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1. Online Narratives and Manipulations: Tunisian and Regional Panorama

Author:
Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In the wake of the presidential elections of October 2024, the first since the coup d'état in July 2021, Tunisia has seen a resurgence of suspiciously sponsored political content, both pro- and anti-regime, on online social media networks. These included advertisements denouncing the refusal of the president of the electoral body, Farouk Bouasker, to reinstate certain candidates. We also saw “locked” profiles with Egyptian-sounding names reacting with likes or "laugh" emojis to publications on the Facebook page of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia. With the proliferation of anti-Saied pages garnering thousands of likes in the space of a few days, pro-regime influencers have multiplied their videos to denounce the spread of these pages and content, calling their audiences to witness the truth of the plot hatched by dark forces, which is the mainstay of the new regime's narrative. It is hard to overlook the importance of Facebook in Tunisia. It remains the most widely used network1 and continues to be a major platform for political life.2 While it has long been the site of disinformation campaigns3 in Tunisia, in recent years the issue has taken on a whole new dimension: the sector has gone from being a local, cottage industry to a veritable industry run by specialized companies operating on an international scale. This industrialization of disinformation goes hand in hand with a phenomenon of opinion manipulation, taking the form of troll profiles dictating the political agenda, or fake profiles creating a false sense of popularity for certain ideas. Both disinformation and manipulation raise questions about the future of democracy, in Tunisia and globally, in a context where for many, these networks continue to represent a faithful reflection of reality. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of disinformation from the Tunisian digital space, exploring the different narratives conveyed, forms of manipulation, and the role of social media platforms in their amplification. The paper also shows that certain disinformation narratives circulate between different countries in the region. The aim is to broaden reflection on these forms of manipulation while proposing a regional research and action agenda that can help reduce the impact of these activities, known in the Arab world by the general name of "electronic flies".4
Topic:
Elections, Media, Misinformation, and Narrative
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

2. Red Lines, Where to Find Them, and How to Work with Them: Civil Society, the State, and Political Change in Morocco

Author:
Francesco Colin
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Who is included in “civil society” and which function it is supposed to perform – particularly in the realm of political action – remain largely debated (Edwards 2014).1 On one hand, achieving political change, and democratization in particular, has become an essential element of civil society in non-democratic regimes after the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Ibrahim 2015: 46–47). On the other, the state’s increasing control of civil society’s space for action has raised attention to the fact that states rely on these spaces to stabilize a given political order (Poppe and Wolff 2017). Even in established democracies, the increasing “politicization” of civil society action has been a key driver of the restrictions on its space for action (as Hummel 2022 showed in the case of Germany, for instance). In Morocco, the monarchy’s posture towards civil society has been ambiguous, to say the least.2 Beyond the analytical insights that stress the regime’s efforts to tame this sector, this paper acknowledges that civil society’s growing ability to intervene in the public sphere prompted a redefinition of the monarchy’s strategy towards this sector (Sater 2007). In this context, palace-led civil society development initiatives such as the “National Initiative for Human Development” (launched in 2005) not only testify to the importance that the state attributes to this sector of society, but also allow the state to reinforce its control over civil society at the local level (Bergh 2012). With more than 240,000 associations officially registered in Morocco, the government’s plan to develop a new official “strategy” for civil society further corroborates the state’s strong and continued interest in the structuring and control of civil society’s space for action (Wail El Karmouni 2023).3
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, and Activism
Political Geography:
North Africa and Morocco

3. Can Poverty Graduation Programs Truly Free the Poor from Poverty? Reflections on International and Regional Experiences

Author:
Howaida Adly Roman
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Poverty is an intractable structural issue, which raises a question that has been perplexing for many years: Why have multiple efforts to combat poverty not liberated the poor from its bond and captivity, allowing them the freedom of sufficiency and human dignity? Does the reason lie in the inadequacy of these efforts, or because the efforts did not address the issue of poverty from its structural causes, instead only dealing with its symptoms? The reasons for questioning this issue are varied. This uncertainty has led to the emergence of a new type of intervention that has been tested initially on limited populations, known as the “graduation out of poverty” approach. This approach was motivated by the recognition in the late 1990s that traditional poverty reduction and microfinance programs could not reach the poorest because, in addition to the barrier of income marginalization, the poor face multidimensional social, economic, and political poverty, as well as psychological and cultural barriers.1 Poverty graduation programs offer an integrated package of interventions aimed at lifting the poor out of their situation and ensuring the sustainability of their emancipation over a specific time, ranging from 24 to 36 months. In 2002, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) developed a program to target the poorest of the poor to free them from their situation and ensure sustainable livelihoods.2 BRAC is a non-governmental organization founded in 1972; its work continued until 2001 when it expanded to include many other countries in the global south, applying its experience in poverty alleviation and establishing branches in many other countries.3 The interventions of these programs seek to combine addressing the immediate needs of those targeted with long-term investment in technical skills, life skills, asset transfer, entrepreneurial development, promoting savings opportunities, and planning for the future to ensure a sustainable exit from poverty and a stable life for these social groups.4 This paper aims to examine poverty exit programs that have been implemented in diverse social, economic, and cultural contexts around the world to draw key conclusions about the ability of these programs to deal with the root causes of poverty and vulnerability. The paper also seeks to investigate the extent to which these programs are scalable, meaning that they can be applied to larger populations; their sustainability; and the guarantee that the poor will not fall back into poverty. The paper focuses on analyzing three experiences from the Arab region, two from Egypt and one from Yemen. Yemen’s program, which is the earliest in the region, dates back to 2006 when the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation decided to expand the approaches to graduation out of poverty through various contexts. In Egypt, the Bab Amal program was implemented by a group of NGOs, while the Forsa program was a government program for graduating beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers (CCT) – the Takaful program – that was implemented in partnership between the Ministry of Social Solidarity and NGOs. Bab Amal was started earlier and has undergone preliminary evaluations, while Forsa is still in its infancy. Research into global poverty graduation programs may help these two experiments avoid making similar mistakes, especially in the context of scaling up. Based on the above, this paper will shed light on what poverty graduation programs are, how they emerged and for what reasons, what role NGOs played, how governments began to adopt these programs and apply them and later expand them, and what the challenges and issues of expansion are. The paper concludes by analyzing a number of challenges facing these programs – chief among them of course the challenge of sustainability – and finally, the lessons learned.
Topic:
Development, Poverty, Economic Inequality, and Social Programs
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, North Africa, and Egypt

4. Urban Communities as Alternative to Slums: A Case Study of Egypt's Asmarat

Author:
Ibrahim Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Egypt is one of the most prominent countries that are facing serious housing and informal settlements issues. The state has, at different times, developed many policies and development programs to deal with these issues. During the last decade, Egypt has witnessed a new development in addressing the issue of informal settlements: the establishment of new urban communities as alternative areas for rehousing those living in slums. This paper analyzes the Asmarat area as the most prominent governmental project in this regard, asking the following questions: To what extent do resettlement areas meet the basic needs of the population? Does the Asmarat project achieve economic, social, and cultural sustainability as a suitable housing project? The paper reviewed the Asmarat general plan in terms of the density of residential units, the road network, the distribution of commercial activities, green areas, and open spaces. The paper presents the geographical location of the study area, which is the Mokattam neighborhood in Cairo Governorate, and it reviews the general plan and the footprint for the area to be built; the three phases of the project; and the financial cost, which exceeded 3.35 billion Egyptian pounds (about US$69.8 million), according to what was announced on official websites. The paper uses the framework of economic, social and cultural rights as an indicator to assess the area. The first indicator assesses the methods of legal security of tenure. All legal safeguards that protect residents from forced eviction should be in place. The second indicator measures access to natural resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation, waste disposal, drainage, and access to emergency services. The third indicator assesses the adequacy and affordability of housing costs in relation to personal income and the cost of daily living for individuals and families. The fourth indicator assesses the suitability of housing for family size in terms of space and protection from cold, humidity, heat, and the spread of infections. The fifth indicator assesses access to adequate housing for all those affected by the removal of their homes, and the need for alternative housing. The sixth indicator assesses the suitability of the housing location in terms of the availability of employment opportunities, access to basic and health services, access to health care and education services, and access to social services. The seventh indicator assesses the expression of the housing’s cultural and social identity, and the adaptation of the exterior and interior design and landscaping to this end.
Topic:
Urban, Informal Settlement, and Housing
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

5. The Road Ahead of Algeria’s Elections: A Changing Status Quo?

Author:
Zine Labidine Ghebouli
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In December 2019, Abdelmadjid Tebboune was elected as President of Algeria to replace Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was forced by the February 2019 Hirak popular protest to resign in April of that year.1 Tebboune was, therefore, inaugurated amidst a deep and turbulent political crisis characterized by an unprecedented protest movement known as the Hirak, a large-scale operation of “clean hands” that targeted hundreds of corrupt senior officials and a fractured ruling establishment. Since then, the Tebboune administration engaged in multiple reforms to rehabilitate the state’s institutions, stabilize the country’s political and social fronts, revive the ailing economy, and reclaim Algiers’ place on the international stage. Four years after his election, the country is preparing for a consequential presidential race which will not be an easy task for any candidate, including the current leadership. Throughout his presidency, Tebboune had to endure several setbacks that often placed his agenda at risk and imposed urgent domestic and foreign policies. In early 2020, the world faced the COVID-19 pandemic2 which paralyzed international and local governance including in Algeria. President Tebboune himself was hospitalized in Germany3 following his infection and had to undergo a relatively long recovery. In addition, Algeria found itself at the heart of complex geopolitical equations when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022.4 As a historic military partner of Moscow, Algiers had to walk on thin lines between its principled non-alignment doctrine and Western pressures to condemn Russia. At the same time, Algiers had also to deal with regional crises including its escalatory cold war with Rabat,5 security turmoil in the Sahel’s Mali6 and Niger,7 and risks of instability in neighboring Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, the 2019 protest movement left its mark on Algerian society as a new generation of Algerians emerged with unique demands and aspirations. While the 2019 elections were essentially focused on sociopolitical stability, candidates for the December 2024 presidential race are expected to provide concrete reforms on domestic affairs and foreign policy. In that sense, a set of priorities is already pressuring the ruling establishment as well as the opposition regarding political reforms, economic revival, and regional dossiers; and how these priorities are addressed is likely to weigh during the vote Hence, an assessment of Algeria’s challenges and the maneuvering of the Tebboune administration is critical ahead of December’s elections to both identify the potential dossiers that will shape public debate and candidates’ programs and draw realistic expectations about the opposition’s options and chances.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Status Quo
Political Geography:
Algeria and North Africa

6. Emergence, Resilience, and Tensions: A Decade of LGBTQ Activism in Morocco

Author:
Sanae A.
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Although Article 4891 of Morocco’s Penal Code criminalizes homosexual acts, LGBTQ organizing in Morocco has taken a new turn since 2011, with the emergence of multiple collectives that organize and employ a variety of strategies to claim their rights as a community. The emergence of LGBTQ collectives can be traced to a post-2011 wave of new forms of organizing.2 During the 2011 social uprisings that swept the MENA region, Morocco’s 20 February social movement mobilized large numbers of citizens around socio-economic and political demands. The movement marked a new era in Moroccan politics and political resistance in the public space. As a youth-led movement, it challenged previous modes of organizing and existing alliances and divisions within the political scene and expanded the public sphere by offering alternative spaces to express grievances and to organize around them. The movement symbolized “hope for Moroccan youth”3 and challenged classical ways of taking political action while bringing into the public debate taboo topics such as feminist body politics, reproductive rights, religious freedoms, and the rights of sexual and gender minorities. At the same time, activists who identified as LGBTQ brought forward discussions around sexual orientation and the rights of LGBTQ. These issues were not explicitly part of the political agenda of the 20 February movement, however, many activists within it who identified as LGBTQ brought queer slogans during official protests with signs reading “Oppression is here, I am here” or “Love is not a crime.” New forms of organizing that emphasized occupying the public space in addition to artistic expressions (such as the production of magazines and zines, graffiti, and music) and underground cultural expressions (such as teach-ins and social theater) came to the surface. This essay explores the evolution of LGBTQ organizing in Morocco since 2011, highlighting the impact of the 20 February social movement as a catalyst for activism. It discusses the emergence of LGBTQ collectives, their strategies for claiming rights, and the challenges they face, including surveillance, violence, and cooptation. The essay also examines new generations of LGBTQ activism, the role of social media, and the response to outing campaigns. It delves into the tensions within local LGBTQ politics, including the debate between culturalist and systemic approaches, and the effects of NGOization on the movement's goals and strategies. It underlines how the increasing visibility of the LGBTQ movement, and the queer critiques of the Moroccan women’s rights movement compels feminist groups to reflect on their politics and the very definition of what feminism is and who it is for.
Topic:
LGBT+, Resilience, and Activism
Political Geography:
North Africa and Morocco

7. Civil Society Organizations and Just Transition in the Middle East and North Africa Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Shady Khalil, Saker El Nour, Rayan Kassem, Kanj Hamade, and Clémentine Lienard
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The ongoing climate, political, economic, and social crises across the Middle East and North Africa have made engaging in a collective process of transition to a more just and sustainable economic and environmental model an absolute necessity. In order to build such a future, there is a need to address key topics such as water access, food security and sovereignty, and energy transition through a multifaceted perspective combining ecological, social, economic, and political lenses. Hence the notion of “just transition”, which has been taken up by some governments, civil society actors, and even some private entities, although they seldom agree on what constitutes such a transition or how it can be implemented in the Middle East and North Africa. Ongoing international events and processes have also affected perspectives on just transition, though the region and its priorities often seem marginalized in such conversations. Our conference sought to address the questions of what exactly would constitute a just transition in the Middle East and North Africa (notably when it comes to access to food and water justice) given the myriad of challenges and the restrictive spaces for mobilization, notably for marginalized communities. In addition, it will explore who decides and sets the agenda for just transition in the region and how civil society organizations (CSOs) can mobilize and work with local communities towards the achievement of a more inclusive process. The dynamics between local and international actors will be explored, notably the question of how the international community can support environmental CSOs in developing a homegrown agenda that is responsive to local needs. Finally, the issue of reframing the narrative around the needed changes for a sustainable future in the region will be explored through the lens of strengthening collaborations with journalists to push for an increase in public awareness of those matters.
Topic:
Environment, Civil Society Organizations, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

8. Social Protection under Kais Saied’s Political Project: Crumbs and Clues in Search of a Vision

Author:
Cyrine Ghannouchi
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Advocates of a social contract approach to social protection consider that social protection has been core to the legitimacy and sustainability of any political project, even if the latter does not offer a space for political participation.1 Historically, the post-independence state-building phase in Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, or Algeria, generously validated this stance as the state positioned itself as the provider for, and protector of, societies, which helped freshly formed governing systems to quickly gain legitimacy for imposed regimes. The social policy of the state overall sustained adherence to a basic social contract (of subordination): the state provides, the people obey.2 This does not mean that post-independence social policies in the region did not score positive achievements in their early years, but it is important today to reflect on those “success stories” by unpacking their political motivations, locally and globally. Recent scholarship from the region started deconstructing those long-standing official narratives from the exploration of the perpetuation of colonial legacies by post-independence elites to the role of welfare in sustaining security belts around authoritarian regimes. However, the post-independence context is significantly different from the post-uprisings landscape. Since 2011, grievances across the region continued to have a strong socioeconomic character, resonating with provision and protection but also demanding political participation – to various extents – and translating the common need for a rupture with old social contracts. The erosion of the social role of the state under globalized neoliberalism and the shortcomings of development models are unanimously pinpointed as the main drivers of the uprisings, but there has been more to it since then. Today, it is also anchored in the dilemma between the state's capability to re-answer the 3Ps (provision, protection, political participation) amidst international turmoil and the very nature of domestic political projects in the Arab region. The Tunisian experience became widely adopted as an illustrative case study in this regard. The current situation in Tunisia is often summarized as the abortion - or spoiling - of the premises of a new social contract and the political cooptation of social momentum. Tunisia is also often cited as evidence to back the necessity of methodological shifts in understanding post-uprising dynamics by equally acknowledging the coexistence of political continuity and rupture.3 The persistence of unrest for over a decade is but the translation of tensions between political elites resisting or curbing prospects of change to preserve (or redistribute) privileges and social groups refusing to settle for an unachieved revolutionary process. However, in the meantime, much has happened, from police violence to political instrumentalization and cooptation of civil endeavors, slowly dismantling networks of collective action and deeply affecting the ability of individuals to keep the fervor alive. In the case of Tunisia, unmet needs, exhaustion, disillusionment, and political deadlock, coupled with a chaotic management of the Covid-19 pandemic, paved the way to another milestone in 2021, namely the declaration of the state of exception by President Kais Saied and the suspension and subsequent dissolution of the Parliament. Tackling social protection and vulnerability in Tunisia and understanding the process that led to July 25 are intrinsically linked, and so is exploring the limits of Saied’s political project. This paper is not interested in revisiting the diagnosis of the socioeconomic situation in Tunisia nor does it pretend to provide answers. However, it uses a social contract lens to shed light on blind spots in debates on social protection in Tunisia in its first section, particularly the “unspoken dynamics of unseen vulnerabilities”. In its second section, the paper investigates the articulation and ramifications of the social question in Kais Saied’s new ongoing political project by reviewing his discursive body between the end of August 2022 and the end of May 2023. The choice of this period is framed by considering Articles 100 and 101 of the 2022 Constitution, respectively stipulating that the President of the Republic is the solemn policymaker and that his government is but the executive body of the President’s policies. This period witnessed a myriad of events, including legislative elections and the implementation of the new Parliament whose activity is yet in its early days and is therefore excluded from the current analysis. While both sections seem distinct in their substance and approach, they together serve, particularly in the absence of a clear correlation, the quest for echoes of a grounded discussion of social protection in Kais Saied’s agenda. The first section establishes a set of elements structural for the said discussion while the second section investigates traces of such a set in the President’s discourse. For this paper, social protection is understood in its socio-political sense and not in terms of technical systems of response confined to schemes of income-based categorization and the aid rationale. This definition recognizes social protection as the sum of social policies anchored in a rights-based approach and justice in accessing these rights. These policies range from food sovereignty to institutional and infrastructural efficiency, and from environmental hazards to education and housing. This definition rejects the association of social protection to “crisis” for crisis is but “the system working as intended”,4 a dangerous discursive element that serves the illusion of inequality and suffering as “temporary” phenomena of “exceptional” times.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Kais Saied, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

9. The Egyptian Army’s Counterinsurgency: History, Past Operations, and the Sinai Campaign

Author:
Hossam el-Hamalawy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Why did the Egyptian military, which had long avoided serious involvement in the police-led 1990s domestic War on Terror and the later fight against armed militants in Sinai, embark on a major counterinsurgency in Sinai following the 2013 coup? Why did it take the Egyptian military almost a decade to pacify the peninsula at a very high cost for Sinai residents and the military itself, despite the small size of the insurgent force and the relatively confined terrain where it operated? This paper will attempt to answer those questions, but first, it examines some catastrophic precedents where the army deployed its personnel in counterinsurgency operations, before delving into the recent Sinai war and what it tells us about the military’s mindset.
Topic:
Security, Counterinsurgency, History, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Sinai Peninsula

10. Morocco’s Social Protection Programs: Can the Country Overcome the Odds?

Author:
Othman Makhon
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
During the 1980s, Moroccan governments adopted structural adjustment policies that inadvertently left deep-seated vulnerabilities across Moroccan society. The enduring consequences of these policies continue to marginalize a significant portion of Moroccans, depriving them of access to quality education, comprehensive healthcare, adequate housing, and decent employment opportunities. The state’s approach to addressing the societal challenges spanning decades has alternated between targeted measures aimed at rectifying the disparities stemming from the maldistribution of resources and services, on the one hand, and reactive strategies aimed at mitigating the adverse impacts of structural adjustments, on the other.1 The decreased government investments in critical social sectors, such as healthcare and education, have over time compelled this new departure from previous policies of neglect. Although such policies might have contributed to macroeconomic stability, they also adversely affected both social cohesion and the population’s social protection networks.2 Subsequent administrations embarked on a mission to address these predicaments, which have exacted a toll on Morocco and relegated the nation to the lower levels of the Human Development Index: As of the 2022 assessment, Morocco’s ranking was 123.3 These administrations were compelled to devise strategies encompassing both economic and social dimensions, aiming to free Morocco from the ramifications of stringent structural adjustment policies. Their goal was to transition the Moroccan economy from its reliance on agricultural and raw material exports to a more self-reliant model, characterized by high–value-added industries capable of absorbing the unemployed workforce into productive economic activities. Such a transformation was anticipated to pave the way for comprehensive social protection. However, the approach adopted by these administrations gravitated towards superficial and improvised remedies, dominated by an urgency-driven and philanthropic approach. These impromptu solutions fell short of propelling the vulnerable and poor segments out of the cycle of exclusion and marginalization. All initiatives within this context adhered to the neoliberal principles adopted by these governing bodies. These administrations gave paramount significance to a market-driven economy, as well as financial and macroeconomic equilibriums, oftentimes at the expense of the substantial sections of the population that experienced pervasive poverty and destitution. Consequently, social assistance endeavors proved to be misleadinag, exacerbating the disparities among Moroccans. This occurred within an environment lacking robust social and economic policies dedicated to achieving social equity and equitable distribution of resources. These programs were subject to criticism and unfavorable assessments from all corners of the state, including from the king himself, who remarked on their fragmentation across ministerial domains, inadequate coordination, and their inherent inability to accurately target deserving groups. As a result, they struggled to effectively address the needs of citizens, leaving only a faint impact on the lives they sought to improve.4 The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the existing economic and social vulnerabilities prevalent in Moroccan society. The pandemic exposed the inadequacies and fragility of the programs in safeguarding the dignity of the populace, which became particularly pronounced in the absence of a fair and robust social protection system. This reality led both the king and the political establishment to recognize the urgency of re-evaluating the fundamental underpinnings of this system. Their shared view materialized in a commitment to universal social protection for all Moroccans, with a deadline set for 2025. On the other hand, the rapid spread of the pandemic coincided with Morocco’s comprehensive assessment and recalibration of its development paradigm. Despite its aspirations, this model had failed to fully incorporate the Moroccan populace within development dynamics, instead focusing on financial equilibrium, often to the detriment of social and human equilibrium; this prompted the contemplation of a fresh development model. The newly envisaged model aimed to sever ties with the trajectory that had resulted in structural disparities, spanning domains such as education, skill development, healthcare, housing, employment, public services, and social protection.5
Topic:
Public Policy, Services, COVID-19, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
North Africa and Morocco