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81. Private Finance and the Quest to Remake Modern Warfare

Author:
Michael Brenes and William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Official Washington is all in on promoting a new type of warfare based on military applications of AI and other emerging technologies. This determination was on full display last year when the Biden administration unveiled the “Replicator” initiative, an attempt to develop swarms of high-tech weapons systems at relatively low cost, and in numbers capable of overwhelming any potential adversary. But the history of so-called miracle weapons offers ample reasons to doubt Replicator’s supposedly transformative potential. Previous innovations, from the “electronic battlefield” in Vietnam to drone warfare in the Global War on Terrorism, did not, in fact, revolutionize war as we know it. Cutting-edge technology is no substitute for sound strategy or a realistic assessment of what military force can achieve. Unfortunately, so far, at least, these lessons from history have been no match for the boosterism of venture capital (VC) firms that pride themselves on disrupting industries and overturning conventional wisdom. While estimates of total VC funding of emerging military technology vary widely, it is clear that private investments in emerging weapons technologies are large and growing, driven by a handful of major Silicon Valley players, including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund and Andreessen-Horowitz. Companies backed by these firms, including Palantir, Anduril, and SpaceX, have already landed major contracts for weapons systems that incorporate next-generation technology. These firms and their allies in the Pentagon and Congress are determined to move full speed ahead on the development and deployment of weapons based on AI and other technological innovations, despite many unanswered questions about the costs and risks involved. While the bulk of Pentagon funding still goes to the “big five” contractors — Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman — VC-backed startups aspire to become the future of military contracting, and they hope that AI and other emerging technologies will be their ticket. These startups may prove to be more nimble and innovative than the bloated, top-heavy firms that currently dominate the arms industry, but they should not be allowed to operate with impunity. Congress must establish ground rules that prevent military startups from exploiting the procurement process in ways that pad their bottom lines while providing flawed systems — outcomes that we have seen all too often from their traditional rivals. What is most important, the rush to profit from emerging military tech cannot be allowed to short-circuit the careful scrutiny and wide-ranging public debate that must precede any move toward a brave new world of autonomous warfare in which human intervention in the kill chain is significantly reduced, if not eliminated. This brief offers policymakers a framework for ensuring that unsupported promises to “reinvent” warfare don’t exacerbate the cycle of corruption and waste that has all too often plagued the Pentagon’s procurement process, to the detriment of our safety and security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Finance, Grand Strategy, and Warfare
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

82. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

83. Subsidizing the Military-Industrial Complex: A Review of the Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) Program

Author:
Brett Heinz and Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
For nearly 30 years, an obscure Department of Defense (DoD) program has given Pentagon contractors a taxpayer-subsidized opportunity to influence U.S. military policy, creating massive conflicts of interest — yet little scrutiny. This research brief offers a first of its kind look at the DoD’s Secretary of Defense Executive Fellows (SDEF) program, which sends U.S. military officers to work at major corporations for a year, and then return and provide recommendations to the DoD for how it might improve. Military contractors benefit disproportionately from the SDEF program. Twenty-nine percent of all SDEF fellows have gone to the nation’s top 50 government contractors, with 15 percent going to the “big five” military contractors alone. None of the 317 fellows in the program’s history has ever served at a public sector institution. Decades of SDEF recommendations have consistently focused on reforms that would both benefit corporations and bolster their influence over the DoD, including calls for a greater share of the agency’s budget to be given to military contractors, reduced oversight, greater private outsourcing of agency responsibilites, and the loosening of international arms trade regulations. SDEF also keeps the revolving door between public service and private profit spinning. Forty-three percent of SDEF fellows went on to work for a government contractor at some point in their post-military career. In consistently failing to distinguish between what’s best for corporate executives and what’s best for the American people, the SDEF program represents a dangerous embrace of the military-industrial complex. Whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against the “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” whose “total influence” can be seen in “every office of the Federal Government,” the SDEF program explicitly advocates for it. SDEF has become a reliable method for corporations to disguise self–interested policy aspirations as helpful recommendations for DoD. If this program is to continue, DoD must act forcefully to address and minimize the unsettling conflicts of interest embedded within SDEF by: Enforcing a “one defense contractor per year” rule; Barring fellows from working in “government relations” roles; Exploring post–employment restrictions for former fellows; Re–balancing orientations away from undue corporate influence and political bias; Rationalizing program size.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military-Industrial Complex, and Militarism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

84. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

85. The Evolution and Ethics of Accountability Sanctions

Author:
Mark Ferullo
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
When Yahya Jammeh seized power in The Gambia in 1994 in a bloodless coup d’état, the young army colonel’s promise to eliminate corruption seemed disin- genuous. At the time, few Gambians could have anticipated how corrupt and cruel his rule would be. His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al-haji Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Babili Mansa, as he titled himself, brutalized his country for over two decades. In 2022, The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Com- mission exposed the extent of his violence, revealing that he commanded a hit squad that crushed dissent through murder, torture, and rape. His claim that he could cure AIDS with herbs might have been dismissed as the delusions of an out-of-touch autocrat were it not for the loss of life this lie caused during the medical trials.1 When the United States placed economic sanctions on Jammeh in 2017, most Gambians had little sympathy for their former leader, and few denied he deserved punishment.2 By then, Jammeh had fled the country, but the United States sanctioned him anyway. Jammeh joined 12 other individuals—including an organ-trafficking surgeon from Pakistan, a Guatemalan Congressman who ordered the killing of a journalist, and a Ukrainian police commander who oversaw the shooting of peaceful protestors in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity three years prior—as the first designations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. “There is a steep price to pay for their mis- deeds,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin at the time.3
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

86. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:
Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

87. At Home or Abroad, U.S. Firearms Should Not Fuel Violence, Instability, and Abuse

Author:
Allison McManus and Laura Kilbury
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Congress and the Biden administration should strengthen the U.S. Department of Commerce’s efforts to prevent American firearms from reaching adversaries and fueling global violence and rights abuses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Weapons, and Gun Violence
Political Geography:
Israel, Latin America, and United States of America

88. Retrospectiva, incógnitas y conjeturas: imaginando la OTAN tras la guerra de Ucrania

Author:
Carlos López Gómez
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Tras el final de la Guerra Fría, la OTAN experimentó una profunda transformación en cuanto a su composición, objetivos, acciones y alcance geográfico. La invasión rusa de Ucrania ha hecho que en los últimos dos años se haya concentrado de nuevo en las funciones tradicionales de la disuasión y la defensa de sus miembros. El artículo explora las variables y condicionantes de las que dependerá el papel de la OTAN en el futuro.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

89. Grand strategy: Alliances

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent. States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor. Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.” Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness. The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

90. Rethinking Africa Command

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy. Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent. AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand. Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Counter-terrorism, Africa Command (AFRICOM), and European Command (EUCOM)
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America