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41. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

42. U.S. foreign policy, Cold War history, and history of capitalism: An interview with Fritz Bartel.

Author:
Fritz Bartel and Asensio Robles
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
It is an exciting time for Cold War historiography. Long gone are debates that were once central to the field, such as those about the origins of the Cold War and the responsibilities for its emergence. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Cold War for our present, some historians now argue, was not its outbreak but its end. Why did the Eastern bloc collapse in the late 1980s? How was it possible for this collapse to occur without triggering major international and domestic turmoil (Romania’s case notwithstanding)? And why did neoliberalism prevail over other economic paradigms in the new post-socialist democracies? Answering all these questions has become an urgent task in light of today's war in Ukraine, the continuing rise of populism, the growing delegitimization of liberal democracies, and the exhaustion of neoliberalism and globalization as reliable agents of growth in post-industrial societies. These are precisely the three big questions that Fritz Bartel sets out to answer in The Triumph of Broken Promises: The end of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2022). Bartel’s book offers a picture of the end of the Cold War that has at its core a particular interpretation of the nature of the East-West conflict. Eastern communism and Western capitalism shared the same base: the Cold War was a politico-economic contest between two industrial ideologies over how best to ensure the continued social and economic well-being of their own populations. As such, both systems were largely successful during the golden years of post-war economic growth. However, if Western capitalism ultimately won the Cold War, Bartel argues, it was because Western liberal democracies proved to be much more flexible and capable of breaking their socio-economic promises in an increasingly globalized world than the Eastern Bloc after the 1973 oil shock. It was not geopolitics that ultimately decided the end of the Cold War, but rather the different strategies that East and West chose in a world increasingly shaped by oil, international finance, the exhaustion of extensive economic growth, and globalization. I had the pleasure of interviewing Bartel on December 5, 2023. What follows is a summary of our discussion about the origins of The Triumph of Broken Promises, its place in today's literature on U.S. foreign policy and Cold War history, and the lessons this book might have for our turbulent times.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, Interview, and Historiography
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. Trump’s tinderbox: US politics and the next war in the Balkans

Author:
Adnan Ćerimagić and Majda Ruge
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over recent years, Serbia’s government and Serb nationalists elsewhere in the Western Balkans have increased their revisionist agitation in the region. They recently adopted an “all-Serb declaration” that seeks to overturn the post-Dayton settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and claims Kosovo as an inseparable part of Serbia. Though some international observers have criticised the Biden administration for its concessions to Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, it deserves credit for containing Belgrade’s ability to realise its ambitions and preventing two worst-case scenarios: the disintegration of the Bosnian state and armed escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. That fragile status-quo would come under significant threat from a new Trump presidency in the US. Among other risks, his second administration may seek to reverse sanctions that have constrained separatist appetites among Bosnian Serbs and to revive dangerous proposals for a Serbia-Kosovo land swap. Peace in the region is at stake. Particularly in the event of a Trump victory on 5 November, the EU should prepare a package of new deterrence mechanisms that it can apply in the Western Balkans independently from the US and spoiler member states like Hungary. And in either eventuality, it should take more responsibility for stabilising the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Serbia, Balkans, North America, and United States of America

44. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

45. International Order Strategies: Past and Present

Author:
Aaron McKeil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
At an important time in foreign policy planning, a new era of “strategic competition” widely noted by policymakers in Washington and allied capitals has produced a new wave of strategic thinking and evolving strategic practices aiming to maintain or modify “international order”. This collected research report aims to clarify how strategies for international order are being understood and formulated today, and how this strategic thinking and planning differs from past eras of strategic competition, toward an assessment of its policy implications today. Dr. Aaron McKeil convenes the International Orders Research Unit at LSE IDEAS. He is Academic Director of the LSE Executive MSc International Strategy and Diplomacy Programme at LSE IDEAS. He holds a PhD International Relations from the LSE. His forthcoming book with the University of Michigan Press explores the collapse of cosmopolitan globalism and rise of strategic competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

46. Has NATO Enlargement Enhanced US National Security?

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
What effect has NATO enlargement had on US national security? Few issues have been as central to US foreign policy over the last three decades. Since the mid 1990s, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus has held that enlarging the alliance was critical to US national security and the only practical manner of consolidating what President Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” This position is so well-established in the United States’ political culture that several rounds of NATO expansion proceeded without meaningful debate in the US Senate. Indeed, occasional efforts by some policymakers to question the merits of enlargement have been met with accusations of isolationism, or of “working for Vladimir Putin”. By this logic, not only does US national security benefit from an enlarged NATO, but were the United States to stop expanding NATO the sky would be likely to fall. In contrast, this paper makes the case that NATO expansion has been a net loss to US national security and ought not to continue. Note that I focus on US national security, not whether enlargement may have benefitted other actors. Drawing on over a decade of archival research into the origins and consequences of enlargement, I advance three specific arguments. First, claims that NATO benefitted US national security by anchoring the alliance, ensuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and promoting democracy are almost certainly overstated. Instead – second – the alliance has generated a host of problems for the United States by encouraging allied cheap riding and reckless driving, limiting US strategic flexibility, and contributing to the collapse of relations with Moscow. As a result, future enlargement to states such as Ukraine is not in the United States’ interest. The remainder of this essay proceeds in three sections. First, I review and critically evaluate the purported benefits of NATO enlargement. From there, I discuss the variety of problems enlargement has posed to US national security. In both of these sections, I pay particular attention to the consequences of enlargement itself and to how alternative policy options may have affected US interests. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of enlargement at a time when Ukrainian accession in particular dominates policy debates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

47. When I was a Vice Consul in Nuevo Laredo

Author:
Edward Marks
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
When FSOs gather in congenial surroundings, even very senior and well-known diplomatic personalities often begin their favorite stories with “Now, when I was a vice consul in Tegucigalpa….” Time passes and now I tell such stories. When I was a vice consul in Nuevo Laredo, I was introduced to the time-honored responsibility for the “Care and Protection” of American citizens in foreign climes. It is the most retail of a diplomat’s responsibilities. American consulates in Mexico do a lot of this sort of business, what with the flood of American tourists seeking foreign exotica across the border.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America

48. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition

Author:
Joey Ching Aracena
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. ​ Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

50. Tunisia at the Crossroads: What Role for the United States in a Multipolar World?

Author:
Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The United States, in recognizing the limits of its traditional “bloc-building” approach, faces the imperative to adapt to a multipolar reality. Embracing multipolarity as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy could pave the way for more flexible and effective international engagements. In today’s global landscape, the clear-cut divisions of the Cold War era have given way to a complex web of challenges and a multipolar world marked by competitive dynamics. This shift demands a nuanced approach from the United States, a move away from seeking dominance through large-scale coalitions against adversaries like China, since such strategies risk escalating tensions in a world that lacks the bipolar stability of the past. In this global reconfiguration, the role of “swing countries” like Tunisia gains unprecedented importance. In the midst of North Africa's political upheaval, countries like Tunisia stand at a critical crossroads, evaluating the merits of their longstanding alliances with Western nations against the enticing prospects of deepening relations with Eastern powers, particularly Russia and China. Against this backdrop, the United States has yet to articulate a definitive stance on engaging with nations such as Tunisia, where authoritarian tendencies are on the rise and anti-Western sentiments increasingly pronounced. This ambiguity raises important questions about Washington’s strategic approach in a region caught between historical affiliations and the lure of new partnerships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
North Africa, North America, Tunisia, and United States of America