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41. The Debate over Taliban

Author:
Kara L. Bue and John A. Gastright
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The challenges to peace and stability in Afghanistan spiked in 2008. The Taliban resurgence that began in 2006 continued to gain strength, with militants now capable of exerting influence over wide swaths of the countryside. Roadside bombs, assassinations, and carefully coordinated attacks on government and military targets have become common place. In the face of this rising violence, increased attention has been paid on how to resurrect positive momentum in a war and nation-building effort that has played second fiddle to Iraq for the last five years. Strategy reviews have been initiated, additional troops called for, and for the first time high level U.S. officials are talking openly about engaging in dialogue with the Taliban. While many believe that rethinking the existing strategy in Afghanistan is necessary, mere mention of talking to the Taliban has engendered heated debate. For some, it is a black and white issue, guided by principles of right and wrong. For others, the issue is grey, rooted in practicality. In the end, however, it is one that needs to be addressed in the context of a larger strategy. Overall, it is critical to view the concept of negotiating with the Taliban as one strategic element among others that has the potential to improve the chances for success in Afghanistan.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

42. Full Issue - Volume 1, Issue 2

Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH, military strategy and leadership quality of the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal territories has qualitatively improved during the last few years. At the time of the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001, allies and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan were not identified as “Taliban” themselves. That reality is now a distant memory. Today, Pakistan's indigenous Taliban are an effective fighting force and are engaging the Pakistani military on one side and NATO forces on the other.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

43. Full Issue - Volume 1, Issue 3

Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
THE NEXT PRESIDENT will inherit from the current administration a dysfunctional counter-terrorism apparatus. The U.S. military has been stretched thin by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the intelligence community has been discredited by the lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ongoing failed hunt for Usama bin Ladin, and the Department of Homeland Security has so many missions and so many disparate agencies that it is ineffective. An even more challenging task will be to restore to the United States credibility in the world and to reduce the number of people who bear us ill will.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

44. Full Issue - Volume 1, Issue 4

Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
NEARLY TWO DECADES AGO, Arabs who volunteered to aid the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan dispersed from the conflict zone to pursue their newfound passion: jihad in the path of God. Known as “Arab Afghans,” these veterans participated in national insurgencies and civil wars, facilitated international terrorism and became ideologues of global jihad. Today, Iraq's global jihadists are facing a similar moment. Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is under tremendous military pressure from Sunni tribes, nationalist insurgents and U.S.-Iraqi counter-insurgency operations. There is a distinct possibility that AQI could be driven out of Iraq in the near future. It is unclear, however, what the movement will do next. The experiences of Arab Afghans suggest that the defeat of AQI may generate new threats associated with the dispersal of its fighters in the region and around the world. Therefore, it is vitally important to revisit the experiences of the Arab Afghans to develop lessons for present day Iraq.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Soviet Union, and Arabia

45. Volume 1, Issue 10 - Full Issue

Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
SEVEN YEARS AFTER the 9/11 attacks, there is good news and bad news. First, the good news: al-Qa`ida has not been able to attack again inside the United States. No one could have possibly predicted this on September 12, 2001, when we looked and felt so vulnerable. In the past seven years, al-Qa`ida has been able to strike the non-Islamic West in only two cities, London and Madrid. Both of these attacks were conducted by local cells with varying levels of connectivity to the central or strategic hub of al-Qa`ida. No matter how you spin it, and even if they attack again on the day this article is published, this is not an impressive record for an organization that looked so powerful on 9/11. It is important to recognize our success in mitigating al-Qa`ida's impact on the world—even in the midst of several years of bad news coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and London

46. Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa`ida From 1989-2006

Author:
Vahid Brown
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Though it has long been known that al-Qa’ida has suffered from disunity at the leadership level, analysis of documents declassified from the Harmony Database allow us to gain a fresh insight into the engine driving those conflicts and illuminate the vulnerabilities that these conflicts have created for the organization. Al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic military goals. Al-Qa’ida’s preference for branding, the military incompetence of its autocratic leaders, and the unanticipated ferocity of the United States’ response to the attacks of 9/11, have together left the brand managers the only ones standing. This is not to say that al-Qa’ida has not been able to threaten American interests; it has. But its real strength has never been as a fighting force, but rather its ability to transform what have traditionally been the local or national concerns of Islamist activism into a vision of apocalyptic inter-civilizational conflict. This report, grounded in the data from the Harmony documents, charts the history of this transformation and of the internal divisions that surrounded it. The Harmony documents shed light on cohesion problems that have been bedeviling Salafi Jihadi organizations going back more than thirty years. While the branding-versus-bureaucracy crux outlined above has consistently been the driving force, at different points in the development of al-Qa’ida the scope and consequences of this leadership struggle have changed. During the first phase, from the founding of the organization at the close of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the return of the leadership to South Asia after its misadventures in Africa, al-Qa’ida had failed in both areas, creating neither an effective guerrilla organization nor a consistent jihadi message. In the second phase, from al-Qa’ida’s re-establishment in Afghanistan to its dispersal from that refuge by American-led attacks, al-Qa’ida was able to exploit the relative security provided by its uneasy alliance with the Taliban to develop and begin to “market” its anti-American message. Though it was during this period that it was able to carry out the large-scale acts of terror for which it is famous – the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in Africa and the attacks of September 11, 2001 – internal divisions over the decision to target the United States severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacity. During the third and current phase, which began with the United States’ response to 9/11, al-Qa’ida as a centrally-controlled bureaucracy all but disappeared, with most of its key military and strategic leaders dispersed, captured or killed. In this period al- Qa’ida Central has been largely reduced to a media organization, while the Iraq war has created a market for its message, a field in which jihadis with little or no connection to the remnants of al-Qa’ida’s central bureaucracy can take up (and thus alter) the al-Qa’ida banner.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Leadership, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia

47. Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements

Author:
David Cook
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2005, veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Musa`b al-Suri released a study of the jihadi movement entitled The Call for Global Islamic Resistance. In order to better appreciate the jihadi movement’s strategic objectives and mindset, the Combating Terrorism Center invited David Cook, an expert on Islamic history and jihad, to provide deeper background on four of Suri’s identified paradigmatic jihads: The Harakat al-Shabiba in Morocco; The Harakat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya in Algeria; The Afghani Arabs in Lebanon under Abu `A’isha al Lubnani; The Islamic Army of Aden Abyan in Yemen. Here are some of the most significant findings from Cook’s survey: Yemen is a critical step in the jihadi march towards a global caliphate. Suri and others believe that Yemen is ripe for a jihadi revolution because of the country’s proximity to the apostate regimes, and high levels of anti-American sentiment, population growth, and weapons proliferation. The Sunni jihadi movement has gained little traction in Lebanon. Suri is embarrassed by the fact that few Lebanese jihadis have been involved in the global movement, and by the fact that jihadi groups have found little historical success in waging jihad in Lebanon. Jihadi organizations should be global in their thinking but careful to build a broad constituency in their homeland. Suri seems to favor those movements that, even if they found little success in reality, had the proper motives and methodology. Jihadis should not excommunicate other Muslims. Suri argues that the slaughter of civilians by the GIA in Algeria, which was legitimated by excommunicating them, was a colossal strategic error that should never be repeated.
Topic:
Terrorism, Ideology, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco