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11. State-Building in Iraq

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Following decades of authoritarian rule and highly centralised governing system, the people of Iraq adopted a democratic Constitution in 2005, designed to put Iraq on an evolutionary roadmap for democracy, rule-of-law and economic prosperity. The Constitution consists of 144 Articles which, together, define the main pillars of a democratic governance and provide frameworks and boundaries for their enactment, with or without mandating new legislations. However, translating the Constitution into reality proved extremely challenging. Over the past 16 years, the political and institutional leaders have engaged in overt sectarian political dynamics that proved detrimental to the state-building process. They were highly selective in enacting, key constitutional Articles. Many essential institutions and/or legislations that are mandated by the Constitution are awaiting establishment, some of which are critical for enhancing the rule-of-law, safeguarding the Constitution, streamlining the legislative cycle, institutionalising the centre-periphery relations, empowering the local government and optimising the management of national resources and assets. As a consequence, there are currently numerous structural and functional gaps or weaknesses in Iraq’s governing system, which have added to the country’s fragility and acted as independent drivers of conflict. In this report, attempts are made to: (a) Identify the key structural and functional gaps or weaknesses in the governing system that have arisen from inadequate implementation of the Constitution; (b) highlighting the relevant historical context and political barriers for progress; and (c) offer appropriate policy recommendations to stakeholders.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Leadership, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

12. Securing the Participation of Women in Iraq’s Reconciliation Program

Author:
Kristin Perry
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
The inclusion of women is critical to the success and sustainability of reconciliation efforts. To date, however, the government of Iraq has failed to prioritize women’s participation in its national reconciliation program. In the development of the second Iraqi National Action Plan (INAP), the federal government has an opportunity to rectify this legacy and restore the social contract with its female constituents. This policy brief examines current gender deficits throughout Iraq’s reconciliation process and offers relevant recommendations.
Topic:
Women, Feminism, Reconciliation, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Baghdad

13. Ninewa: Barriers to Return and Community Resilience – A Meta Analysis

Author:
Henriette Johansen and Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
The sustainable return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq occupies many international donor projects and resources. However, in the context of the Ninewa province, this problem is not straightforward. Both the concept of displacement and expectation of return are complicated by a long history and atrocious waves of violence, including war, genocide, state-discrimination and systematic demographic changes. Displacement is ingrained in the history of Ninewa and forms part and parcel of community narratives about survival, identity and belonging. In this way, displacement cannot be conceptualized as a linear process or a uniform experience, but rather as a transformative experience conditioned on geographical, gender and identity factors. This report is a meta-analysis of the vast literature on Ninewa IDPs and the barriers to their return. It covers important analytical and contextual gaps with firsthand research to inform and enhance stakeholder policies.
Topic:
Displacement, Discrimination, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

14. Ninewa: Initiative Mapping of Sustainable Returns & Stabilization Efforts

Author:
Henriette Johansen, Kamaran Palani, Kristin Perry, and Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Stabilization initiatives in Iraq require specialized efforts in each of its diverse districts, which should be based on an in-depth understanding of their history and population compositions. Although coordination between stakeholders continues to improve, subject to various agendas and donor expectations, international and national organizations working on stabilization efforts are dealing with historically deep structural and social cohesion challenges (See Barriers to Stability and Return: A Meta-Analysis report). Following the liberation of Mosul from the Islamic State (IS) in 2017, Ninewa governorate and its districts have had the most severe living conditions for returnees. This is largely due to the significant housing and infrastructure destruction in many areas, combined with slow reconstruction and compensation processes. In Ninewa’s post-war context, concerns continue to rise with the prolonged mode of displacement, particularly in the areas of protection, infrastructure, demining, livelihood, housing-land-property, social wellbeing, basic services, social cohesion and reconciliation. Through an analysis of the current initiatives in Ninewa, this report highlights critical challenges relating to stabilization and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Topic:
Political stability, Displacement, Diversity, Sustainability, and Social Cohesion
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

15. Decentralisation in Iraq: Process, Progress & a New Tailor-Made Model

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
The Iraqi state has become increasingly fragile for decades and is plagued with instability, social conflicts and wars. Many drivers have contributed to the country’s intractable fragility, one of which relates to its highly centralised and poorly institutionalised governing system, which has failed to manage centre-periphery tensions and integrate local communities into the country’s polities. Rebuilding Iraq’s governance along the lines of its democratic Constitution, which adopts decentralisation at its core, will be a critical step toward stabilisation, reconstruction, and socioeconomic recovery. The Iraqi Council of Representatives adopted two transformative legislations in 2008, namely Law No. 21 of the Governorate not Incorporated into a Region, and Law No. 36 of the Provincial, District and Subdistrict Council elections. These put Iraq on a decentralisation pathway that is still evolving. However, after more than a decade of experimentation, the decentralisation process has failed to tackle the on-going crises of legitimacy and a lack of trust in government. It has failed to address problems of rampant corruption, inefficiency and an inability to improve the lives of citizens. It is, therefore, paramount to review the existing system and propose ways forward, hence this timely report. Here, Nineveh is used as a representative governorate to review the challenges facing the decentralisation process and explore possible models that can be piloted.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Governance, Fragile States, State Building, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

16. Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority issues for international mediation

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In the last decade, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has seen many moments of crisis – budget cuts, Daesh’s assault on Erbil, the halving of oil prices (twice!) and armed conflict with the Iraqi government over Kirkuk. Today’s situation feels different and arguably worse than these episodes: there’s COVID, a deep oil recession in Baghdad and Kurdistan, intensifying tensions with Turkey and Iran, and an unpleasant undercurrent of resentment against the Kurds among many of the MPs in the Baghdad parliament. What makes this moment uniquely dangerous, however, is the near-breakdown of cooperation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Iraq’s Kurds have shown that they can weather any storm when they pull together as a people. The KRI’s international partners tend to support the Iraqi Kurds more effectively when the two parties work in harmony, but often back away when they cannot identify a cohesive counterparty to deal with in the KRI. International memories of the intra-Kurdish civil war in the 1990s undermined the Kurdish cause in Iraq in the 2000s, when the Kurds’ greatest opportunity for self-governance lay before them. Looking forward, it is clear that the futures of Iraq and the KRI are linked. If Baghdad’s economy and currency collapses, so does Kurdistan’s. If the Kurdish people starve, the blame will fall on Baghdad. If the Islamic State returns, it will emerge first in the strip of disputed territories between federal Iraq and the KRI. The success of U.S. policy in Iraq is the success of both the fifteen provinces of federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, not one or the other. The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue will continue in the late summer, hopefully including a visit of the Iraqi leadership to Washington DC. This presents an opportunity to re-energize the role of the U.S. and international partners in the issues facing the KRI. It is important to stress the importance of a multilateral mission to support intra-KRI cohesion and Baghdad-KRI relations because America does not have all the answers on Kurdistan, nor does it tend to focus enough attention there. U.S. power and leadership are most effective when combined with the perceptive insights and good instincts of many other partners on Kurdistan, such as the French, British, and Canadians, to name just a few. There is an argument that the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement should either have a specific working group or committee on KRI issues (or on decentralization more generally), or a cross-cutting mechanism that ensures the KRI is worked into each of the security, political, economic and energy working groups. The list of topics that require persistent attention is quite long. Most important, the KDP and PUK need to be led towards a de-escalation that will allow the region to speak with one cohesive voice in Baghdad and with international partners. This is a foundational issue that affects all the other issues the KRI faces. An adversarial relationship between the two parties undermines everything that is attempted in the KRI and is deeply off-putting for international partners and potential investors. It can result in armed standoffs, affecting key industries like LPG trucking, or in security crises such as the Zina Warte armed confrontation between KDP and PUK Peshmerga in mid-March 2020. Almost nothing – from oil and gas investment to counter-terrorism to fighting COVID to negotiations with Baghdad – works as well as it should due to the KDP-PUK schism. It would be magical thinking to imagine that the two parties can easily reconcile. Even so, the U.S. and its various partners should prioritize efforts to get the powerful leaders in the same room to hammer out a minimal level of cooperation and start a dialogue, however stilted or tense at the outset. The U.S. and other internationals also need to help Baghdad and the KRI complete the promising steps that have been taken on political, security and economic cooperation. The Kurds worked well with former premier Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s government in Baghdad, and they have overcome their initial caution towards a change in Baghdad to support the new Prime Minister Mustapha al-Kadhimi, another old friend. For the Kurds, however, the relationship will be almost solely judged on what it delivers in terms of budget support. Having watched six Iraqi prime ministers negotiate and renegotiate budget deals with the Kurds every year for over a decade, the U.S. is intimately familiar with every possible configuration of give and take – more so than the Iraqi and Kurdish leaders themselves. What has always been clear is that politics trump economics in such discussions: typically, the solution is political and the numbers and formulas get fudged to fit the required compromise. This is why, for the remainder of 2020, Kurdistan will probably keep selling its oil and gathering customs revenue while Baghdad will provide a reduced top-up to the Kurdish exchequer each month, which is basically what has been happening for the last two years. A lot of discussion tends to end up right back where the parties began. This pattern of recurrent budget crises is not sustainable for two reasons. First, the annual showdown complicates an already fraught budgeting process and Iraqi MPs are becoming more hostile to the KRI economy every time the cycle is undertaken. Second, the KDP and PUK are increasingly fighting over the revenue-sharing mechanism, with Sulaymaniyah seeking more direct transfers from Baghdad or other guarantees of a fair share. The U.S. and its international partners need to back a multi-year arrangement that has buy-in at the highest levels: the Iraqi Prime Minister, speaking for a sizable bloc in Iraq’s body politic, and key leaders within the KDP and PUK. This is yet another reason why the two parties must be able to sit down together at the highest political levels. The sweet spot for a Baghdad-KRI budget deal would seem to be about $800mn per month, requiring the KDP and PUK to agree on a no-blame, non-politicized and permanent reduction of KRI obligations (salaries, social services and allowances) by about 30%. The U.S. and other internationals need to put strong and well-intentioned pressure on the KRI to appoint an empowered and dedicated Minister of Natural Resources to salvage investor confidence in the energy sector, which will serve as a signpost for the KRI’s future non-oil investors. A quick win for Baghdad-KDP-PUK cooperation may be possible in the realm of counter-terrorism. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, the KDP-led Counterterrorism Department (CTD) and the PUK-led Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) are three highly professional services that work closely with the international Coalition against Daesh. They have worked together before and can work in the disputed areas with relative ease now. The creation of joint counter-terrorism coordination centers should initially focus on these elite units and their related intelligence arms, not necessarily the “big military” units like the Iraqi Army, Federal Police and Peshmerga. One important symbol for Baghdad-KRI cooperation could be an investment in the deployment, for short periods, of some Iraqi Air Force F-16 aircraft to the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. These fighter-bombers were notoriously viewed as a stick that Baghdad might use against the Kurds, but today the F-16 fleet and its American technicians are struggling to stay in service as Iran-backed militias surround their operating base at Balad. Perhaps an out-of-the-box idea might be to cycle a fragment of the F-16 fleet through the safe operating environments of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, as the Italian Air Force did with a small complement of Eurofighters during the war against Daesh. The common thread in all these options is a desire to “go big” in the Baghdad-KDP-PUK relationship, and for international players to encourage and support new thinking. The Kurdistan Region is currently cycling downwards, with less stability and less attractiveness as an investment environment, largely because Kurdish leaders are allowing themselves to be divided by personality politics. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 1991 helped to free the Iraqi Kurds and the intervention in 2003 saw the U.S. ask those same Kurds to rejoin Iraq on the basis of U.S. guarantees. It is time to begin to make good on those guarantees. U.S. intervention transformed Iraq from a dictatorship to a democracy (imperfect, like all democracies), but an equally great transformation would be to help create an Iraqi state at peace with all of its components, first and foremost its Kurdish population. That moment can and should start in earnest now.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Governance, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

17. The Status of Erbil-Baghdad Relations

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In Iraq, politics is personal, and the politics of Baghdad-Erbil relations is no exception. Improvements and deteriorations in this relationship have largely been dictated by interpersonal dynamics, such as the rapport and mutual confidence between leaders. In May 2020, the Kurdistan Region’s major political parties played an unusually decisive role in having Mustafa Al-Kadhimi selected as the Prime Minister (PM) of Iraq. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan declared their support for his designation before he was officially nominated by the Iraqi President, Barham Salih. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leaders knew Al-Kadhimi personally and had enjoyed good working relations with him when he was the chief of intelligence. Importantly, they believed that demonstrating early support was a worthwhile investment that could help to extend the period of tension-free engagement between Erbil and Baghdad, similar to what they experienced with Al-Kadhimi’s predecessor, Adil Abdul Mahdi. After a period of frozen relations that followed the Kurdish referendum for independence in September 2017, Erbil-Baghdad relations regained a degree of normality in the run up to the 2018 elections and were further bolstered by the appointment of Adil Abdul Mahdi, a personal friend and close associate of many KRG leaders. In 2019, Baghdad agreed to send Erbil 12.67% of the federal budget; in return, the KRG agreed to offer Baghdad 250,000 barrels of exported oil per day. For various reasons, the KRG never delivered the oil or its revenue, and the Shia political parties exerted unbearable pressure on the PM to cut the KRG from the national budget altogether. Nevertheless, Abdul Mahdi’s government continued to send the Kurdistan Region its share of the budget. Negotiations continued, and both sides eventually reached a comprehensive agreement to resolve the revenue issues from the KRG’s oil sales and border crossing customs. These negotiations, as well as the implementation of previous agreements, were suspended upon the resignation of Abdul Mahdi’s government at the end of November 2019. Nevertheless, budgetary payments to the KRG, minus the calculated revenue from the agreed KRG oil exports, continued until April 2020 (total IQD 454b, c. $278m). Unexpectedly though, in the final few weeks of his premiership, Abdul Mahdi ordered the finance ministryto halt the delivery of the KRG’s public-sector salary payments.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Local
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

18. EU-Turkey Policies in Iraq & Syria: Challenges & Opportunities

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Turkey is in every way ideally placed to bridge the EU with its southern neighbours and together tackle their common challenges and myriad business opportunities. The question is, can they align priorities and policies to make the most of the opportunities? The answer is: not easily. Given the complexity of and uncertainty in Turkey and Iraq, as well as Syria’s security dynamics, sustained EU-Turkey convergence in all areas of common interest is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although both Turkey and the EU have adopted multifaceted foreign policies vis-a-vis the Middle Eastern countries, yet they have converged only on specific issues, such as dealing with the Iran nuclear deal. Both sides consider the US withdrawal from the deal as a “matter of concern”, believing that maintaining the deal and keeping Iran engaged through diplomatic and economic means instead of sanctions or military threats is crucial even after the US withdrawal. Otherwise, Turkey and the EU diverge on the overall approach to the most troubled neighbours, namely Iraq and Syria, which have been sources of grave concern to all. Iraq continues to be a fragile country, struggling to keep its integrity. The country was at the brink of failure between 2014-2017 after the emergence of the so called Islamic State (IS), and further threatened by the Kurdish referendum for independence in 2017. Iraq was pulled back to survival, mainly by international assistance. Interestingly, in 2018 Iraq saw two transformative general elections, one for the Federal and the other for the Kurdistan Region’s Parliament. The outcome of these elections brought about a degree of change in the political landscape, a sense of optimism for future recovery and a clear promise for creating new business opportunities for international partners. However, in keeping with the past, the formation of government in both Baghdad and Erbil became protracted and problematic. These features indicate that the Iraqi leaders remain ill focused on the country’s priorities in terms of state-building and provision of services or addressing the root causes of its fragility. Turkey and the EU share the objectives of accessing Iraq’s market and energy supply, and prevent onward migration of the displaced populations. Of course, the EU is to a large extent dependent on Turkey to achieve its goals. Therefore, it would make sense for the two sides to converge and cooperate on these issues. However, Turkey’s foreign policies in the southern neighbourhood are driven primarily by its own domestic and border security considerations and – importantly – Turkey sees the economic, political and security issues as inextricable. While Iraq has lost its state monopoly over legitimate violence and is incapable of securing its borders, Turkey often takes matters into its own hands by invading or intervening in Iraq, both directly and indirectly (through proxies). Of course, the Iraqi government considers Turkey’s interventions as acts of aggression and violations of its borders, but is unwilling to take measures against them. For Iraq, Turkey is a regional power and an indispensable neighbour. It has control over part of Iraq’s oil exports, water supply and trade routes. The EU, on the other hand, considers Turkey’s interventions as acts of self-defence but frowns upon them as destabilising factors, adding to the fragility of Iraq. In Syria, the political landscape and security dynamics are very different from Iraq, but the EU-Turkish policies follow similar patterns. Syria remains a failed state with its regime struggling to secure survival and regain control over its territories. Meanwhile, Turkey has become increasingly interventionist in Syria via direct military invasion and through proxies, culminating in the occupation of a significant area west of Euphrates, and threatening to occupy the Eastern side too. Turkey has put extreme pressure on the USA for permission to remove the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) and its lead organisation (Democratic Union Party, PYD) from governing North East Syria (also referred to as Rojava). However, the EU and USA consider the SDF and PYD indispensable in the fight against IS and fear the Turkish interventions may have grave consequences. Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission recently emphasised that “Turkey is a key partner of the EU”, and that the EU expect the “Turkish authorities to refrain from any unilateral action likely to undermine the efforts of the Counter-IS Coalition”. Therefore, EU-Turkey divergence or even conflict with some EU Member States is possible over Syria.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Islamic State, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

19. Reconstructing Iraq: Where Do We Stand

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
This month last year, the Kuwaiti government hosted a ‘Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq’. It was attended by the United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres, along with dozens of foreign ministers and large numbers of other government and business representatives. The timing was perfect for Iraq. The country had recently announced the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) and was enjoying an unprecedented level of optimism and all-round international good will. Until then, Iraq had for a number of years been suffering from a severe economic crisis, precipitated largely by decades of poor management of state resources, never-ending wars and crises, and the drop in oil prices. Hence, the country needed help and, luckily for the Iraqis, its neighbours were willing to help because failure to address reconstruction needs would add to the country’s fragility and chronic instability.
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, Reconstruction, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

20. The Hashd Al-Shaabi: From heroes to … what exactly?

Author:
Emma Hesselink
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Now that IS has been defeated, at least territorially, governments, donors and the international community are investing in Iraq’s state building programmes both at national and local levels. However, Nineveh governorate, which suffered greatest damage and requires greatest attention, has been the scene of a highly divided security landscape since its liberation from IS. The chronic divisions between different actors such as Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are only worsened by the presence of the Hashd al-Shaabi and other non-state actors in the Disputed Territories. This brief provides an analysis of the risks posed by Hashd in Nineveh and offers recommendations into regaining a grip on the situation.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Baghdad