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42. The Children of War
- Author:
- Lila Roldán Vázquez
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
- Abstract:
- Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shaken the world order and has seriously disrupted international peace and security. The geopolitical impact, the causes of the war and the reasons invoked to justify the armed aggression have been widely discussed. Among the many facets of the war, there is one issue that requires special attention, since it constitutes, without a doubt, one of its most serious consequences: the death of hundreds of children and the abduction of thousands of them, in flagrant violation of humanitarian law. We aim to analyze the circumstances and consequences of these actions, which may constitute a war crime, and to evaluate their impact in the medium and the long term.
- Topic:
- Security, International Law, Children, Civilians, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
43. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties
- Author:
- Mamuka Zhvania
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
- Topic:
- Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
44. Freedom isn’t Free: A cost-benefit analysis of support for Ukraine
- Author:
- Bob Deen and Roman de Baedts
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- More than ten years after the Russian annexation of Crimea and two years after the large-scale invasion, Ukraine is still holding its own against Russia. This is not only due to the courage and efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, but also thanks to the extensive military, economic, and financial support packages from Europe and the US. For 2024, the government had allocated three billion euros for military support to Ukraine in the fight against Russian aggression and also pledged an additional three billion for 2025. Following the UK, France, and Germany, the Netherlands has entered into a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine to ensure long-term support. The recently released AIV briefing note and a recent parliamentary letter also advocate for sustained support. However, this Western support is no longer a certainty or uncontested. Particularly in the US, but also in some European NATO countries, calls to halt support to Ukraine are slowly gaining more traction. The American support package of sixty billion dollars was stuck in the House of Representatives for months, causing significant difficulties for the Ukrainian armed forces. President Biden has scaled back his rhetoric from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”. New commitments for new aid to Ukraine stalled at the end of 2023 (with a nearly ninety percent drop), while promised ammunition quantities fell far short. A warning from French President Macron that a Western military intervention should not be ruled out received little support from his foreign counterparts. Although the issue of Western ‘boots on the ground’ also requires further attention, it is not addressed within this memo, and ‘support’ encompasses both economic and material assistance, but without the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Following Putin’s ‘election victory’ in March, the Kremlin escalated its war rhetoric. Government officials are now openly discussing ‘war,’ whereas previously, using that word could land one in prison. This fits into the rhetoric where NATO, rather than Ukraine, is portrayed as the aggressor. Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the formation of two new combined arms Army Corps and accelerated the recruitment of new military personnel. Meanwhile, the Russian war industry is gearing up, producing large quantities of ammunition and equipment for the Russian war effort. The extensive import of artillery ammunition from North Korea and drones from Iran, among other capabilities, further complements Russian stocks. The consequences on the battlefield are already noticeable, as seen in the loss of the city of Avdiivka in February, and developments along the front since. Meanwhile, pressure on Ukrainian troops at the front is mounting. In an interview at the end of March, President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will have to cede more land if Western material support continues to be lacking. The renewed Northern front after the second Russian Kharkiv offensive is likely to further stretch Ukrainian defences and resilience in the near future. Despite overwhelming support in the Dutch parliament for continued support for Ukraine, there are nonetheless questions about the duration and scope of future assistance. The question regarding the costs and benefits of providing political, economic, and military support by the Dutch government is extremely relevant in this context. This constitutes more than a simple calculation where profit or loss is expressed in Euros. It also involves security risks and geopolitical and moral costs and benefits that cannot always be quantified in one-dimensional figures. It is therefore essential to adopt a broader understanding of costs and benefits, reasoned from the perspective of Dutch national security interests and the impact of international support on the outcomes of the conflict. An important consideration here is the extent to which support for Ukraine contributes to a military victory, a military loss, or a protracted conflict.
- Topic:
- Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
45. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
46. The Impact and Limits of Sanctions on Russia’s Telecoms Industry
- Author:
- Maria Kolomychenko
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- The West responded to Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine with unprecedented sanctions targeting its entire tech industry. While the sanctions on the telecoms sector have not had the intended destructive effect on Russia’s war machine, they have created significant negative side effects for its populace. Russian propaganda is using them to reinforce its narrative that “the West is fighting Russian citizens, and Vladimir Putin is protecting them.”
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Sanctions, Economy, Telecommunications, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia
47. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe
- Author:
- George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
48. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship
- Author:
- Mark Episkopos
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America
49. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order
- Author:
- Faisal Devji
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
50. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?
- Author:
- Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe