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41. Fly me to the moon: Why Europe needs to move into space

Author:
Samantha Cristoforetti and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Outer space is experiencing a paradigm shift from exploration to exploitation, whereby orbits become more congested and contested than ever. NATO militaries are adapting not only to integrate space in military operations on Earth but also to operate in this domain. U.S. is leading the spacepower doctrinal evolution, while Europe holds important space capabilities but lags behind in certain key areas. Human space transportation is the new frontier that Europeans should address through civil-military cooperation.
Topic:
NATO, Space, Civil-Military Relations, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe and Space

42. How to write a strategy

Author:
Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Writing a strategy is difficult because the purpose is to change the behavior of humans. The most common context for strategy is in the sphere of military activities: how to apply force in a manner that breaks the will of an enemy, causing that enemy to stop fighting. However, strategy can also be useful at less intense levels of conflict such as crisis management and stability operations. Indeed, strategy can be used for peaceful but competitive purposes such as government tax policy or corporate marketing of consumer products. This paper expresses strategy as a formula: Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means + Risk wherein Ends are the objectives or the “what” the strategy intends to accomplish; Ways are the strategic concepts/courses of action or the “how” that describes the methods of applying the means to attain the ends; and Means are the resources. Risk is the degree to which the Ends exceed the Ways + Means. The following steps should be used to write a strategy. They may be performed in a different order. In most cases, some of the steps will be repeated during the development process: • Estimate the development timeline: determine the deadlines for writing the strategy. • Develop understanding: gather information and relate it to conditions and actors. • Frame the problem( s) and opportunities: determine what is the question or problem to be solved. Questions should address internal context for the strategy development process as well as the external problem context. • Draft proposed ends: envision what is to be accomplished. • Determine the ways and means: compare the contemporary problem frame with the vision of what should be achieved, ascertain the set of resources that are currently available (or can reasonably be made available within the necessary time frame), and identify how these resources can be applied to produce the desired end state. • Consider risk: assess whether the ends, ways, and means are in sustainable balance. The degree to which the perceived cost of Ways + Means exceeds the perceived value of the Ends is Risk. • Reframe the problem: consider the likely evolution of the situation in light of proposed actions. • Finalize the statement of Ends, Means, and Ways: write the strategy using the steps in this list as an outline. • Monitor strategy implementation and effect; revise as necessary: assess whether the strategy is being properly implemented, is producing the expected effects, and progressing adequately towards the desired ends. If not, revise the strategy or the plans and/or activities that implement the strategy.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

43. Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee* How Allies adapt to drones

Author:
Brian R. Miletich
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Drone proliferation and technological advancements in contemporary confl ict represent an evolutionary trend. Despite the growing scope and scale as a combat multiplier, drones have not yet changed the character of war. Drones are part of a broader evolutionary trend in military technology for three reasons: drones fail to achieve decisive eff ects on the battlefi eld, are vulnerable to basic adaption, and do not profoundly change existing military doctrine. The article recommends three policy provisions within NATO’s strategic construct that will help NATO meet the challenges proposed by drones. While technology alone is often insuffi cient to generate a Revolution in Military Aff airs (RMA), a new warfi ghting approach such as Multi Domain Operations (MDO) must be implemented to seize the opportunities presented by drones.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

44. The new NATO Force Model: ready for launch?

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO Allies are in the process of a dramatic change to the Alliance’s force structure, which will see the NATO Response Force (NRF) replaced with a threetiered structure of Allied forces, to include an Allied Reaction Force (ARF), all of which is designed to better defend and deter. This new NATO Force Model faces a variety of challenges, from whether Allies will have suffi cient forces at appropriate readiness levels to fulfi l their own objectives to whether SACEUR will still have the authority to “alert, stage and prepare” Allied forces as a crisis emerges, through whether and how the Alliance’s command structure now needs a re-examination as well. To avoid the potential pitfalls and ensure the Alliance fulfi ls its own vision, NATO and its member nations ought to consider an array of mitigating steps, such as using snap exercises and inspection visits to ensure forces are indeed manned, trained and equipped, and emphasizing mass and capacity in Allied acquisition plans and capability targets.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Force Model
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

45. NATO and a Taiwan contingency

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This paper Discusses the conditions under which a Taiwan contingency could trigger Article 5. Explains how individual NATO countries already play a role in Taiwan’s security. Outlines scenarios under which individual NATO countries could become directly involved in a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

46. NATO 2099: The science fiction anthology

Author:
Florence Gaub
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
N ATO is a fundamentally future-oriented organization: the entire North Atlantic Treaty is written in the future tense. The word “will” appears ten times, the word “shall” even fifteen times. And yet, it features very little in the genre that is dedicated to all things future, science fiction. In the 75 years since its inception, the Alliance has appeared in just six films and five books, with most of these not even strictly science fiction. To some, this does not matter: they equate science fiction with fantasy, a realm of the impossible. But to others, it does: science fiction has a knack for detecting trends, imagining the rare, extrapolating consequences, and sparking important debates about what is to come. It is precisely this quality that makes science fiction useful for security and defence purposes. In part, this is because science fiction often focuses on technology, projecting innovations such as sliding doors, mobile phones and tablets (Star Trek 1966 - 1969), Virtual Reality (The Matrix 1999), and space travel (Francis Godwin, Cyrano de Bergerac, Johannes Kepler in the 17th century). But it also asks moral questions about the implications of these innovations, such as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), Isaac Azimov’s I, Robot (1950) or Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1931). Science fiction can also have a warning effect, highlighting were things might go wrong in the political sense, whether it is 1984 warning of a totalitarian society or Snow Crash (1992) showcasing the effects of excess capitalism on democracy. For military purposes, science fiction can imagine conflicts precisely in order to prevent or mitigate them. Since the late 19th century, authors have used this genre to anticipate and prepare for conflicts to come, with George Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking (1871) being one of the first of this kind, describing an invasion of Britain by a German-speaking country, including the destruction of the Royal Navy by a futuristic wonder-weapon (“fatal engines”). H.G. Wells’s The Land Ironclads (1903) in turn featured tank-like armoured fighting vehicles.1 It is for this reason that science fiction has been used repeatedly by military organizations. In the 1980s, US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative was influenced by science fiction material, and Ghost Fleet (2015) was said by then SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis to be “a startling blueprint for the wars of the future and therefore needs to be read now!” But the military has not just used existing science fiction, but also used the genre to develop its own thinking, be it in the United States – such as the US Army TRADOC Mad Scientist Initiative which produced Science Fiction: Visioning the Future of Warfare 2030-2050 (2016) – or in France, where the project La Red Team hires science fiction authors to imagine what future opponents might think and do.2 Similar initiatives are also underway in the United Kingdom and Germany. Of course, imagining the future of NATO is a much bigger task than solely imagining the future of conflict, and perhaps this explains why the Alliance features little in regular science fiction. While NATO might be about defence, it is first and foremost a political enterprise, a promise for the future. Envisioning what challenges it will face and overcome, how it will adapt to a changing political, technological and even physical environment and maintain unity makes for a much bigger task than coming up with a new weapon that could change everything. And this is precisely what we asked the authors in this volume to do 75 years after NATO was born: imagine what it will look like 75 years from now, in 2099.
Topic:
NATO, Future, and Science Fiction
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

47. NATO: Waging High-Tech Warfare

Author:
Yury Belobrov
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
THE rapid technological progress observed in the last decade throughout the world, especially in China and Russia, threatens the established sources of military and industrial dominance of the collective West on the world stage. NATO views this as an alarming trend, and in an attempt to stop it, bloc members are making a determined effort to preserve their militarytechnological leadership and the international order structured around their policies. To this end, they are initiating a new arms race, partially through the active incorporation into the military sphere of the latest breakthrough technologies (Emerging and Disruptive Technologies – EDT), which, they believe, can reverse the emerging multipolarity of international relations and radically change the nature of future wars. Thus, the Allies are stepping up collective efforts to master innovative technologies and introduce them into the operational activities of NATO and all member nations to ensure their victory in future high-tech wars. They emphasize the urgency of adapting the armed forces of said countries to the realities of global technological advancement. As the communiqué adopted at the Alliance summit in Vilnius in 2023 directly stated: “We are accelerating our own efforts to ensure that the Alliance maintains its technological edge in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military advantage including through dual-use solutions.”1 The US, as the main sponsor of NATO militarism, demands that its allies and partners closely and expeditiously collaborate on the creation of novel weaponry utilizing these emerging technologies and dramatically increase investment in various EDT projects and adapt their armed forces to them. Under the US’s diktat, Brussels and its American allies are creating new bureaucratic and financial entities. Private businesses and academic and research institutions are also being drawn into this sphere. To speed up this process, at the urging of Washington at the NATO summit in Brussels in 2021, a strategic initiative was launched to create the NATO Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which will manage and coordinate all this activity within NATO. The main task of this organization is to form an innovative technological network that unites R&D centers, innovative start-ups, defense enterprises, and military agencies in order to simultaneously and rapidly master all types of dual-use EDT technologies and implement them in the civilian and military fields. In addition to these efforts, a decision was also made to form a €1 billion NATO Innovation Fund to finance venture capital companies developing dual EDT in areas of strategic importance to NATO. Essentially, these decisions by the alliance are aimed at mobilizing European resources, primarily to strengthen American military power. Of course, the main efforts to field the latest technologies are being undertaken by the largest member nations.
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Weapons, Innovation, Emerging Technology, High-Tech Wars, and Military and Industrial Advantage
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

48. Freerider or Strategic Balancer? Austria vis-à-vis NATO and Russia. US – perspective on Austrian neutrality politics

Author:
Jason C. Moyer and Patrick Kornegay
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 highlighted the fragility of peace and security in Europe. The resurgence of war in Europe prompted a reassessment of the security postures of traditionally neutral countries. Norms on military spending and assistance have been shattered, leading to Finland and Sweden reversing decades of military non-alignment to join NATO. Even Switzerland is eyeing a strategic overhaul and is considering joint exercises with NATO (Revill, 2022). Despite Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO Austria remains committed to neutrality. The public debate on Austria’s strategic culture has remained largely the same and policymakers in Vienna have not changed their stance on NATO. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored Austria’s need to reevaluate its policy of neutrality and strategic approach vis-a-vis NATO and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Austria, and United States of America

49. Identity Continuities, Far-Right Acquiescence, and the “New” and the “Old”: Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession and Neutrality

Author:
Erik Isaksson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
With Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the number of neutral or non-aligned states in the EU has been reduced to three: Austria, Ireland, and Malta. How did Finland and Sweden’s shifts come about? What do these shifting neutrality – alliance membership constellations mean for the concept of neutrality, and for Austria’s position as a neutral state? This paper first examines the Finnish and Swedish debates pertaining to their own respective shifts, with particular attention to the far-right parties in those countries. It argues three things: first, contrary to most commentary, both the Finnish and Swedish policy shifts were underpinned by identity considerations, identities that remain largely the same under NATO membership as under non-alignment. Second, the far right’s acceptance of NATO membership has been a mix of opportunism and broadly engrained views of Russia. Third, par-ticularly in Sweden, neutrality has become seen as a thing of the past, and alliance membership as new and exciting, with possible implications for how neutrality is understood internationally. The paper then examines the state of the neutrality debate in Austria, with particular attention to the notion of neutrality as Austrian identity, the role of the FPÖ, and the potential risks for “neutral Austria” going forward. It concludes with a summary of the paper’s findings; a look at how neutrality in Austria, too, might increasingly be seen as an “old” concept; and by offering examples of how foreign policy con-cepts have been successfully reimagined in the past.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Regional Integration, Neutrality, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

50. The End of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Causes and Expected Consequences

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On November 7, 2023, Russia formally withdrew from the Convention on Arms in Europe (CFE), and in December, NATO suspended the agreement, leading to the collapse of one of the largest arms control treaties since the Cold War. The main goal of the treaty was to ensure security and stability in Europe through conventional arms control; through periodical monitoring, information was shared and trust was built between the parties. The new reality, emerging right after the cancelation of the agreement, has become the subject of active discussion in political and academic circles. Our paper aims to analyze the essence and meaning of the CFE agreement, the reasons for it being cancelled, and the expected results
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Russia, and Convention on Arms in Europe (CFE)
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe