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62. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
63. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises
- Author:
- Anna Maria Dyner
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus
64. Eritrea as an Informal Representative of the Pro-Russia Forces in Africa
- Author:
- Jędrzej Czerep
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 2 March condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although this voice was isolated, Eritrea has become the informal representative of a larger group of states on the continent critical of the West. The possible enlargement of this pro-Russia bloc will depend on the financial and military ability of Russia to remain active in Africa.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, and Eritrea
65. Turkey's Role in the Russian-Ukrainian Negotiations
- Author:
- Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on 29 March in Istanbul demonstrates that Turkey is assuming the role of an intermediary. Its policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is backed by the majority of the Turkish public, which gives President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more freedom to manoeuvre. Acting as an intermediary in the conflict may allow Turkey an opportunity to start improving the strained relations with the European Union and the United States.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine
66. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold
- Author:
- Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America
67. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative
- Author:
- Vasif Huseynov
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
68. How Russia Fights
- Author:
- Nicolò Fasola
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
69. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations
- Author:
- Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
70. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank
- Author:
- Marc Ozawa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine