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601. The Case for Neutrality: Understanding African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Author:
Olayinka Ajala
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In March 2021, Russian armed forces began deploying thousands of military personnel and equipment near Russia’s borders with Ukraine, with another contingent deployed in Crimea which was annexed by Russia in 2014. The scale of this military build-up, which represented the largest force mobilisation by Russia since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, came as a surprise to Ukraine and a source of concern to other European countries and the United States. The unexpected stance of neutrality held by many influential African countries coupled with notable abstentions in several UN resolutions have rattled their Western allies. one of the biggest surprises for the West has been the reaction and stance of several notable African countries. Having enjoyed political patronage and goodwill from most countries in Africa for several decades, the United States and its Western allies expected a robust and strong castigation of Russia by their allies from the continent but were shocked by the response of some key African countries. While many such countries were quick to condemn the invasion and toed the line of the US and other Western allies, some notable countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Senegal refused to condemn the attack with some blaming the West and NATO for the war. This article explains why African countries are taking their current stance and the implications this might have on the international balance of power at the end of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. The reasons are linked to political, economic, and strategic considerations as well as contemporary grievances relating to the recent Covid pandemic and the treatment of Africans in Ukraine at the onset of the war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

602. How likely is it that Vladimir Putin will be able to Claim some sort of Victory in Ukraine? An Assessment based on Events from February - early November 2022

Author:
Alexander Hill
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper provides both an outline of the war in Ukraine to date and an assessment of the likelihood that Vladimir Putin’s Russian government will be able to claim a degree of success in its special operation in Ukraine if and when there is either a meaningful ceasefire or ultimately peace agreement between the warring powers. Russian success is defined in terms of the aims of the special operation’ as stated by Russian leaders on the eve of and during the course of the operation to date. The paper concludes that in all likelihood Russia will be able to claim a limited degree of success at the end of the special operation, even if that success will have come at a high cost.
Topic:
Vladimir Putin, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

603. ‘Now or Never’: The Immediate Origins of Putin’s Preventative War on Ukraine

Author:
Geoffrey Roberts
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
President’s Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a classic case of preventative war decision-making. The public record shows that Putin went to war to prevent Ukraine becoming such a powerful NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders that Kyiv would seek to forcibly regain control of Crimea and the Donbass. Putin foresaw a future war not just with Ukraine but with NATO and the assessed the risks to Russia of an immediate conflict were lower than the medium and long-term threat. The danger of Ukraine becoming a nuclear-armed state also had an important bearing on his final decision for war, as did his perception of the ultra-nationalist Kyiv government as an implacably ‘anti-Russia’ regime.
Topic:
NATO, Vladimir Putin, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

604. The Futility of U.S. Military Aid and Nato Aspirations for Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the U.S. has provided $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine. Continued security assistance prolongs the conflict and heightens U.S.-Russia tensions. Russia shares a 1,200-mile border with Ukraine and views the prospect of Kyiv joining NATO and basing U.S. and allied forces there as a threat. Russia will absorb significant costs—monetary and human—to prevent this outcome. A resolution in Ukraine that does not account for Russia’s concerns is unrealistic; therefore, U.S. and European leaders should account for them, starting with ruling out Ukrainian accession to NATO. Because of the risk of escalation, potentially to nuclear war, the U.S. should seek détente with Russia and support the establishment of a neutral, non-aligned Ukraine that serves as a buffer state between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Crimea, and United States of America

605. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition

Author:
Raimondo Lanza
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Italy’s new far-right government has been widely perceived as the potential weak spot of the anti-Kremlin European front following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: traditionally pro-Putin politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi are back in power. Yet, after Mario Draghi’s hawkish Euro-Atlantic government fell in July and Giorgia Meloni was looking forward to a probable victory, she immediately sided with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in a firm condemnation of Russia. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition Download 0.66 Mo Key takeways: Italy’s good relations with Putin’s Russia have not been the prerogative of a specific party. Political, economic and energy ties developed significantly with center-left and center-right governments alike. In line with most far-right parties in the EU, Salvini’s Northern League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy developed an appreciation for Putin’s neo-conservative regime while criticizing the EU and NATO for damaging Italy’s entente with Moscow. A potential reconciliation with Moscow goes against Italy’s national interest at this point. Russia accounts for only 1.5% of Italy’s exports against its Western partners’80%. Besides, the EU’s interconnected gas market requires a coordinated plan to overcome the energy crisis. Finally, the reconquest of Kherson by Ukraine in November makes support for the Kremlin political suicide. Meloni’s sudden pro-NATO shift has taken much of her electorate by surprise, while support for Ukraine is low in the country. Coalition allies Salvini and Berlusconi are ready to take advantage of this gap to weaken Meloni’s leadership. This is typical of Italy’s fragile parliamentary democracy. To avoid further disappointing her electorate, Meloni is rapidly satisfying other demands of theirs, on issues such as migration, family values and tax policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Right-Wing Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

606. CHOOSING AN ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE

Author:
Danielle L. Lupton
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
It’s been over two months since the crisis between Ukraine and Russia escalated with the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018. Since then, the global news media has devoted little attention to the conflict and references to the dispute from senior American and European policy makers have grown increasingly sparse. Despite an immediate public condemnation of Russia’s actions by the EU and NATO, European and American leaders have yet to coordinate a significant response. In short, the reaction has been underwhelming. This is problematic for three reasons. First, Russia’s latest act of aggression has been interpreted by many as a test of Western resolve and America’s commitment to its European allies. A failure to present a united front carries reputational consequences for the United States, the EU, NATO, and other European powers as well as their leaders. Second, the conflict in Ukraine is ongoing and the humanitarian consequences for civilians of this “forgotten” war—not to mention for Ukrainian democracy itself—are dire. Third, a lack of response to such acts of aggression could further embolden Putin, not just in Ukraine, but also in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Ethics, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

607. HYBRID WARFARE IS HERE TO STAY. NOW WHAT?

Author:
Kristina Hook
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
“Hybrid warfare is the new normal,” announced NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Antonio Missiroli at November’s NATO-Ukraine Forum in Kiev, Ukraine. He spoke these words at a fitting venue: Ukraine holds the dubious honor, along with Georgia, as the world’s two nations who have experienced the full gamut of Russia’s modern hybrid war tactics. These methods operate through a mixture of kinetic violence and subversive tactics to destabilize while avoiding retribution. Grounded in historic military strategies, a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007 signified an emerging form of political violence. The later invasions and annexations of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate the Kremlin’s particular hybrid strengths, including exploiting international law by couching their presence in these countries as humanitarian or anti-piracy.
Topic:
NATO, Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Syria, Montenegro, and United States of America