service businesses and transfer methods.”
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Jihad, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

22. February 2022 Issue

Author:
Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Kristina Hummel, Don Rassler, Charlie Winter, and Abdullah Alrhmoun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Notwithstanding the possibility of a deal soon being reached to revive the JCPOA nuclear deal with Iran, nefarious activity by Iran continues to pose significant counterterrorism and security concerns. In this month’s feature article, Matthew Levitt examines trends in Iranian external assassination, surveillance, and abduction plots based on a dataset of 98 Iranian plots from 1979 through 2021. Levitt notes that “perhaps the most important finding to emerge from this study is the fact that Iran pursues international assassination, abduction, terror, and surveillance plots in a very aggressive fashion, even at times and in places that are particularly sensitive. With the exception of a period right after the 9/11 attacks … Iranian operatives and proxies have carried out operations even during periods of key negotiations—including current negotiations over a return to the JCPOA.” He adds: “Today, with the revolutionary leadership solidifying control over key elements of power in Iran, and with an eye toward protecting the revolution at a time when the revolutionary leadership sees increasing threat coming from elements both foreign and domestic, operations like these are likely to increase.” Our interview is with Randall Blake, who recently retired from U.S. government service after spending 35 years working in a variety of critical roles in the counterterrorism enterprise, including most recently as National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats at the National Intelligence Council. Charlie Winter and Abdullah Alrhmoun assess the trajectory in Syria of the Islamic State in the wake of its fluctuating fortunes so far this year. The group’s multi-day assault on Ghwayran prison in northeastern Syria was “by a significant margin, the highest impact and most complex operation launched by the Islamic State in Syria since its territorial defeat.” But just days later, the Islamic State’s leader, who had orchestrated the prison attack, was ‘removed from the battlefield’ during a U.S. raid. Winter and Alrhmoun’s analysis of Islamic State attack claims in Syria since the group’s territorial defeat in March 2019 “suggests Islamic State cadres in Syria may have been saving their energies to carry out a large strike, cutting through the notion that previous declines in operational activity were a sign of weakening or that the prison attack necessarily portends a resurgence.” They add: “In Syria, the Ghwayran prison attack was an example of the latent threat posed by the Islamic State exploding into view. Whatever the monthly ebb and flow of Islamic State operations in Syria, the group is likely to persist as a threat for the foreseeable future.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Surveillance, Assassination, and Abductions
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

23. January 2022 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Alex Almeida, Don Rassler, Brian Fishman, and Amira Jadoon
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Notwithstanding a night attack that killed 11 Iraqi soldiers on an army base in the Iraqi province of Diyala earlier this month, the Islamic State is at its lowest ebb in Iraq in many years, according to new data published by Michael Knights and Alex Almeida in this month’s feature article. They write that “a comprehensive analysis of attack metrics shows an insurgency that has deteriorated in both the quality of its operations and overall volume of attack activity, which has fallen to its lowest point since 2003. The Islamic State is increasingly isolated from the population, confined to remote rural backwaters controlled by Iraq’s less effective armed forces and militias, and lacks reach into urban centers.” They note that “the key analytical quandary that emerges from this picture is whether the downtrend marks the onset of an enduring decline for the group, or if the Islamic State is merely lying low while laying the groundwork for its survival as a generational insurgency.” In this month’s interview, Amy Zegart speaks to Brian Fishman and Don Rassler about her soon-to-be published book Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. In the interview, she calls for the creation in the United States of a dedicated open-source intelligence agency because “OSINT will never get the priority or resources the nation needs without its own agency.” Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines assess the threat trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. They assess that “given the absence of multilateral counterterrorism pressure, the Taliban’s limited capacity to govern, and a worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, ISK now finds itself perhaps in the most permissive environment yet to rebuild, rally, and expand.” Drawing on extensive fieldwork, including interviews with bandits and jihadi defectors, James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz examine the nexus between Nigeria’s bandits and jihadi organizations in northwestern Nigeria. They find that despite widespread fears bandits and jihadis would find common cause, there has been infrequent cooperation between them because they have conflicting approaches in their treatment of local inhabitants and because the more powerful bandits feel they have little to gain from working with the jihadis.
Topic:
Crime, Insurgency, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and Nigeria

24. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

25. November 2021 Issue

Author:
Andrew Watkins, Seth Morrow, Nicholas Tallant, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Matthew Bamber
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
It has been three months since the Taliban entered Kabul and retook control of Afghanistan. According to the head of the U.N. World Food Programme, “23 million people [are now] marching toward starvation. 95% of Afghans don’t have enough food. The economy is collapsing. Winter is coming. This is going to be hell on earth.” In this month’s feature article, Andrew Watkins assesses the Taliban’s efforts to rule Afghanistan so far. He writes that “The Taliban have busied themselves consolidating control, reacting swiftly and harshly to perceived threats. They have not clearly defined the scope or structure of their state, nor have they shared long-term plans for their rank-and-file, many of which continue to operate as they did before August 15, 2021. Taliban leaders have demonstrated the continued primacy of maintaining internal cohesion, a longstanding trait that will likely stunt the group’s response to Afghanistan’s impending economic and humanitarian crises.” Watkins writes that from their perspective, “accepting aid that might sustain their state would prove worthless if doing so fueled a fissure within their own organization. The Taliban would become the very thing their origin story professes they rose up to eradicate and replace: a fractious constellation of militant bands. To put it another way, if Afghanistan’s compounding crises pose the Taliban with the prospect of either failing to provide for the desperate needs of the Afghan people or their own potential fragmentation, the Taliban will put their own organization first.” This month’s interview is with General Richard D. Clarke, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. In a commentary, Jerome Bjelopera argues that “given that the U.S. national security establishment has taken up great power competition (GPC) as its primary concern recently, and terrorism has slipped from the top position, it is time for the security policy community to place terrorism within a new conceptual framework, one that combines terrorists, violent criminals, drug traffickers, insurgents, and others under the heading of violent non-state actors (VNSA).” Interviews that Matthew Bamber conducted with 43 former Islamic State civilian employees shed light on two distinct categories: those who became full members of the group and those who did not. He writes that “there are significant differences in how these two categories were treated by the Islamic State, the positions they were able to fill, the financial benefits they received, and the processes through which they joined and left Islamic State employment ... Understanding the nuances is important in assessing the culpability of the Islamic State’s civilian workers and the danger they may pose in the future.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, and United States of America

26. October 2021 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Michael Knights, Michael Smith, Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, Sean Morrow, and Jonathan Schroden
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, and Hamdi Malik examine the increased discordance within the Iran Threat Network militias in Iraq (muqawama) based on their detailed tracking of recent dynamics for the “Militia Spotlight” platform at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. They find that “while the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force) still runs Iran’s covert operations inside Iraq, they face growing difficulties in controlling local militant cells. Hardline anti-U.S. militias struggle with the contending needs to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions, meet the demands of their base for anti-U.S. operations, and simultaneously evolve non-kinetic political and social wings.” The authors assess that, having under-performed in the recent elections, the muqawama will likely prioritize a bottom-up approach to building up their political base. And they warn that “any shift from Iran’s de-escalatory position, perhaps linked to a failure of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks—or a more significant loss of Iranian influence over muqawama factions—could trigger a sustained escalation of muqawama operations against the U.S.-led coalition in 2022 and beyond.” In this month’s interview, former U.S. National Security Advisor Lieutenant General (Ret) H.R. McMaster provides his perspective on what led to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. In a commentary, Don Rassler argues that the United States needs to better leverage its vast terrorism data holdings by creating a new terrorism and counterterrorism data action plan that exploits the power of data-science and artificial intelligence driven approaches. That plan, he writes, should include five key precepts: 1) reinvest in and advance core terrorism data, 2) strategically leverage captured material, 3) better develop and utilize counterterrorism data, 4) practice data alchemy, and 5) automate basic and other analytical tasks, and augment data. Jonathan Schroden looks at lessons learned from the 2021 collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF). He writes that six themes that emerge are: “the ANDSF collapse was months—if not years—in the making; the United States did not give the ANDSF everything they needed to be independently successful; the ANDSF did put up a fierce fight in many areas; the ANDSF were poorly served by Afghan political leaders; the ANDSF were poorly served by their own commanders; and the Taliban strategy overwhelmed and demoralized the ANDSF. From these themes, there are three key lessons: the ANDSF’s failure had many fathers; the U.S. model of security assistance requires reform; and greater emphasis on non-material factors (e.g., morale) is needed in future security force assessments.”
Topic:
Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Militias
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

