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31. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

32. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

33. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

34. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

35. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

36. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

37. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

38. Soviet vs. Post-Soviet Russian Disinformation

Author:
Todd Leventhal
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
An intriguing and important question for students of disinformation and propaganda is: how do Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda differ, why, and what does this indicate for the future? I believe an unbiased analysis reveals that: there is a great deal of continuity between the goals and techniques of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda. the new digital media environment offers unprecedented ways for new Russian disinformation and propaganda instruments, including RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik, to influence foreign audiences. the reelection of Donald Trump would offer unparalleled opportunities for Soviet influence on US international policy at the very highest level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia and Soviet Union

39. A New Face, But an Old Tactic: History Offers Clues on Stopping Russia’s African Advance

Author:
Herman J. Cohen
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The conflict in Gaza has taken center stage in global affairs. But while the eyes of the world are drawn to the Middle East, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been working in the background to expand Russia’s influence in Africa. His tactics are drawn from the Soviet Union’s Cold War playbook. He offers military support, now via the mercenary Wagner Group, to unstable regimes across the continent, helping them retain power in exchange for diplomatic allegiance and natural resources. If the US does not meet this issue head-on, the consequences for African nations and the international community could be dire. US policymakers should look at the history of the Soviet Union’s diplomacy on the African continent– a period I witnessed personally as a diplomat on the ground– for clues on how to effectively respond to and combat this growing issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, History, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Africa and Russia

40. A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe