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21. NATO in 2025 and Beyond: Success and Peril Go Hand in Hand

Author:
Emiliano Alessandri
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an impressive string of achievements, including the recent enlargements to Finland and Sweden, NATO is poised to remain the dominant force in the post-Russian invasion European security landscape. Indeed, NATO’s self-styled description as “the most successful alliance in history” has never seemed more apt. (Stoltenberg, 2024). Yet questions and doubts about NATO’s future are to resurface in 2025, possibly forcefully so: how will the Alliance cope with the return of NATO skeptic Donald Trump to the White House? And will Europe be able to meaningfully step in to compensate for a less Atlantic-oriented America? As the rise of populist nationalism is a key factor behind both America’s returning temptation to go it alone (McConnell, Foreign Affairs, 2025) and the inclination of a growing number of European politicians to define strategic policy in narrow national terms, a crucial test for the coming years is to what extent a shared vision of Euro-Atlantic security is still possible – and what it would look like. The roles and agendas of both NATO and the European Union in the evolving political context remain open questions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nationalism, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

22. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

23. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:
Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

24. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

25. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. A New Security Order for Europe

Author:
Pierre Vimont
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Europe's security order has collapsed in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict. The very idea of rethinking this particular European framework raises doubts when faced with a Russian regime unable to admit the futility of its imperial dream. However, Europeans cannot afford not to think about the future of stability in Europe in response to the Russian question, which has been troubling our continent for too long[1]. Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine has put an end to the European security order as it was established in 1975 in Helsinki. By launching his "special military operation", the Russian President has gutted the whole edifice that had lasted as well as it could since its foundation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

28. Ukraine's European Aspirations

Author:
Myroslav Marynovych
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Ukrainians have always been aware of the fact that they belong to the European cultural sphere. As Serhiy Plokhyi, professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, points out, "...times change, ideologies change - liberalism is replaced by national-communism... or the idea of human rights emerges. But Europe remains a constant as an example of that something else that is par excellence necessary for the survival of the Ukrainian national project." Before Ukraine was absorbed by Muscovy in the 17th century, the fact that Ukrainian lands were then part of the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) opened up a natural cultural window onto Europe. It was thanks to this lively cultural exchange (albeit not without its problems) that “Ukrainian Baroque” yes amongst other trends, came to be. However, once Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire, new ideas from Western civilisation only reached Ukraine by way of the Russian language, thereby condemning Ukrainian culture to secondary status. Politically, as an independent subject, Ukraine simply disappeared from European consciousness. The emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 offered Ukrainians new opportunities to re-establish direct cultural and political contacts with Europe. Immediately, the need to "return to Europe" emerged in Ukrainian public debate. Politically, this had an initial consequence: Ukraine found itself at the end of a fairly long queue of states waiting to join the European Union "club". It was assumed that these states would join as they went along (legislative reforms, economic modernisation, the fight against corruption, etc.). It was not all plain sailing, nor was it without its pitfalls, but the vector of the European vocation (and accession to the European Union) in Ukraine's development was undoubtedly the most powerful, even if it was rivalled by the attachment of eastern Ukrainians to Russia's cultural and political landscape. The impact of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, primarily affected the pro-Russian part of the country. It is members of this population who now constitute the majority of refugees and displaced persons. It is their vision of the world that has been turned upside down against a backdrop of atrocities and genocidal crimes committed by the Russians. Accession to the European Union and NATO has therefore become the sine qua non of Ukraine's aspirations, as confirmed by several documents of national importance. In addition to historical memory and purely cultural preferences, security priorities are now clearly visible. Ukraine has begun to implement the European Union’s recommendations and to adapt its legal framework to that of Europe. Any campaign against European integration, or simply questioning the need for it, would be perceived by Ukrainian society as a betrayal of national interests. Recently, however, opinions within the European Union have diverged somewhat. Alongside those States that were shocked by the brutality of the Russian aggression and have declared their solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their willingness to accept our country into the Union, there are also States such as Hungary and Slovakia that consider Ukraine's accession to the European Union to be premature, or even wrong. We can be both optimistic and pessimistic. Optimistic, because European leaders and the majority of Member States are increasingly in favour of Ukraine's accession. Pessimistic, because the chances of Ukraine's accession remain slim as long as the European Union retains its current decision-making rules. As war continues, the reactions of Ukrainian society to the reticence of Hungary and Slovakia and to the blocking of the borders by Polish, Slovakian and Romanian farmers have remained discreet. Ukrainians are aware that their country's accession to the European Union would be a long-term solution, and that a certain amount of restraint is therefore advisable. However, since nobody knows the future, in unfavourable circumstances, resentment and therefore rancour might erupt in Ukrainian society. This is why it would be useful to examine this situation not only from the point of view of the formal concordance of conflicting economic and political interests, but also from a broader perspective.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

29. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

30. Has the time come for European defence?

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
European defence has been a key issue since at least 1948, with the Treaty of Brussels between France, the United Kingdom and the three Benelux countries. At the time, the spirit of the signatories was still to guard against the threat posed by Germany, which was still fresh in people's minds (following on from the Franco-British alliance treaty of Dunkirk in 1947). But it was also increasingly aimed at responding to the threat of the USSR, which was tightening its iron grip on the eastern half of the European continent. As we know, this treaty was soon superseded by the Washington Treaty creating NATO, which is still, to this day, the political and military framework for European defence, coupled with that of the United States. Although the Brussels Treaty eventually disappeared, it survives, notably through the collective defence clause incorporated into the European treaties by the Lisbon Treaty. The idea, the project and the hope of a European defence are still alive, although they have not yet been realised. The war in Ukraine has changed the situation in several ways. Firstly, it places the question of war and peace firmly centre stage in Europe, an issue that had never completely went away, despite the end of the Cold War; however, it is now back at the top of the political agenda. Secondly, the war has led to profound unity in the response of the countries of the European Union to Vladimir Putin's open aggression against Ukraine, and the European Union has asserted itself as a major player complementing NATO and the United States. Finally, it raises the question of whether, should the United States change its policy on Ukraine following the presidential election in November 2024, Europeans would be in a position to take over assistance to Ukraine and move towards a genuine collective defence. To address this issue, it is necessary to take stock of European defence, with its achievements and limitations, and to reflect on the conditions under which a shift towards a genuine European defence could be envisaged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe