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271. Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock

Author:
Stefan Forss and Col. (Ret) Pekka Holopainen
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Nordic states, just as other regions of Europe which neighbor Russia, are engaged in an urgent reexamination of their security and defense posture. Events in Ukraine in early-2014 threw into sharp focus a local lack of capability following decades of drawdowns and focus on crisis management operations instead of territorial defense. After an unpleasant awakening, countries in the region have turned their attention to the heightened security risks they face and their lack of preparedness for them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia

272. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012)

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag). Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally. During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player. The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007. Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia. Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

273. Ensuring Deterrence against Russia: The View from NATO States

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s military actions in 2014 and 2015, particularly in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, have upended expectations among NATO members about their security and the future course of NATO-Russian relations. In response, many of the NATO states bordering Russia have argued for reinvigorating NATO’s deterrent capabilities after two decades of drawing down conventional and nuclear forces in the immediate post-Cold War era. At its 2014 summit in Wales, NATO agreed to a number of short-term measures to bolster the alliance’s conventional deterrent, dubbed the Readiness Action Plan. But as the standoff with Russia has continued, some analysts—particularly in the United States—have argued for additional deterrence measures, including in the nuclear realm. In response, researchers from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey travelled to the NATO front-line states of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Turkey to assess the perceptions of governmental and nongovernmental experts regarding how NATO should respond to Russian actions, with an emphasis on how nuclear issues should be addressed. Our research also included meetings with experts in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as a thorough review of existing literature in the field on issues such as Russia’s new military approach and US nuclear weapon policies—past, present, and future. It was conducted with the aim of providing analysis and recommendations to NATO states in advance of the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw. The following report highlights the key findings of this research, provides analysis on a country-by-country basis, and concludes with recommendations for consideration in Warsaw.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, Germany, North America, and United States of America

274. Russia's Arctic: A Necessary Space for Dialogue

Author:
Andrew Yerkes
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Over the weekend of November 21st, 2015, Russia flew 141 sorties over Syria, hitting 472 targets in eight different provinces throughout the country.[1] While the deployment of the Russian Air Force over Syria has been in full affect since last September, the events of November 20th proved to be unique. Two of the TU-160 blackjack bombers that participated in the weekend’s campaign took flight not from a base in southern Russia, but rather from Olenegorsk Airbase on the Kola Peninsula of the Russian Arctic.[2] The two bombers traveled southwest along the coast of Norway, skirting United Kingdom airspace, turning east through the straits of Gibraltar, and achieved their goal of firing cruise missiles on Syria from the eastern Mediterranean. After their mission was complete, they flew northeast over Iran and the Caspian Sea to their home base in Engles, Saratov Oblast, in Southern Russia.[3] In total, the flight lasted 16 hours, with the aircraft traveling 8,000 miles, while motivating Norway[4] and Britain,[5] among other nations, to scramble fighter jets in the process. Presumably, the Russians chose such a circuitous route along the edges of Europe to demonstrate its long range bombing capabilities. In doing so, the Russian Federation also showed the rest of the world that its capabilities might rival those of the United States, proving that Russia too could attack targets all throughout the world. This use of an Arctic airbase for active bombing missions also marks a turning point in history; not even during the Cold War did the Russians demonstrate Arctic-based military capabilities with such expansive reach.[6] While this mission did not focus on targets within the Arctic, the use of an Arctic base for active bombing missions draws attention to Russia’s military buildup in the region...
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Syria, Arctic, and United States of America

275. Expanding Nuclear Weapons State Transparency to Strengthen Nonproliferation

Author:
Jonas Siegel
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In the years since the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT nuclear weapons states have engaged in consequential transparency measures about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. The level of transparency thus far achieved, however, has proven uneven in terms of the types and amounts of information released and in terms of the frequency of those releases—and most importantly, has not contributed significantly to fulfillment of these states NPT commitments. Nuclear weapons states should reassess the scope of their transparency efforts to date and consider expanding the types of information that they reveal to provide international assurances and achieve gains in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper identifies particular steps that these states could take to fulfill the desire for greater transparency that move beyond declarations of the number and status of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In particular, it focuses on how transparency can be expanded about the operational practices and protocols that govern the day-to-day management of their military nuclear materials—their warheads, weapons components, and material stockpiles—and how transparency in this area would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, and France

276. How to Bring Stability to Bahrain

Author:
Brian Dooley
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
Washington needs a new strategy to help bring stability and reform to Bahrain. Although the smallest country in the Middle East, Bahrain exemplifies several of the major challenges for U.S. policy in the region: Sectarian tensions exploited by ISIS and other Sunni extremists and by Shi’adominated Iran to fuel conflict Economic troubles linked to public corruption and an over-reliance on oil revenues, exacerbated by sharply falling oil prices Stalled political reform leaving the root grievances of large scale public protests unresolved De facto U.S. support for an authoritarian status quo through a government that fails to deliver good governance and continues to deny basic rights and freedoms to its people, while courting support from Russia and other U.S. rivals Falling public support for the United States Major military assets, in Bahrain’s case the basing of the U.S. Fifth Naval Fleet, threatened by protracted instability
Topic:
Imperialism, Oil, Religion, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and Bahrain

277. The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View

Author:
Marek Madej and Robert Czulda
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The article ‘The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View’, analyses the role of NATO alliance in the contemporary security environment within the context of its priorities defined by new Strategic Concept 2010, having special attention on potential role of former newcomers and potential new members.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and United States of America

278. Why “no-fly zones” or “IS-free zones” are not a solution in Syria

Author:
Hrair Balian
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
There is a renewed push to establish “no-fly” and “IS-free” zones in Syria. An external military intervention to establish such zones, even with the good intention of protecting civilians, is likely to precipitate more chaotic fighting and further harm civilians. Instead, the international community should build a minimum consensus among the “Friends of Syria”, Russia, and Iran to accommodate the interests and concerns of Syria’s external stakeholders, and reconcile the existential fears of various communities and regime supporters in Syria with the aspirations of the country’s majority Sunni population. Once these fundamental issues are addressed, a political solution to the Syrian crisis will become possible.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Civil War, Military Strategy, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

279. Russia’s policy in the Middle East imperilled by the Syrian intervention

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The military intervention launched by Russia in Syria in September 2015 has altered the character of this protracted civil war and – quite remarkably – has both advanced and jeopardised Russia’s positions in the Middle East. This risky experiment in power projection constitutes a continuation of traditional Russian policy in this rapidly transforming region, but is also a departure from the strategy of careful manoeuvring aimed at exploiting the confusion in U.S. and European policies. Quite possibly the main drivers for this proactive move were either domestic factors or issues related to the confrontation with the West caused by Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. The present analysis, however, deals only with the Middle Eastern contexts, aims and consequences of this enterprise.
Topic:
Civil War, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

280. Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine

Author:
David Matsaberidze
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze the construction and transformation of the post-Soviet security perspectives of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the “near abroad,” quite often termed the “legitimate sphere” of Russian influence by high-ranking Russian officials. This inquiry covers the panorama of the foreign policy in post-Soviet Russia across the FSU, from the early 1990s through to the present, where Georgia and Ukraine’s independent and pro-Western orientation are the main issues securitized for the Russian Federation. Accordingly, the maintenance of territorial integrity has become a security priority for Georgia since the early 1990s and will most likely be Ukraine’s top concern after the Crimean occupation by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and the subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it could be claimed that post-Soviet Russian and Georgian/Ukrainian security strategy (following peaceful revolutions) represent a zero-sum game.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia