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1. A Three-year War and Four Lessons for Europe

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The tragic third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022 witnesses the start of diplomatic talks between Russia and the United States on the possible end of the conflict. Three years of large-scale, high-intensity war of attrition in Europe, with over a million dead or injured soldiers, offers at least four politico-military lessons for European countries, the EU and NATO. Lessons to bear in mind through this negotiation for the future not only of Ukraine but of the security of the whole continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

2. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

4. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:
Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

6. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. NATO Summits: Looking ahead from Washington to The Hague

Author:
Dick Zandee and Roman de Baedts
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The July 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC confirmed that the Alliance is ‘back to the future’. Upon its 75th anniversary NATO took important decisions to further strengthen its political-military power in response to a variety of security challenges, in particular to the threat posed by Russia. Increased defence spending is starting to deliver results in improving the military capabilities of European Allies. NATO’s partnerships with the EU and with countries in the Pacific have been reinforced. Yet, dark clouds are hanging above the Alliance on its way from Washington to its next Summit in The Hague (June 2025). First and foremost, the US presidential elections on 5 November cast a shadow over the transatlantic cooperation, or even worse, may result in a category 5 hurricane for NATO if Donald Trump re-enters the White House. American military support for Ukraine could stop completely, increasing the pressure on European Allies to do more, or to end their ‘whatever it takes’ rhetoric. To ensure the US contribution to NATO, European Allies will need to step up their defence efforts, even under Democratic President Kamala Harris. The American focus on the Indo-Pacific/China is raising questions about the European role and contribution to the Alliance as well as to the Asia-Pacific region. This policy brief will address these major issues for the Alliance on the road from Washington to The Hague.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

9. Retrospectiva, incógnitas y conjeturas: imaginando la OTAN tras la guerra de Ucrania

Author:
Carlos López Gómez
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Tras el final de la Guerra Fría, la OTAN experimentó una profunda transformación en cuanto a su composición, objetivos, acciones y alcance geográfico. La invasión rusa de Ucrania ha hecho que en los últimos dos años se haya concentrado de nuevo en las funciones tradicionales de la disuasión y la defensa de sus miembros. El artículo explora las variables y condicionantes de las que dependerá el papel de la OTAN en el futuro.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

10. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?

Author:
Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe