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91. Can and Will Germany Be a Viable Partner in a U.S. “Pushback” Strategy Towards Russia?

Author:
Hannes Adomeit
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Joe Biden, as presidential candidate, is on record as having stated that “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our − our security and our alliances − is Russia.” As president, he asserted, “the days of the United States rolling over in the face of Russia’s aggressive actions are over.” The first months of his tenure in office have given some substance to such claims and confirmed that the new administration aims at containing and counteracting Russian malign behavior and to impose costs so as to affect the Kremlin’s risk calculus. Can Germany − and most likely will it − be a viable partner in such a U.S. strategy?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

92. Russian Crisis Behavior, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkey?

Author:
Richard Giragosian, David G. Lewis, and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan initiated a war to retake the disputed Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts of Azerbaijan held by Armenian forces.1 The forty-four-day war resulted in a resounding defeat for the Armenian forces and only halted with the acceptance of a Russian-imposed agreement for a cessation of hostilities on November 9-10, 2020. Although the war was initially expected to unfold as a war of attrition with an eventual stalemate based on the advantages of terrain of the Armenian defenders, reality differed in terms of duration, intensity, and outcome.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

93. Russia’s Corona Diplomacy and Geoeconomic Competition: A Sputnik Moment?

Author:
Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Russian science, technology and innovation (STI) system is geared towards global geoeconomic competitiveness and is based on three S’s: state control, sovereignty and self-sufficiency. State-sponsored biotechnological innovation is a component in Russia’s geoeconomic strategy: in the case of Sputnik V, Russia’s commercial and strategic objectives are intertwined. The Russian state’s close involvement in development, marketing and propagating Sputnik V – as well as its readiness to skip standard practices in order to make headway with the product – create well-founded distrust towards it in Western markets. In the emerging and developing markets, Sputnik V suffers from insufficient manufacturing capacity. In many countries, only a fraction of promised doses have been delivered, and setting up local manufacturing capacity outside the EAEU takes time. The European states should pay more attention to linkages between Russian innovation policies and its foreign, security and military policies. For Russia, these are not separate silos but build upon and support each other.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

94. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

95. Reviving Pak-Russia Relations: Implications for CPEC

Author:
Hafeez Ullah Khan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Moscow and Islamabad have experienced many ups and downs throughout the past, but recent Russia Pakistan military and economic cooperation can be comprehended as significant progress in their relationship. As CPEC is a signatory sign of the Sino-Pak relationship, this paper seeks to analyze the need for Russia to be a part of CPEC as its inclusion in the project will also be significant for the regional integration and it will, even more, strengthen the relations of Beijing, Islamabad, and Moscow that will eventually build a new bloc. In addition, by giving the theoretical framework of complex interdependence theory, how Russia and Pakistan can work together in this project. Also, if Russia becomes a part of CPEC, how it can be helpful to eradicate all the apprehension which have been imposed by different entities to defame this project.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, Europe, and Middle East

96. The young and the restless: Europe, Russia, and the next generation of diplomats in the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Joanna Hosa, Tefta Kelmendi, and Pavel Slunkin
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Young diplomats in Eastern Partnership countries are optimistic and pro-European. Many of them want the EU to become a bolder geopolitical actor. They often criticise their countries’ leaderships and prefer to trust institutions rather than individuals. Most young diplomats tend to link success in foreign policy with domestic reforms. Russia is losing support among them, but it maintains a significant presence on the ground in their countries. Young diplomats see China as an attractive economic player but a controversial political partner. They would like to maintain good relations with the US, but the confrontation between Washington and Moscow forces some Eastern Partnership countries to take the Russian side.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Reform, Partnerships, and Youth
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

97. Push back, contain, and engage: How the EU should approach relations with Russia

Author:
Carl Bildt, Gustav Gressel, Kadri Liik, and Nicu Popescu
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
In recent years, the EU has based its Russia policy on modest sanctions, periodic offers of engagement, and a careful accommodation of Russian strategic sensitivities. But the Russian approach to the EU has been much less calibrated, involving deliberate attempts to disrupt the bloc’s influence in large swathes of its neighbourhood. The EU should push back against, contain, and engage with Russia, bracing itself for rocky diplomatic interactions with the country. The bloc should reframe how it speaks of human rights and democracy, while developing closer security and military links with select neighbours in the Balkans, its eastern neighbourhood, and the Middle East and Africa. The EU should continue to selectively engage with Russia’s government and society through multilateral institutions, simplified visa procedures, and dialogue with a wide spectrum of organisations.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Multilateralism, and Strategic Accommodation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

98. TINA for Putin – Or is there an alternative?

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
EU Relations with Russia hit the news headlines this week. The visit of EU High Representative Josep Borrell, launched in a constructive spirit, ended up in a diplomatic catastrophe. The Navalny saga and the recent weekly demonstrations all over Russia have been commented on at length in the Western press. What is going on in Russia? How to interpret the recent surge of aggressiveness of theRussianauthorities? Aretheprotestsjusta small hiccup in a stable Putin regime, or is something more going on? To be clear, this is neither the end nor, probably, the beginning of theendofaregime.Buttheeventsarefarfrom insignificant. In this article I look at the ongoing events from three angles: what is the Putin regime up to? What is behind the recent wave of protests? And what are the implications for the EU’s relations with Russia?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

99. The EU and Russia: A New Foreign Policy for the “Carcass”?

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Without any irony: the decision of High Representative (HR) Borrell to go to Moscow in early February was courageous and correct. The discussion on EU-Russia relations at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22 February and the conclusions of that meeting were a success. But that does not mean that the EU should not drastically improve its foreign policy game.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

100. Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?

Author:
Rob Lee
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
During March and April 2021, the Russian military conducted a large-scale buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media sites showing Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The United States Department of Defense’s spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Russian buildup was even larger than during the peak of the fighting in 2014. Ukrainian officials estimated that the Russian military buildup would reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops with more than fifty-six battalion tactical groups (BTG). United States defense officials gave a lower estimate that 48 BTGs had moved into the border area and 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders. To put this in perspective, the Russian military has approximately 850,000-900,000 servicemembers in total, and 168 constant readiness BTGs, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. If these estimates were accurate, the Russian military massed roughly 10-15% of its total manpower and approximately one third of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. In response to the buildup, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all called their Russian counterparts to discuss the situation. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status to its highest level. The buildup also coincided with an increase in fighting along the line of contact, with at least 36 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in 2021. The movement of Russian forces led to intense speculation about Russia’s intentions, including fears of a large-scale ground invasion. However, U.S. intelligence indicated that a large-scale ground invasion was unlikely because of a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics necessary for such an operation. Likewise, EUCOM commander General Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks. On April 22, after the end of a large-scale exercise at the Opuk training area in Crimea, which included an amphibious landing, a helicopter air assault operation with two companies, and a multi-battalion airborne operation with more than two thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the winter verification tests for the Western and Southern Military Districts had been a success and the troops would return to their permanent bases. However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and other heavy equipment, would remain at the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise in September. Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly whether all of the equipment and units deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside of Crimea would also return to their bases, nor how those units were employed during the snap inspection. Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, U.S. defense officials said that Russia had removed only “a few thousand” troops and that there were approximately 80,000 servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, despite Shoigu’s order for most of those units to return to their permanent bases by May 1. Thus Russia can still escalate rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the immediate threat of a serious escalation of fighting in the Donbas appears to have passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America