27. February 2021 Issue

Author:
Ali Soufan, Matthew Kriner, Jon Lewis, Johannes Saal, Felix Lippe, and Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Ali Soufan provides a comprehensive profile of Saif al-`Adl, an Egyptian charter al-Qa`ida member who could soon become the group’s third emir. Soufan writes that “with the confirmed deaths of Hamza bin Ladin and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, as well as the reported (but as yet unconfirmed) demise of al-Qa`ida’s second emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the likely next in line to inherit the leadership is … Saif al-`Adl. Like the late Abu Muhammad, Saif lives in Iran and is apparently restricted from leaving the country. Little is known about his current movements or activities. Nevertheless, Saif’s revered status within the movement, as well as his deep experience as a military, intelligence, and security leader and a terrorist planner, make him a potentially dangerous emir.” In this month’s feature analysis, Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis assess that the Boogaloo movement “has quickly evolved into a significant domestic violent extremist threat” with “an accelerationist faction within Boogaloo” seeking to “instigate decentralized insurrectionary violence.” They write that the movement “is best conceptualized as a decentralized, anti-authority movement composed of a diverse range of actors,” including white supremacists, neo-Nazis, militia movement members, accelerationists, and ultra-libertarians, who are mobilized in part by the “belief that they are following in the footsteps of the United States’ founders and participating in a revolution against tyranny.” Johannes Saal and Felix Lippe provide a case study of the November 2020 Vienna terrorist attack. They write that “the Vienna attacker, Kujtim Fejzulai, grew up in the city he attacked and had longstanding connections within the jihadi extremist milieu in Austria as well as jihadi contacts in other European countries and further afield. His two failed attempts to join the Islamic State overseas and the failure of efforts to deradicalize him after he was convicted for seeking to join the group underline the threat that can be posed by failed jihadi travelers and terrorist convicts after their release, as well as the difficulties in rehabilitating jihadi prisoners.” Hassan Abbas writes that “even as Pakistan has made progress in reducing the threat from terrorist sanctuaries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, an increased crime-terror nexus in urban centers and a new terrorist recruitment drive by Islamic State Khorasan province, or ISK, in Baluchistan has raised alarms. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is trying to stage a comeback, and sectarianism is also rising, creating a congenial environment for terrorist and extremist organizations, including some Kashmir-focused groups that have evaded counterterrorism scrutiny.”
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Far Right, Political Extremism, and Boogaloo Bois
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Austria, and United States of America

28. Structure of a State: Captured Documents and the Islamic State’s Organizational Structure

Author:
Daniel Milton
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
When the group known as the Islamic State declared its caliphate in June 2014, it did so with a promise that it was not just an organization engaged in fighting, but in governing as well. As a result, the group’s pursuit of “stateness” required an investment in more than just battlefield advances. It also had to demonstrate a capability to create institutions that ostensibly served the dual purposes of imposing its interpretation of order on people while also improving the lives of its citizens. While much has been written about the various bureaucratic agencies and institutions created by the Islamic State during the highwater mark of its tenure in Iraq and Syria, still relatively little is known about the size and scope of those institutions, or the personnel power needed to sustain them. Through analysis of a small number of key primary source documents, this report offers a glimpse at both facets, demonstrating that the Islamic State created intricate organizational structures to support its governance efforts, but also that the group’s funding supported tens of thousands of individuals and their families in Iraq. Although it has lost much of its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has continued to show interest in governance there and in its affiliate provinces around the world, making the information contained in this report an important baseline against which to compare the group’s ongoing efforts.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

29. Cash Camps: Financing Detainee Activities in Al-Hol and Roj Camps

Author:
Audrey Alexander
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Over two years since the fall of Baghouz, entities managing the detention facilities holding Islamic State-affiliated adults and minors in northeastern Syria face overwhelming challenges in securing this population, particularly alongside people displaced by conflict in the region. Often characterized as wastelands inhabited by a volatile population living in squalid conditions, camps like Al-Hol actually serve as a valuable hub for the region’s violent extremists and criminal networks. Since the international community has not decisively answered calls to remedy the humanitarian and detention crisis involving facilities holding Islamic State detainees, many actors have exploited opportunities afforded by inaction, particularly with regard to financial activity. This dynamic has short-, medium-, and long-term implications for terrorism financing and, more broadly, the region’s stability. The Islamic State, for instance, has leveraged the situation to raise and move funds, build ideological and financial support for the cause, and establish logistical channels that benefit the organization. To explore this phenomenon and inform how stakeholders in the counterterrorism community mitigate the issue, this report uses publicly available information and social media monitoring to trace how funds 1) move into, 2) move around, and 3) move out of two camps holding Islamic State detainees in northeastern Syria. In short, the report details how individuals, networks, and groups inside and outside Al-Hol and Roj camps raise, use, move, manage, store, and obscure funds for and from alleged Islamic State detainees held in the facilities. The analysis seeks to explain some of the trends and dynamics emerging at each stage. The section about funds going into the facilities discusses notable players raising and moving money for detainees, particularly from abroad, then highlights popular funds transfer methods. The second section describes how and why funds move around the detention facilities, particularly within the camps’ formal and informal economies, the latter of which involves transactions that camp administrators and security do not authorize or oversee. The third section details how funds leave the facilities, including trends like detainees paying smugglers to facilitate their escape, and discusses why payments for such services are detrimental to stability in the region. Ultimately, this report makes the case that funds moving into, around, and out of Al-Hol and Roj camps enable some traditional terrorism financing issues and invite risks to the region by injecting funds that embolden facilitation networks involving violent extremists, criminals, and corrupt officials. Invigorating such networks has notable implications for the region and beyond since numerous entities may ultimately exploit the players and smuggling routes regenerating in Syria today. After establishing a clearer understanding of financial activity in and around the camps, this report concludes with six policy considerations for players that can help challenge terrorist financing trends in Al-Hol and Roj camps, and thus, dynamics in the surrounding region.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Finance, Islamic State, Innovation, and Internal Displacement
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

30. The Terrorist Lists: An Examination of the U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism Designations Efforts

Author:
Seth Loertscher, Daniel Milton, Bryan C. Price, and Cynthia Loertscher
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
After the attacks of September 2001, the U.S. government grappled with ways to apply all aspects of its national power against the terrorist groups it found itself combating militarily. On the diplomatic and financial fronts, much of this increased effort revolved around the sanctioning and designating of terrorist groups and individual terrorist actors, resulting in a drastic increase of the number of individuals and groups which were branded with the term “terrorist.” Yet despite the application of these tools for almost 20 years, or longer in some cases, little work has been done to understand the impact of these programs. This report examines two sanctioning efforts the U.S. government has employed against terrorist actors: the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list and the designation of individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under the authority granted by Executive Order 13224. Although the specific purposes of each of these programs differ from one another, ultimately both represent a non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism that relies on the application of diplomatic and/or financial statecraft. The examination of each of these programs in this report has two general goals. The first is to provide an overview of the program and descriptive statistics regarding its implementation. The second is to provide some form of assessment regarding the impact that these programs have on terrorist groups and individuals. In accomplishing these two goals, the authors relied exclusively on open-source information collected by researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). This report attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of these tools, in addition to highlighting some of the structural limitations and gaps in the application of counterterrorism sanctions.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Abu Sayyaf
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America