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41. NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure

Author:
Sean Monaghan, Otto Svendsen, Michael Darrah, and Ed Arnold
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
NATO is not ready to mitigate increasingly prevalent Russian aggression against European critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). Despite its depleted ground forces and strained military industrial base, Russian hybrid tactics remains the most pressing threat to CUI in northern Europe. Despite its current limitations, NATO is the primary actor capable of deterring and preventing hybrid attacks on its allies and has expedited its approach to CUI protection by establishing new organizations to that aim. At the 2023 NATO Vilnius summit, allies agreed to establish the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure within NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), which focuses on preparing for, deterring, and defending against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics. To help NATO planners and staff at the new center conceptualize and prioritize their efforts, this issue brief provides immediate and long-term recommendations to set the new center up for success.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Security, Infrastructure, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

42. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. Breaking Down the Arguments for and against U.S. Antitrust Legislation

Author:
Caitlin Chin
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In many areas of the world, including the European Union, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Australia, governments are considering new legislation to check the market power of a few dominant technology platforms. Yet some of the most sweeping proposals are taking place within the U.S. Congress. In October 2020, the majority staff of the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law published a set of recommendations to promote competition in technology markets, the result of a 16-month investigation that directed attention to the actions of Alphabet (the parent company of Google), Amazon, Apple, and Facebook (now Meta). The House Judiciary Committee advanced six bills in June 2021 that paralleled many of these recommendations, focusing on the anticompetitive impacts of self- preferencing, mergers and acquisitions, data accumulation, and network effects related to digital platforms. Meanwhile, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to advance the American Innovation and Online Choice Act and Open App Markets Act in early 2022. While antitrust reform has seen broad bipartisan support in Congress, members of both parties have also expressed concerns that these bills might have unintended consequences. For example, many of the newly proposed restrictions would only apply to “covered platforms” that meet certain size or categorical criteria—which, under current market conditions, would primarily include Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta. In turn, some critics have asserted that unequal rules could create arbitrary winners or losers in the marketplace and even benefit foreign competitors or bad actors at the expense of U.S. technological innovation. To put these issues into context, below is an overview of seven major bills under consideration in the U.S. House and Senate as well as the related challenges, commentary, and controversies that surround them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Legislation, Antitrust Law, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

44. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. Untapped Innovation? The Racial and Gender Divides That Hinder the U.S. Knowledge Economy

Author:
Alexander Kersten and Gabrielle Athanasia
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The United States’ innovative spirit rests on a complex network of economic rules favoring market-based competition, predictable legal arrangements for patenting and securing intellectual property, and incentives for investors. It also relies on a robust university system that provides the requisite educational training and facilities to carry out research and development (R&D). Maintaining this network fundamentally requires a focus on early education, especially in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). A more inclusive innovation economy also demands greater attention to communities of color, who are often poorly connected to the innovation economy; women, who are underrepresented in the innovation economy; and those in regions that do not yet share in the prosperity of the United States’ innovation clusters. To build a more inclusive innovation-based economy, policymakers should foster equitable access to early childhood STEM education. They should encourage the expansion of technology transfer programs across universities and colleges, including historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and connect them to their regions’ economic growth. Policymakers, academia, and industry leaders should also encourage minorities and women to participate in the patenting and venture systems that support the innovation economy. Renewing American innovation means making opportunity as universal as the talent that seeks it.
Topic:
Economics, Gender Issues, Race, Labor Issues, Discrimination, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

46. Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective

Author:
Gerard Dipippo, Ilaria Mazzocco, and Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Economics Program and the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics quantifies the size of total industrial policy spending by China and compares it to seven other major economies: Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Much of the existing research on industrial policy focuses on its effects, but there are few, if any, published studies that attempt a systematic comparison and quantification of overall industrial policy spending. The heart of the report is the careful calculation of total industrial policy spending by China and the other economies, combining estimates from multiple tools, among them direct subsidies, tax breaks, below-market credit, and state investment funds. The report provides additional context by examining the historical trajectory of industrial policy of these economies and the evolution of industrial policy across these economies for three industries—aluminum, semiconductors, and electric vehicles. The historical and sectoral analyses point to some similarities across economies, but they also demonstrate how distinctive China has been in terms of both quantifiable spending and non-quantifiable policy tools. Finally, this report discusses several important policy implications, including greater transparency and more harmonized reporting about industrial policy spending and the potential ways in which policymakers could employ these data to more effectively limit industrial policy spending by China and other economies.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Industry, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

47. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

48. Creating an Enabling Environment for Sustainable Water Infrastructure Financing

Author:
Conor M. Savoy and Janina Staguhn
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Water presents a significant global development challenge as crises over resources and access to clean water are becoming more extreme due to climate change. To reach the most disadvantaged communities in rural areas, adequate infrastructure is going to be integral. It is estimated that water infrastructure will require an additional $22.5 trillion by 2050, and to achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6, financing would need to triple to $114 billion per year. As with other forms of infrastructure, water requires more than simply building reservoirs, pipes, and holding tanks. For true sustainable infrastructure, donors and local governments should also invest in support to maintain infrastructure and create a regulatory environment that enables continued improvement. To successfully finance water infrastructure, there must be an understanding of what the current financing landscape looks like and how the United States, its Group of Seven (G7) allies, and multilateral partners should prioritize financing, especially on a local level.
Topic:
Environment, International Cooperation, Water, Infrastructure, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

49. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

50. Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System

Author:
Barry Eichengreen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and a coalition of cooperating countries imposed harsh financial sanctions on the Russian government, corporations, and individuals.1 These sanctions bar Russian banks from using SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) to facilitate cross-border payments, prohibit banks from doing most forms of business with Russian entities, and freeze assets held abroad by the Central Bank of Russia in the form of treasury securities and bank deposits. These developments have led Russia, as well as other countries contemplating whether they might find themselves in the same position, to explore alternatives. Such options could include building a substitute for SWIFT to send instructions regarding cross-border interbank transactions; identifying financial counterparties other than Western banks with which to do international business and platforms other than Western clearinghouses through which to make payment; and finding a vehicle other than the dollar for denominating and executing transactions. Specifically, countries are looking to China, which has large internationally active banks, has created its own clearinghouse for cross-border transactions and is embarked on a campaign to encourage broader international use of its currency, the renminbi.2 This note investigates how far China has gone in creating alternatives to SWIFT, Western banks, and the dollar. It explores whether Russia and other countries might be drawn toward this parallel international financial universe and what economic and political implications this has—for the United States, for its geopolitical rivals, and for global economics and politics. China is making strides in fostering cross-border use of the renminbi and building a renminbi-based interbank payments system that can serve as an alternative to SWIFT and Western clearinghouses. However, these remain somewhat limited alternatives—for the moment. The situation could change faster if lent additional impetus by Western sanctions. Thus, countries such as the United States that employ financial sanctions should prepare for the development of alternative financial arrangements in China and possibly elsewhere. This may mean relying more heavily on nonfinancial measures insofar as financial sanctions eventually become less effective.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Finance, Borders, and Banks
Political Geography:
China and Asia