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Begin New Search Topic Geopolitics Political Geography Russia

1. Transformation of Turkish-Russian Relations: Rivalry and Cooperation in Eurasia and the Levant

Author:
Mustafa Aydin
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Relations between Russia and Türkiye have developed considerably since the end of the Cold War. What began as energy trade in the late 1980s evolved into cooperation in business, energy, construction, tourism, politics and even security. Behind the ever-expanding cooperation lies a mistrust fueled by historical enmity and regional rivalry that occasionally leads to confrontation. As the two countries seek to shape their competitive cooperation beyond the current geopolitical challenges and constraints of regional security and alliances, the question of whether they could find ways to advance their partnership is of paramount importance and has regional and global implications. This paper seeks to understand how they have managed their conflict-ridden past to develop a modus operandi in the post-Cold War world by proposing a new conceptual model, namely “competitive cooperation” or “coopetition”, to understand the relationship that developed over the last 30 years in different geographical regions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rivalry, and Competitive Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, Mediterranean, and Black Sea

2. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:
Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

4. Foreign Malign Influence Targeting U.S. and Allied Corporations

Author:
Daniel Byman
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
U.S. corporations are regular targets of foreign governments seeking to undermine the United States. These hostile states have both commercial and strategic motives, and they use disinformation, malinformation, and artificial promotion to tarnish the reputations of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations and the U.S. government should take steps to mitigate this threat, including improving corporate counterintelligence, building networks of advocates for use in crisis situations, and sharing more information on the scope and scale of the problem.
Topic:
Terrorism, International Security, Geopolitics, Corporations, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

5. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:
Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

6. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

7. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:
Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

8. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:
Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

9. A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, and Yuki Adachi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change. Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future. The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions. Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria. Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface. The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.
Topic:
Regime Change, Geopolitics, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and Eastern Mediterranean

10. Baltic States’ synchronization with the continental grid

Author:
Veronika Slakaityte and Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The disconnection of the Baltic States from the Russian electricity system and their synchronisation with the Continental European Network is a key technological and geopolitical milestone. But safeguarding energy infrastructure remains vital. Operating within a shared electricity grid across multiple countries improves reliability. This arrangement allows transmission system operators (TSOs) to share resources, maintain a steady flow of electricity and handle mismatches between supply and demand more efficiently, helping to lower overall costs and ultimately benefiting consumers. However, geopolitical tensions have turned the Russian electricity system into a strategic paradox: the Baltic States, NATO and EU members are connected to Russia’s electricity dispatch system – a perceived security threat – for grid stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Electricity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic States