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21. Two to tango: Russian-Iranian drone cooperation

Author:
Katie Fricke, Taylor Hankins, and Victoria Jones
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Iran and Russia are strengthening their partnership through collaboration on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) development and deployment. Iran’s drone programme presents a multifaceted challenge to NATO. The acquisition of Western technology through reverse engineering, coupled with Iran’s growing reputation as a drone supplier, enhances its military capabilities and global infl uence. Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine exposes vulnerabilities in NATO-provided defence systems and undermines eff orts to protect member states and partner countries. The proliferation of this technology to other state and non-state actors complicates NATO’s defence strategies. It is important for NATO to understand the drone warfare dynamics shaped by the Russia-Iran partnership. Analysing their innovations and integration into military doctrines is crucial for anticipating threats and developing countermeasures.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

22. Achieving Minimum Viable Cyber Resilience: A Leadership Top Ten “To-Do” List

Author:
Steve Hill
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I t is a reflection of the growing maturity of the cybersecurity industry that when the UK’s Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden, a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security, claimed in a speech to the November 2024 NATO Cyber Defence Conference that Russia “can turn the lights off for millions,” he was roundly criticized for hyperbole. Pragmatism has replaced alarmism as the driver for persuading the state and the C-suite to invest in cybersecurity. The world has neither ever been more complex nor more fast-moving. But that is not the same as saying that the world is more dangerous. The same inter-connectedness that creates supply-chain fragility also acts as a disincentive for governments whose priorities are primarily inward-looking (domestic stability and growth) to escalate conflicts to outright regional or global warfare that will likely undermine that domestic agenda. We see therefore brinkmanship and “grey conflict” taking place throughout the world. This includes targeted assassinations, arson attacks, disruption of underseas cables, drone activity, social media election influence campaigns, and all kinds of cyber-attacks.
Topic:
NATO, Cybersecurity, Gray Zone, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

23. PfP Enters its Fourth Decade: A Journey Undertaken with Azerbaijan

Author:
Rick Fawn
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to join NATO’s major outreach program, Partnership for Peace (PfP), upon its establishment at the Alliance’s summit in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994—a year that also marked the fifty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Alliance itself. This happened on 4 May 1994, when President Heydar Aliyev came to Brussels to sign the Partnership for Peace Framework Document, an event that took place about a year after he returned to Baku to begin pulling the country back from the edge of total collapse. Surely there was an element of deliberate sequencing involved, for the very next day after signing this document, on 5 May 1994, a final agreement was reached on a Russianbrokered ceasefire to end the First Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And only four months later, in September 1994, the negotiations on the Contract of the Century were successfully concluded that would facilitate the export westwards of Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbons rather than through Russia. This last development had been predicated—and again unlikely to be coincidental timing—by the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of its “Russia First” policy, which had elevated Moscow’s interests above those of other post-Soviet successor states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Azerbaijan

24. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

25. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:
Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

26. Navigating neutrality: How to find the best match between NATO and its four remaining neutral Western European Partners (WEP4)?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“Is small still beautiful?” (Gebhard, 2013). Is NATO still interested in the remaining four neutral countries in Europe (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland)? Can these WEP4 benefit from the Alliance’s ‘return to Europe’ in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? On the opposite, might the Alliance’s ‘war’ approach, with high focus on defence and deterrence, risk marginalizing them and evidencing “the limits of partnership for deterrence” (Aronsson & Swaney, 2022, 5)? Using the opportunity of the current geopolitical crisis as well as rapidly shifting alliance constellations, this paper aims to assess the current partnership between NATO and the WEP4 and to provide with a framework for its redefinition in light of the new security context in Europe. While keeping Trump.2 ‘after-shock’, the current turmoil of the new Transatlantic relation as well as NATO’s existential crisis on the way to its summit in The Hague in June 2025, as a background, this paper tries to isolate the question of the WEP4 from the ‘elephant in the room’ and to address it as a per se challenge.
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Neutrality
Political Geography:
Europe

27. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

28. NATO in 2025 and Beyond: Success and Peril Go Hand in Hand

Author:
Emiliano Alessandri
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an impressive string of achievements, including the recent enlargements to Finland and Sweden, NATO is poised to remain the dominant force in the post-Russian invasion European security landscape. Indeed, NATO’s self-styled description as “the most successful alliance in history” has never seemed more apt. (Stoltenberg, 2024). Yet questions and doubts about NATO’s future are to resurface in 2025, possibly forcefully so: how will the Alliance cope with the return of NATO skeptic Donald Trump to the White House? And will Europe be able to meaningfully step in to compensate for a less Atlantic-oriented America? As the rise of populist nationalism is a key factor behind both America’s returning temptation to go it alone (McConnell, Foreign Affairs, 2025) and the inclination of a growing number of European politicians to define strategic policy in narrow national terms, a crucial test for the coming years is to what extent a shared vision of Euro-Atlantic security is still possible – and what it would look like. The roles and agendas of both NATO and the European Union in the evolving political context remain open questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nationalism, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

29. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

30. Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental grid

Author:
Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The disconnection of the Baltic States from the Russian electricity system and their synchronisation with the Continental European Network is a key technological and geopolitical milestone. But safeguarding energy infrastructure remains vital. Operating within a shared electricity grid across multiple countries improves reliability. This arrangement allows transmission system operators (TSOs) to share resources, maintain a steady flow of electricity and handle mismatches between supply and demand more efficiently, helping to lower overall costs and ultimately benefiting consumers. However, geopolitical tensions have turned the Russian electricity system into a strategic paradox: the Baltic States, NATO and EU members are connected to Russia’s electricity dispatch system – a perceived security threat – for grid stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic States