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121. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

122. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

123. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Author:
Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

124. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis in the research of power distribution in Eastern Europe

Author:
Erwin Metera
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article presents Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, which as a scientific method can be an important tool for studying the distribution of power in Eastern Europe, supporting the assumptions of structural realism with an element of quantitative research. This region, as a place where spheres of influence and the ensuing economic and potentially military conflicts meet, is an area where the knowledge of the most precise distribution of power may be a crucial element in the analysis of the genesis of conflicts, the shifts in power distribution during their course, as well as in the prediction of future flashpoints. Being the first attempt to correlate Systemic Geopolitical Analysis with the issue of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the paper contains a hypothesis that Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is a research method that enables an effective analysis of the geopolitical reality in the region because of: 1) the conflicts occurring in the system due to differences in power distribution; 2) the nature of the components of power, measurable by the means of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. Confirming the above hypothesis, the article points to the economic aspect, linked to the Russian natural gas exports, and the military aspect, by taking into account the characteristics of contemporary tensions in the region, which reduce the role of supra-systemic reserves.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Gas, Conflict, Exports, Regional Politics, and Structural Realism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

125. The American Multi-Domain Operation as a response to the Russian concept of New Generation Warfare

Author:
Tomasz Wójtowicz
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
America’s unipolar balance of power created after the end of the Cold War is inevitably coming to an end. The dynamic economic growth of the People’s Republic of China, lasting uninterruptedly since the 1980s, the reconstruction of spheres of influence by the Russian Federation, the world war on terrorism with the accompanying costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, economic crises systematically weakening the economies of Western countries in 2001, 2007 and 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic – these are just some of the many causes of geopolitical changes. Parallel to the weakening position of the United States, countries such as the Russian Federation are increasingly boldly challenging the current balance of power, provoking armed conflicts and destabilizing countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to present the American Multi-Domain Operation concept as a response to the Russian concept of new generation warfare by which the country successfully led to the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the political destabilization of Ukraine. The main research problem resulting from the assumed goal was to answer the following question: what is a Multi-Domain Operation and how do the United States intend to compete and win in the armed conflict taking place in Central and Eastern Europe with the Russian Federation? The following research methods were used to solve the research problems: the method of cause-effect and institutional-legal analysis, method of examining documents, and the method of analysis and criticism of literature. The monographic and comparative methods were also used. However, the main role was played by deductive reasoning which enables the identification of facts based on an in-depth analysis of source data. Taking into account the preliminary research, the author proposed the following research hypothesis: a Multi-Domain Operation is another American operational concept describing the security environment, and the Russian and American way of war. The USA will achieve victory in a possible armed conflict by locating and neutralizing the enemy’s anti-access – area denial capabilities, and then destroying its forces in the disputed area.
Topic:
Power Politics, Conflict, Multipolarity, Russia-Ukraine War, and New Generation Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

126. Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Aleksejeva and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. To research this report, the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified recurring pro-Kremlin narratives over two timeframes: the 2014–2021 interwar period and the seventy days leading up to the 2022 invasion. For the interwar period, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets over the seventy-day pre-invasion period. To understand how these narratives evolved, we catalogued them by themes, sub-narratives, and relationships to pre-invasion escalatory events. This allowed us to produce a timeline of false and misleading Kremlin narratives encompassing the year leading to the invasion, showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war.
Topic:
News Analysis, Conflict, Narrative, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

127. tarr Forum: An Update on Russia's War Against Ukraine

Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
What is the status of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

128. Russian Attacks May Prompt Increased Refugee Flows from Ukraine

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia is continuing its intensive attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. These are deliberate actions that violate international humanitarian law and are aimed at breaking the morale of Ukrainian society. Power outages mean that many towns and villages are not only without heating but also without water. Further devastation and the difficulty of repairs could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe. Most of the population will try to survive the winter in their current residences or by resettling in smaller towns. Increased refugee movement across borders, especially to Poland, is also possible.
Topic:
Refugees, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

129. Geopolitical Consequences of the War in Ukraine

Author:
John Rennie Short
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new world order that has developed from the bipolar world of 1945 to 1991 and the brief unipolar interlude from 1991 to 2008. This new world order is dominated by a relatively declining U.S. and an emerging Sino-Russo anti American alliance, a renewed sense of the West as a counter to authoritarian regimes and reversal of the globalization trends of the past thirty years. We are moving into a deglobalizing, multipolar world.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

130. Geopolitics, Geography an the Ukrainian Russian War

Author:
Serdar Ş. Güner
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The trigger of the Ukraine-Russia war is the enlargement of NATO, essentially a Western exploitation of Russian weakness emanating from Soviet Union’s dissolution. Russia has communicated her reactions to the enlargement peacefully until the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The second wave of enlargement coming from the direction of neutral states such Finland and Sweden originates from Finnish and Swedish fears of being the next targets of Russian military campaigns. NATO enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality and become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion efforts has led to a further expansion through war. However, the exclusion of and warring with Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large alliance to balance China. The West should understand that it is not wise to create incentives for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Conflict, Geography, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine