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1. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

2. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:
Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

3. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

4. Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects

Author:
Dara Massicot
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. The End of the Near Abroad

Author:
Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Putin’s war on Ukraine marks the end of the near abroad—the idea that Russia enjoys a special status in much of the post-Soviet space. But while Russia’s neighbors are seeking greater independence, they are not necessarily turning West.
Topic:
Democracy, Post-Soviet Space, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Inevitable Fractures: The Ukraine War and the Global System

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The divisions in contemporary geopolitics are an inevitable consequence of colliding ideas and interests against the backdrop of American primacy. The United States should accept their reality while advancing its own interests in a competitive strategic environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

7. Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Jack Keating
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Each one of these states threatens U.S. interests. Yet they are far from a coherent bloc and largely pose threats independent of one another.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

8. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

9. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict

Author:
Ariel Levite
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

10. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine