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881. NATO Allies’ geopolitical diversity and the cohesion of the Alliance

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed a high degree of cohesion among NATO Allies, who largely converge on what the Alliance is about and how it should respond to the Russian threat. In the longer- term, though, NATO’s cohesion will be dependent on Allies’ success in knitting together a common vision from their varying strategic cultures and threat assessments. And indeed, from the United States’ global reach and first-class military to France’s strategic autonomy imperative and the UK’s renewed ambition for ‘Global Britain’; from the Baltic states’ and Poland’s geographical proximity to Russia, to Italy’s and Spain’s regional southern focus; and from Türkiye’s special defence and foreign policy posture to Germany’s Zeitenwende, the Atlantic Alliance brings together a wide range of geopolitical diversity. This Policy Brief draws on a study conducted by the author1 to build a typology of NATO Allies based on three sets of variables: the nature of the relationship between any given Ally and the United States; the Ally’s perception of the Russian threat; and the extent to which NATO is given exclusivity in the Ally’s defence policy. Against this backdrop, Allies can be classified into three groupings that reveal persistent fault lines running through the Alliance, making cohesion a permanent challenge.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Alliance, Diversity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cohesion
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

882. Russia’s military after Ukraine: down but not out

Author:
Łukasz Kulesa(ed.)
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The June 2022 Madrid Summit decided on the next steps in enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture, describing Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.1 The poor performance of the Russian forces in the first months of their war against Ukraine and the scale of casualties and material losses they suffered should however prompt further reflection about Russia’s ability to recover and challenge NATO militarily. If the Russian military seems unable to prevail over Ukrainian forces (supported by a number of NATO countries), it may reasonably be asked whether unrolling “the biggest overhaul of our collective defence and deterrence since the end of the Cold War”2 is justified. This Policy Brief argues that NATO’s goals to shore up the Eastern flank are indeed warranted for three reasons – Russia’s political will to claim a victory, evidence of learning from past mistakes, and the existing Russian industrial capacity. In fact, the Russian military will probably experience a relatively speedy recovery. With the caveat that much is contingent on day-to-day developments and the ultimate outcome of the war, it is also plausible that Russia will “build back better” rather than simply rebuild a military which has proven to be ill-prepared for the operation against Ukraine.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Madrid Summit
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

883. El por qué de la guerra en Ucrania y su posible impacto en América Latina

Author:
Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
El artículo recorre las razones históricas y políticas que, a juicio de la autora, han derivado en la guerra desatada por la Federación Rusa contra Ucrania. También es su objetivo analizar los impactos inmediatos y mediatos de la guerra a nivel internacional, así como sus posibles consecuencias en el ámbito regional de América Latina.
Topic:
Security, Politics, War, Economy, History, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

884. WEER 2022 | Still Without Peace (Full Issue)

Author:
Mykola Riabchuk, Olga Brusylovska, Iryna Bohinska, Julien Théron, and Anna Menshenina
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
“Still without Peace” was the title and the motto of the annual Warsaw East European conferences held in July 1-2, 2022 at the University of Warsaw under the auspices of the Center for East European Studies and with the support of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian war in Ukraine has largely determined the topics of that conference as well as the content of this issue of the Warsaw East European Review, partly though not exclusively based on the conference presentations. From the scholarly point of view, Ukraine has been always a bit of puzzle – partly because it was chronically understudied for years if not centuries insofar as it did not exist on the most of the mental and geographic maps, but also because many processes and phenomena in the ‘newborn’ country did not fit the established analytical paradigms, let alone the dogmas of the Russian ‘Imperial knowledge’ adopted uncritically in the West. This is why so many Westerners, including scholars and politicians, were so stunned by the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union (that had never been seen and named as ‘empire’), and probably even more surprised lately at Ukraine’s spectacular resilience under Russian all-out military invasion. In spite of the gloomy predictions and expectations, the country that had been broadly described as corrupt, dysfunctional, and internally deeply divided, appeared quite strong, institutionally robust and consolidated by civic patriotism. Ten months of the bloody, horrendous war have not brought any signs of breakdown of Ukrainian state or society. On the contrary, Ukrainians of all social brands seem to rally around the flag, united as never before. And all the state institutions, despite the persistent stress, duly provide all the services, probably even better than before the war. Why did this happen (rather than the opposite) is a big question that requires the study of many interrelated factors in their synergic interaction. The papers presented at the Warsaw East European Conference and partly collected in this volume, shed some light at the problem, in particular Anna Menshenina’s study of “Transformation of socio-political values in Ukraine: from gaining its independence till the outbreak of full-scale war”. But the problem remains too broad, multifaceted and complicated, and definitely requires further examination. Four articles of this volume examine various aspects of the ongoing war – starting from the origins of Putin’s obsession with the ‘Ukrainian question’ explored in Mykola Riabchuk’s essay, and from the early attempts to impose a disastrous implementation of Minsk agreements upon the Ukrainian government, scrutinized by Iryna Bohinska, – to the remarkable peculiarities of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, featured by Julien Théron, and to the venomous propagandistic campaigns staged by Russia against Ukraine on a global scale, as presented in a detailed case study by Oksana Nesterenko. Global ramifications of the Russian war in Ukraine and some scenarios for the future are considered in Olga Brusylovska’s article; and the cultural and political activity of displaced Belarusians in the post-war West Germany is attentively discussed by Anastasiya Ilyina. It may slightly fall out of the main topic of this volume, but it may resonate with today’s problems of Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons and keep, in a broader sense, all the East European nations on our radar. The Russian war in Ukraine is most likely to dominate in both the WEEC panels and the WEER pages next year but we encourage our international colleagues to explore Eastern Europe as alive and dynamic body, where various parts are interconnected and interdependent.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, History, Displacement, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, Invasion, Arms Sales, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

885. Public Perception of Serbian Foreign Policy in the Midst of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Maja Bjeloš, Luka Šterić, and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
We present you the analysis of the results of the public opinion survey on Serbian foreign policy and relations with great powers. The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months. As opposed to Russia and China, the EU is being cynically perceived as a self-interested actor. On that same front, there are more of those who perceive the EU’s policies towards Serbia as hostile than those who perceive these policies as friendly. When it comes to perceptions of the US, the spectrum is dominated by those who perceive the US as a self-interested power and those who perceive it as an enemy of Serbia. The public also treats the issue of foreign direct investments (FDI) as important for the country’s foreign policy. However, the FDI are more likely to be considered highly important among those who favour the EU membership than among those who oppose the membership. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the public opinion survey demonstrates that Russia is still a major vector in Serbian foreign policy. Extremely positive perception of Russia is a product of recent Serbian history but also of the radical pro-Russian narrative that was pushed for years in the pro-government media and tabloids. Serbian public largely subscribes to the Russian point of view on the Ukraine war, with the majority blaming NATO and the US for its outbreak. The majority of the Serbian public is against introducing sanctions against Russia, with the majority doing so on the ground that Serbia experienced sanctions in the 1990s. This fact demonstrates that Serbian perceptions of Russia are frequently based on historical experiences from the 1990s. Belgrade Center for Security Policy conducted public opinion survey in the period from October 3 to 17, 2022, as part of the Western Balkans Security Barometer project led by Kosovar Centre for Security Studies with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. The survey is conducted on a sample of 1,020 citizens of Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

