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1. EU-NATO relations in a new threat environment: Significant complementarity but a lack of strategic cooperation

Author:
Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The relationship between the EU and NATO has traditionally been characterised by a degree of ambiguity and competition but also by attempts at coordination and cooperation. In the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU and NATO have played crucial and mutually complementary roles, taking advantage of their respective strengths. However, there are also many areas in which their efforts overlap and closer cooperation would be necessary. Thus far, only small steps in this direction have been taken. Ideally, the EU and NATO would work together to develop a more strategic outlook on issues such as developing Europe’s military capabilities, strengthening the security and defence of membership aspirants as well as managing crises beyond EU and NATO territory. Formal relations between the EU and NATO remain complicated. However, there are ways to work around the existing obstacles to EU-NATO cooperation, not least in the capitals of EU and NATO member states.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Multiple nuclear arms control treaties have collapsed in recent years, but analogies associated with them have returned as possible inspiration to manage risks stemming from artificial intelligence (AI) advancement. Some welcome nuclear arms control analogies as an important aid to understanding strategic competition in AI, while others see them as an irrelevant distraction, weakening the focus on new frameworks to manage AI’s unique and unprecedented aspects. The focus of this debate is sometimes too narrow or overly selective when a wider examination of arms control geopolitics can identify both irrelevant and valuable parallels to assist global security governance for AI. Great power leaders frequently equate AI advancement with arms racing, reasoning that powers lagging behind will soon see their great power status weakened. This logic serves to intensify competition, risking a spiral into more unsafe AI practices. The global norm institutionalization that established nuclear taboos can also stigmatize unethical AI practices. Emphasizing reciprocal risk reduction offers pragmatic starting points for great power management of AI safety. This research is part of the Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT) project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 101094228.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Cybersecurity, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

3. NATO as a nuclear alliance : NATO’s nuclear capability and its evolution in the international nuclear order

Author:
Tapio Juntunen, Jyri Lavikainen, Matti Pesu, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Finland’s entry into NATO marked admission to a nuclear alliance. The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the structure and trends of the international nuclear order, the basics of NATO’s nuclear deterrence and its implementation, and decision-making related to the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. The study will also assess how Finland can participate in NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy if it so wishes and what effects NATO membership will have on Finland’s arms control policy. Nuclear deterrence constitutes one part of NATO’s deterrence mix, and the alliance views nuclear weapons as the supreme guarantee of its security. U.S. nuclear weapons form the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, and a small proportion of its nuclear weapons are stationed in allied countries. According to NATO’s statements, the purpose of its nuclear deterrence is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter military aggression. NATO has not made any major changes in its nuclear weapons policy in recent years. The key outlines of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy are decided at NATO summits. The alliance has its own senior body for discussion on nuclear weapons: the Nuclear Planning Group. Non-nuclear allies such as Finland have several opportunities to influence and participate in the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. Importantly, as a member of NATO, Finland can continue its active arms control efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Deterrence, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

4. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

5. The EU and military AI governance: Forging value-based coalitions in an age of strategic competition

Author:
Katja Creutz, Ville Sinkkonen, Mahmoud Javadi, and Michal Onderco
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has increased dramatically, driving discussion on the best way to govern it. While much of the discussion has focused on AI in the civilian domain, its usage in military applications raises distinct ethical and legal questions that actors increasingly seek to address. Governance initiatives are becoming more common, even though strategic competition between major powers remains a challenge. The EU navigates this governance landscape more hesitantly than in the civilian domain with its Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). More information is needed regarding what kind of regulation, and especially with whom the Union could pursue such avenues. This paper seeks to address these questions by presenting and analyzing results from an expert survey conducted in autumn 2023 by researchers at Erasmus University Rotterdam. It argues that the EU needs to pursue a broad range of cooperation formats to advance its values and interests in the context of military AI. Strategic multilateralism is needed, especially with like-minded states that share values with the Union.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Foreign investments, de-risking and the EU’s green transition: Mining critical minerals in Finland

Author:
Elina Sinkkonen and Marco Siddi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The EU is highly dependent on imports of critical and strategic raw materials, both at the extraction and the processing stages. Many of the key supply chains for these materials are dominated by China. In addition, the EU is also dependent on China for many green technologies, such as battery production. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) sets concrete targets for reducing dependencies in the green transition by 2030. Considering both the level of existing dependencies in critical and strategic raw materials and the fact that the Act does not provide any new funding instruments, the feasibility of reaching the set targets is questionable. The Finnish mining sector presents an interesting case that illustrates the scarcity of domestic financing. Most metal ore mines in Finland are owned by foreign companies, and similar trends apply to the refining and recycling of materials. If the EU wishes to mitigate the risks of becoming dependent on authoritarian countries, foreign investments in sectors relevant to the green transition should be subject to investment screening. For example, the Finnish Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions does not cover greenfield investments such as investments in building battery factories.
Topic:
European Union, Mining, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Raw Materials, Critical Raw Materials (CRM), and De-Risking
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

7. EU support for Ukraine: The paradox of insufficient assistance

Author:
Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Since Russia started its aggression against Ukraine in 2014, EU member states have lacked the political will to firmly contest Russia’s imperialism in the shared neighbourhood. This was concretized in the rejection of Ukraine’s EU path and the failure to build Ukraine’s military capabilities before 2022. The EU’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion has been more successful than expected considering its limited capabilities and some past failures of international security assistance. The West is, however, failing to equip Ukraine to win the war. This paradox of insufficient aid leaves Ukraine in limbo, whereby it is enabled to continue the defence effort but without adequate means to succeed. In theory, the EU backs Ukraine’s strategy of non-negotiation with Russia, but the limited military support is pushing Kyiv towards peace talks. EU capitals continue to disagree over the extent to which Russia’s imperialist policies need to be suppressed, and whether small concessions could help to end the war in Europe. Even in the scenario where Ukraine emerges from the war as a truly sovereign state, the risk of future Russian interference, combined with Ukraine’s particular vulnerabilities and the likely challenges of post-war reconstruction, cast a shadow over its immediate future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

8. The rise of the far right in the European Union: Gaining power not through a sweeping victory, but through creeping normalisation

Author:
Nils Fabian Müller
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
In the 2024 EU elections, far-right parties are expected to win more seats in the European Parliament than ever before. At the national level, too, far-right parties are entering more and more EU governments. Despite these gains, the centre-right European People’s Party, rather than the far right, is likely to play the central role in the EU institutions in the next legislature. The EU’s consensus-based system is a safeguard against the sudden seizure of power by far-right parties. But once they have achieved a certain position, the same system makes it difficult for others to form majorities without them. The EU is therefore facing not a sweeping but a creeping gain in far-right power, as centrist political parties become more open to cooperation, and far-right positions are slowly normalised in political discourse. Paradoxically, the very mechanisms that are supposed to protect national sovereignty (such as unanimity requirements in the Council) are the ones most likely to allow far-right parties to influence EU policy, even if they represent only a minority of EU citizens.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Far Right, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe

9. The EU’s accidental geopolitics: Europe’s geopolitical adaptation and its limits

Author:
Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
This Working Paper develops the idea that the EU is engaged in accidental geopolitics. There is a lack of consensus among EU institutions and members on the extent of the EU’s geopolitical role. The Union’s structures and strategic culture do not reflect a focus on geostrategy and power. Instead, the environment of strategic competition has pushed the EU to act in geopolitical ways, for example through the financing of military aid or the imposition of sanctions. The paper argues that these actions have been accidental rather than intentional. To substantiate this argument, the paper draws on an analysis of several key foreign and security policy developments during the EU’s outgoing institutional cycle (2019–2024). The analysis reveals the EU’s shortcomings in becoming an intentional geopolitical actor, and highlights the role of foreign policy agents within the Union in driving decisions. Accidental geopolitics and the reactive deployment of the EU’s international leverage underline the impact of the Union’s top jobs on its role in international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe: Towards a more integrated security architecture?

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Joint Expeditionary Force – a UK-led defence cooperation format of ten European countries – has gained political momentum since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the late 2010s, the JEF has shifted its focus towards hybrid issues, increasingly in Northern Europe. While its role in the hybrid sphere is potentially fruitful, the JEF should be wary of taking on too wide a range of tasks. The JEF’s role as a “sub-threshold” actor could complement NATO’s collective defence efforts below Article 5. Hence, the JEF should be more coherently integrated into the Northern European security architecture. Obstacles to JEF-NATO integration have now been removed, as all JEF nations are also members of the alliance. A more explicit division of labour between the JEF and NATO would help Northern European countries to handle the current security environment comprehensively. Such a security architecture, covering all dimensions of the conflict spectrum, would be particularly beneficial for Finland, which shares a long common border with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, Defense Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Finland, and Baltic States