886. The Case for Neutrality: Understanding African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Author:
Olayinka Ajala
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In March 2021, Russian armed forces began deploying thousands of military personnel and equipment near Russia’s borders with Ukraine, with another contingent deployed in Crimea which was annexed by Russia in 2014. The scale of this military build-up, which represented the largest force mobilisation by Russia since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, came as a surprise to Ukraine and a source of concern to other European countries and the United States. The unexpected stance of neutrality held by many influential African countries coupled with notable abstentions in several UN resolutions have rattled their Western allies. one of the biggest surprises for the West has been the reaction and stance of several notable African countries. Having enjoyed political patronage and goodwill from most countries in Africa for several decades, the United States and its Western allies expected a robust and strong castigation of Russia by their allies from the continent but were shocked by the response of some key African countries. While many such countries were quick to condemn the invasion and toed the line of the US and other Western allies, some notable countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Senegal refused to condemn the attack with some blaming the West and NATO for the war. This article explains why African countries are taking their current stance and the implications this might have on the international balance of power at the end of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. The reasons are linked to political, economic, and strategic considerations as well as contemporary grievances relating to the recent Covid pandemic and the treatment of Africans in Ukraine at the onset of the war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

887. How likely is it that Vladimir Putin will be able to Claim some sort of Victory in Ukraine? An Assessment based on Events from February - early November 2022

Author:
Alexander Hill
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper provides both an outline of the war in Ukraine to date and an assessment of the likelihood that Vladimir Putin’s Russian government will be able to claim a degree of success in its special operation in Ukraine if and when there is either a meaningful ceasefire or ultimately peace agreement between the warring powers. Russian success is defined in terms of the aims of the special operation’ as stated by Russian leaders on the eve of and during the course of the operation to date. The paper concludes that in all likelihood Russia will be able to claim a limited degree of success at the end of the special operation, even if that success will have come at a high cost.
Topic:
Vladimir Putin, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

888. ‘Now or Never’: The Immediate Origins of Putin’s Preventative War on Ukraine

Author:
Geoffrey Roberts
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
President’s Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a classic case of preventative war decision-making. The public record shows that Putin went to war to prevent Ukraine becoming such a powerful NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders that Kyiv would seek to forcibly regain control of Crimea and the Donbass. Putin foresaw a future war not just with Ukraine but with NATO and the assessed the risks to Russia of an immediate conflict were lower than the medium and long-term threat. The danger of Ukraine becoming a nuclear-armed state also had an important bearing on his final decision for war, as did his perception of the ultra-nationalist Kyiv government as an implacably ‘anti-Russia’ regime.
Topic:
NATO, Vladimir Putin, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

889. The Futility of U.S. Military Aid and Nato Aspirations for Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the U.S. has provided $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine. Continued security assistance prolongs the conflict and heightens U.S.-Russia tensions. Russia shares a 1,200-mile border with Ukraine and views the prospect of Kyiv joining NATO and basing U.S. and allied forces there as a threat. Russia will absorb significant costs—monetary and human—to prevent this outcome. A resolution in Ukraine that does not account for Russia’s concerns is unrealistic; therefore, U.S. and European leaders should account for them, starting with ruling out Ukrainian accession to NATO. Because of the risk of escalation, potentially to nuclear war, the U.S. should seek détente with Russia and support the establishment of a neutral, non-aligned Ukraine that serves as a buffer state between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Crimea, and United States of America

890. Agenda OTAN 2030 y Concepto Estratégico 2022

Author:
Carmen Romero
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El momento crítico que atraviesa la seguridad europea tras la agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania ha alterado el entorno estratégico y obliga a la Alianza Atlántica a repensar su posición. Sunuevo concepto estratégico a aprobar en 2022 está marcado por este hecho histórico. Si bien, esta nueva estrategia está guiada a su vez por la Agenda OTAN 2030, adoptada en 2019, que establece una serie de principios como guía: unidad, defensa colectiva, resiliencia, salvaguarda de las infraestructuras y superioridad tecnológica. Así, este ensayo estratégico quiere reflexionar sobre este proceso para que la Alianza y la OTAN sean claves en la defensa del orden de seguridad internacional. Con este fin,analiza las claves de dicho entorno y cómo la organización pretende responder a esos desafíos, lo que tiene evidentes y potenciales implicaciones para España.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain